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 1 
 
We need to do away with the pretence that cessation of 
hostilities amount to peace. A firm foundation for 
sustainable peace cannot be land unless and until full 
comprehension and mastery of the conflict has been realised. 
This requires more than mere conjectures or intelligent 
guesses as to their fundamental causes.1 
  
                                 INTRODUCTION 
The persistence of conflict in Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, DRC and Ivory Coast has 
made Afro-pessimism fashionable. Moreover, it indicates Policy-makers, academia 
and the international community are still grappling how to prevent, manage and 
resolve African conflicts with little or no success. Consequently, a major enquiry 
facing Africa remains how to find a lasting solution to violent conflicts on the 
continent. Fundamentally, this challenge imposes an urgent need for a conceptual 
understanding of the origins, recurrence and persistence of African conflicts.  
 
This study is a contribution to literature on the debate around the genealogy, 
conceptualisation and protractedness of African conflicts. Against this backdrop, the 
study is steeped around the following questions: What is the cause of conflicts in 
Africa? Why have some of these conflicts endured despite the perceived benefits of 
globalisation, Bretton Wood institutions and efforts to manage and resolve them?  
 
I do not pretend to arrive at a sacrosanct conclusion on the these questions because, 
any attempt at summation of issues in conflict resolution is an ambitious undertaking 
that warrants time, resources and the shifting contours of contemporary politics. 
Using Ivory Coast2 as a case study, though the lessons might be suggestive rather 
than conclusive, I nevertheless challenge some stereotypes and accepted views of 
African conflicts. As a consequence, this study is an attempt to follow up, qualify and 
                                                 
1
 Adedeji, A. (ed) 1999. Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts. The Search for Sustainable 
Peace and Good Governanace. Zeb Books ltd London 1999 pp9 
2
 Ivory Coast and Cote d’Ivoire will be use interchangeably. 
 2 
elaborate on the debate around African conflicts in an era of democratisation and 
globalisation against a backdrop of limited state capacity.3  
 
Independence in Africa was supposed to bring peace and prosperity, a kind of Seek ye 
first thy political kingdom and all things else shall be added unto you. But almost four 
decades down the road, while many parts of the world have moved towards greater 
political and economic stability and co-operation, Africa has become the forgotten 
continent,4 a metaphor for instability and economic deprivation.5 Reminiscent of 
Chinua Achebe’s things fall apart the center cannot hold6; albeit the fact that the end 
of Cold War was supposed to reduce tension, and pay out a “peace dividend”7 amidst 
the third wave of democratisation,8 hence insinuating Fukuyama’s end of history.9 
 
Between 1960 and 1990, there was 80 violent change of government in the continent. 
By the end of 1998, only 39% of 48 SSA countries enjoyed stable political conditions 
and good governance, 23% faced political crisis and turbulence while 38% were 
engaged in armed conflict or civil strife.10 In the Horn of Africa, Sudan has spent 36 
of its 45 years of independence fighting, which has generated some 4 million 
displaced people and 2 million deaths.11 Somalia is effectively a failed state with no 
central government, Ethiopia and Eritrea are in the brink of resuming fighting after a 
4 years break. In Central Africa, Africa’s “First World War”, the conflict in the 
                                                 
3
 Ajulu, Rok. “Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance in a Globalising World Economy: The Struggle for 
the Soul of the Continent” Review of African Political Economy. Vol.28 No.87 (March 2001), pp27-42. 
For a succinct distinction between state capacity and strength, see Migdal, Joel. Strong Societies and 
Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press, 1988. 
4
 Mkandawire, Thandika & Soludo, Charles, Our Continent Our Future: African Perspective on 
Structural Adjustment. New Jersey: Africa World Press, Inc. 1999 
5
 Any attempt at generalisation of African polity will surely miss the rich diversity of the continent and 
strengthen Afro-pessimism. This is not a generalisation of the situation in Africa because clearly Africa 
is on the right path I most stress, except for some pocket cases of economic and political instability. 
The World Bank report (2005) shows that African economies are growing at an average of 4%, while 
the economies of Europe and US are growing at a rate of 3%. In fact Walter Kansteiner former US 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs once declared that Africa will produce the next Asian 
Tigers. 
6
 Achebe, Chinua. Things Fall Apart. Oxford: Heinemann 1986 
7
 Ajulu, R. (2003) “African Security: Can Regional Organisations Play a Role?” In Field, S (ed) Peace 
in Africa: Towards a Collaborative Security Regime. Institute of Global Dialogue. Johannesburg 2004 
8
 Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization In The Late Twentieth Century. Norman: 
University Of Oklahoma Press, 1991 
9
 Fukuyama, Francis. The End Of History And The Last Man. New York: Free Press, 1992 
10
 Adedeji. A, op. cit. pp 4 
11Lind, F. and Sturman, K. (ed) 2002. Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa’s conflict. Institute of 
Security Studies. South Africa.2002. p187 
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Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) which intensified in 1996, still drags on today 
pitting old allies against each other. The Rwandan conflict which lasted for almost a 
decade, witnessed the death of 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus within a hundred 
days.12  The jury is still out on the viability of the peace process that ended Burundi’s 
close to a decade civil war. Congo Brazzaville is witnessing episodic skirmishes with 
the Ninja militia; Central Africa Republic and Chad have effectively lost the 
monopoly of legitimate violence over their territory. Cameroon and Nigeria are still 
trying to find a common ground over the disputed Bakassi peninsula.13 In Southern 
Africa, It took three decades before the belligerents in Angola were brought to their 
senses thanks to the death of Savimbi. Mozambique is slowly recuperating from an 
excruciating two decades of civil war. South Africa has “effectively” turn the corner 
with the fall of apartheid. Zimbabwe is at a latent stage of conflict. Conflict was 
averted in Mauritius thanks to a popular uprising. In East Africa, the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) while flirting with peace proposal is still bent on pursuing a 
brutal bush war against Musevini’s regime despite an international warrant for Joseph 
Kony and his henchmen. In Kenya, political elites are struggling over the spoils of the 
state. Zanzibar is proving to be a nightmare for Tanzania. In West Africa, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone are in the process of reconstruction; Guinea is teetering with internal 
strife; Mauritania and Togo escaped overt conflict; while the Casamance separatist in 
Senegal are flirting with a peace proposal.  Surprisingly, most African conflicts are 
intrastate (civil wars, low intensity wars, new wars) but for few exceptions like the 
Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute over Badme, Cameroon-Nigeria border dispute over 
Bakassi.  
 
In spite of numerous multilateral and bilateral efforts to arrest these conflicts, peace is 
more apparent than real. Thirteen peace accords were signed by belligerents during 
the Liberian civil war, but failed to be implemented during a six years period.14 Four 
peace accords where signed in Angola, eleven in Somalia and five in Sudan. These 
initiatives where dead letters once parties left the negotiating table. Kotze argues, 
                                                 
12
 Adelman, Howard .2001. “The Use and Abuse of Refugees in Zaire” Refugee Studies Review No 27 
(1) 2001 pp9 
13
 Ikome, Francis Nguendi. “The Inviolability of African Colonial Boundaries: Lessons from 
Cameroon-Nigeria Border Conflict.” Institute for Global Dialoque. Occasional Paper No. 47. 
Novermber 2004 
14
 Adebayo, Adekeye. 2002. Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leon and Guinea-Bissau. 
Lynne Rienner: Boulder and London  
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research posits that most peace agreements in Africa become dead after five years of 
their negotiation.15 It seems then that once a conflict starts in Africa, it becomes a 
long drawn battle with incidental cessation of hostilities, negotiated ceasefire, peace 
agreement and national elections, which are in reality an adjournment of the conflict. 
In essence, while these accords have become canons for national reconciliation and 
government of national unity, they carried within them germs of conflict.16  
Therefore, signing peace agreements is just a polite way of ending meetings, and 
going back to the warfare business without wasting time. Ironically, most belligerents 
do negotiate a peace agreement before it falls apart. This seems to suggest that, the 
reasons might not necessarily be their irreconcilable differences but something else.  
 
A number of studies have tried to explain why implementing a negotiated peace 
agreement is sometimes very difficult. Any attempt grounded in African conflicts as a 
unit is doom for failure. Every African conflict has its own dynamics and specifics. 
Basically, the theoretical and scholarly debate can be divided into three channels of 
causation: Diplomacy scholars ground their arguments around procedural and 
substantive elements of an agreement. For example, William Zartman argues that the 
timing/ripeness of negotiations is imperative.17 Development economists look at the 
economic and social wellbeing of the society and belligerents. For example, Paul 
Collier using cost-benefit analysis argues that war itself is a means of accumulation so 
why stop it. Political scientists turn to analyse the power structure and balance 
between belligerents. For example, Adekeyo Adebayo argues that peace agreements 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone failed because of the proliferation of militias, weapons, 
ethnic rivalry and looting.18 Horowitz and Stedman argue that in ethnic conflict not all 
leader want accommodation.19 Arend Lijphart argues that some negotiations fail 
because of their exclusivist nature.20 Professor Ajulu and Professor Adedeji argue that 
                                                 
15
 Kotze, D. “Issues in Conflict Resolution.”  African Journal on Conflict Resolution. Vol. 2, No.2, 
2002, pp.77-100 
16
 Nanga, Jean “A ‘Civil War’ that is French and Neo-Colonial” International Viewpoint. IV364 - 
February 2005 
17
 Zartman, I. W. Ripe For Resolution: Conflict And Intervention In Africa. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989 
18
 Adebayo, A. op cit  
19
 Horowitz, D.  Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley, University of California Press 1985; Stedman, S. 
J. “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes.” International Security Vol. 2. No 2 fall 1997 pp5-53 
20
 Lijphart, Arend. 1991. “The Power Sharing Approach” In Montville, Joseph (ed) Conflict and 
Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies. Lexington, Mass: Lexington Press 490-510; Arend, J. 1969 
“Consociational Democracy.” World Politics No 21, pp. 207- 225 
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it will be a futile exercise if a negotiated settlement does not take into consideration 
the causes of the conflict. Grounded in Ajulu and Adedeji’s argument, this study 
seeks to ascertain failure to fully implement the Linas Marcoussis accord which has 
been acclaimed as the framework for peace in Ivory Coast.                     
              BACKGROUND OF IVORIAN CONFLICT 
 
                  If unity had not been in our heart, we should have  
                 discovered it in our head.21 Houpheut Boigny  
The war in Ivory Coast is one demonstration of the emptiness of the promises of a 
post Cold War peace dividend, globalisation and democratisation in Africa. It drew in 
factions and rebel groups from other African wars; the remnant armies of defunct 
neighboring regimes, the usual crowd of international profiteers, would-be 
peacemakers and humanitarians. It is closely connected with armed conflicts in 
several neighboring countries: Liberia, Sierra Leon and Guinea-Conakry. 
 
Afro-pessimism seems to have been vindicated when Ivory Coast, a former French 
colony often describe as a beacon of hope amidst poverty and conflict prone West 
Africa descended into chaos in 2002. Post independent economic development 
grounded in liberal and outward looking economic policies vis a vis inward lookin-
import substitution policies of other African countries-produced an annual growth rate 
of about 7%; until economic crisis engendered by fall in world prices of cocoa in the 
1980s.22 Economic prosperity translated into political stability within the context of a 
one party state based on Boigny’s policy of inclusiveness and integration of non-
Ivorian population.  
 
Ivory Coast as the leading cocoa producer in the world and the second coffee 
producer on the continent relied heavily on foreigners (especially from Burkina Faso 
and Mali) to keep the economy alive. Boigny’s administration granted land access to 
anybody willing to make something out of it irrespective of their origins, Ivorian and 
foreigners alike. Boigny argued that la Terre appartient a’ celui qui la met en 
                                                 
21
 Zolberg, Aristide. R One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1964. pp.74. 
22
 Hecht, R. M “The Ivory Coast Economic Miracle: What Benefit for Peasant Farmers? Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 21 1, March 1983, pp. 25-53 
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valeur.23  French firms given the long-standing Ivorian-French partnership injected 
huge funds in the economy.24 
 
However it seems Raúl Prebish, Hans Singer and Samir Amir where proven right 
when Ivory Coast descended into economic chaos because of fall in world prices.25 
The economy was too dependent on primary production without much consideration 
on strengthening industralisation through import substitution. Thus when the fall in 
commodity prices came, the economy could not withstand its vulnerability. The 
already dire situation was compounded by a huge external debt burden accumulated 
during the boom years and austerity measures forced on the government in the name 
of structural adjustment. Within this context, social unrest and agitation for political 
liberalisation intensified amidst the deteriorating health of le veux (Boigny). 
 
Boigny responded to the crisis by instituting multiparty “democracy” in 1990 and 
nominated Ouattara a northern technocrat from IMF as his Prime Minister; with a 
mission of revamping the economy. Boigny defeated Gbagbo a self confessed 
socialist and leader of Front Populaire Ivorien (FPI) in the 1990 presidential elections 
in which foreigners were allowed to vote. In a bid to finance the economy, Ouattara 
instituted resident permits for foreigners.  
Following the death of Boigny on 7 December 1993, Ivory Coast was plunged into a 
protracted power struggle, which generated intense political instability and culminated 
in December 1999 in a coup d'état, led by General Robert Gueï, who overthrew 
President Henri Konan Bédié.  
The post-Houphouët-Boigny power struggle was exacerbated by controversies over 
nationality laws and eligibility conditions for national elections, particularly 
presidential elections, which resulted in the disqualification of some prominent 
political leaders, including Alassane Ouattara of the Rally of the Republicans (RDR). 
Ironically, Boigny’s children from his first marriage would have been barred from 
                                                 
23
 Land belongs to those who put it into use. My translation 
24Ajulu, C., “Côte d’Ivoire: A Regional Quandary” in Global Insight, Issue No.37, September 2004, 
pp.2.  
25
 Amin, Samir. Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique Of The Theory Of Underdevelopment. 
New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974. 2; Prebish, Raúl 1950. Economic Development in Latin 
America and its Principal Problems. New York. United Nations Economic Commission for Latin 
America 
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contesting such elections since their mother was from Senegal, let alone Laurent 
Fologo, long time Secretary General of the PDCI married to a French woman.  
Bédié was overthrown in a bloodless military coup in 1999 and Gueï was called to 
lead the junta. He promised to clean Ivorian politics and organise new election. But 
sooner than later, he activated ivoirité to exclude Ouattara from contesting the 2000 
presidential election. The heated dispute over the results of the election led to violent 
clashes between partisans of the two main contenders - General Gueï and Laurent 
Gbagbo. Subsequently, the Supreme Court declared Mr. Gbagbo the winner. Calls 
from RDR for Gbagbo to organise new election was refused and this led to clashes 
between partisans of RDR and FPI.  
Despite an alleged coup attempt in January 2001, municipal elections were held in 
March 2001. The municipal elections marked an important turning point for Ivory 
Coast as all political parties were allowed to field candidates for the election.26 
Ouattara’s RDR party won the largest number of communes/councils. Following the 
election, President Gbagbo pursued a policy of national reconciliation and sought to 
decentralise State authority by organising provincial elections.  
In October 2001, the President organised a forum for national reconciliation to 
address the issues that had polarised Ivorians. The forum culminated in a summit 
meeting attended by President Gbagbo, Mr. Bédié, General Gueï and Mr. Ouattara on 
the 22 and 23 January 2002 to settle their differences and consider recommendations 
of the forum. The four leaders subsequently issued a final communiqué in which 
among other things; they agreed to oppose undemocratic avenues to power and to 
professionalise the security forces and improve their conditions of service. They also 
agreed to create a broad-based national electoral commission and a national body to 
address the question of land ownership and a government of national unity. 
Unfortunately, not all of the recommendations of the forum for national reconciliation 
were implemented.27 
                                                 
26
 This move was not really meant at reconciliation because, though a decentralisation law exist in 
Ivory Coast, real power is exercised by the president and metropolitan councils are invariably 
controlled by government delegates appointed by the president. 
27United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minuci/index.html 
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On the 19 of September 2001, around 800 discontented former exiled military 
personnel simultaneously led coordinated attacks on government and military 
facilities. The coup failed but left many dead including the Minister of Interior-Emile 
Doudo, General Gueï and his family.28  Having failed to capture Abidjan the rebels 
fully established themselves in Bouake and Korhogo in the north and center of the 
country and called themselves Movement Patriotique Cote d’Ivoire (MPCI).29  
Government efforts to recapture these areas proved futile. 
 
Around 600 French forces stationed in Ivory Coast quickly intervened and on 28 
September the first of a series of peace negotiation was initiated by Togolese 
President Eyadema under the aegis of ECOWAS. Two other rebel groups, the Ivorian 
Popular Movement for the Great West (MPIGO) and the Movement for Peace and 
Justice (MJP) emerged and controlled the western part of Ivory Coast. The three rebel 
groups merged and re-hat themselves as the Forces Nouvelle (FN). 
 
In January 2003, after failed attempts in Lomé and Accra, the French brought all the 
parties to the negotiation table in France at Linas-Marcoussis. They reached a 
consensus and signed the French-brokered Linas-Marcoussis Accord. They agreed to 
a power-sharing and government of national unity. They also agreed to revisit issues 
of citizenship, nationality and land tenure laws. In July 2003, the Forces Nouvelle and 
government forces signed an end-to-the-war declaration, vowing to work along the 
lines of Linas Marcoussis and the implementation of the DDR program.30 
 
Amidst claims of insecurity and sabotage by Gbagbo, FN walked out of the 
government of national unity in March 2004. On the 9th of November, government 
forces tried but failed to reunite the country. Their effort cost the lives of nine French 
peacekeepers. France reacted by wiping out the Ivorian air force, this intensified anti-
French feeling in the country.  
 
Amidst anti-French rhetoric, the French were no longer considered neutral in the 
crisis, and President Thabo Mbeki was mandated by the African Union (AU) to 
                                                 
28Ellis, S., Grono, N., “Now it’s happening in the Ivory Coast”, www.crisisgroup.org, April 2004, pp.1.  
29
 Lamin, A., “The Conflict in Côte d’Ivoire: South Africa’s Diplomacy, and Prospects for Peace.” 
Occasional Paper No.49, Institute for Global Dialogue, Johannesburg, August 2005    
30
“Armed Conflict Report-2004” in www.ploughshares.ca, January 2005, pp.6. 
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negotiate the implementation of the Linas Marcoussis accord. Mbeki submitted a five-
point roadmap to the parties in December 2004 that included disarmament, the 
restoration of a power-sharing government and new legislation to eradicate rows over 
citizenship and ethnicity.31  Parties to the Ivorian conflict convened in Pretoria in 
April 2005 to negotiate an end to the crisis within the framework of Linas Marcoussis. 
All parties to the conflict declared their commitment to the peace process. Squabbles 
over the composition of the independent electoral commission and eligibility laws 
meant that elections could not be held on the 30th of October. The rebels accused 
President Mbeki of impartiality and refused to acknowledge him as a mediator. For 
the time being the UN has extended Gbagbo’s mandate for a year and a powerful 
Prime Minister appointed pending elections next year. 
Aim/Objective 
An effective management and resolution of a conflict presupposes an understanding 
of its nature and causes. Conflicts can be frozen by UN and AU peacekeepers for 
instance, but a true and lasting resolution warrants a thorough understanding of how 
the conflict emerged, how it was perpetuated and sustained. Accordingly, the aim of 
this research is to debunk the perversity that surrounds the genealogy of Ivorian 
conflict and the problems around the implementation of Linas Marcoussis Accord.  
 
Ivorian conflict like most African conflicts is conceived and conceptualised as ethnic, 
religious and factional; thus conflict management, resolution and peacebuilding 
initiatives have been steeped around this paradigm.32 This study argues that, the slow 
implementation of the Linas Marcoussis accord is as a result of the fact that, the peace 
initiative did not deal with the structural causes and nature of the Ivorian conflict (it 
tackled the symptoms and not the disease).  
 
Couched within the prism of political economy, this study further argues that, one 
cannot comprehend the roots and nature of Ivorian crisis thus a sustainable framework 
for peace; unless we examine the history and creation of the Ivorian state, its position 
in the commonwealth of states and the effects of post-Cold War neo-liberal policies or 
what is often referred to as globalisation, especially on state power and 
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poverty/human security. The conflict in Ivory Coast was ignited by contestation over 
resources. In other words, the conflict has its roots in the scarcity of resources and the 
absence or failure of institutions that guarantee equitable distribution. Taking 
cognisance of the fact that the lack of indigenous capital means control of the state is 
control of economic resources.   
 
The argument that the Ivorian conflict is rooted in ethnic animosity is seductive, but 
does not resist a closer look. This study views ivoirité33, which has been acclaimed as 
the root cause of the Ivorian conflict as a nationalistic rhetoric for political 
mobilisation in the absence of an economic alternative grounded in the contradictory 
nature of the Ivorian state. In essence, this study aspires to examine the political 
economy of Ivory Coast, how it has engendered conflict and how the conflict has 
generated its own dynamics that help sustain it, making peace and security a mission 
impossible. 
Rationale 
An in-depth study of the nexus between causes of conflict and implementation of 
negotiated peace agreement is timely for various reasons. The choice of Ivory Coast 
as a case study is deliberate. How come a country that has been acclaimed as a model 
for development in Africa suddenly occupies the 1st position on Foreign Policy’s 
Failed State Index Ranking?34 In relative terms, Ivory Coast is definitely rich in 
natural resources; it is the world leading cocoa producer, it has abundant coffee and 
oil has just been discovered. Hence, is Ivory Coast another sad example of the 
paradox of plenty or what is popularly called the resource curse?  
 
Literature on Ivorian conflict is still very limited. Two channels of causation have 
attempt explanation to the Ivorian crisis with no consensus. Sociologists and some 
journalists argue that the Ivorian crisis is an ethic conflict grounded in relative 
deprivation between the north and south.35 Political scientists argue that it is a power 
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struggle among elites over resources amidst economic collapse.36 A major 
contribution this study brings to this literature is the fact that in a holistic manner, it 
tries to synthesis both arguments within the context of political economy stretching 
back to the dynamics of Ivorian colonial state. Any analysis of the Ivorian conflict 
that is not grounded in Ivorian colonial state and its transition to independence misses 
the most interesting phenomenon of half a century of Ivorian politics. Politics is a 
process grounded in cause and effect due to chain of events. Therefore, any attempt at 
unreasonable delineation will create a disjuncture. Methodologically, can the expected 
result from this work be different from others keeping in mind that the point of 
departure is a succinct analysis of Ivorian colonial state? Do we need to comprehend 
African colonial states in order to understand contemporary African politics?  
 
It has become a sacrosanct rule within the realm of conflict management and 
resolution to think of negotiated settlements, cease fire agreements, government of 
national unity, national reconciliation and national elections as the sustainable way to 
deal with conflict. The conventional approach to 'early warning' and preventive 
diplomacy is premised on the assumption that conflict can be averted by reacting to its 
proximate rather than its structural causes.37 This study is important because it 
sustains and highlights an alternative to conflict resolution grounded on addressing 
the structural causes of conflicts. Professor Ajulu and Adebayo argue that most of the 
literature on conflicts in Africa has been centered on conflict resolution, cessation of 
hostilities, negotiated ceasefire, peace agreements and national elections, which are no 
more than makers in the conflict resolution continuum.38 Professor Adedeji opines 
that, we need urgently to move away from mere mouthing of peace-making platitude 
into the realm of proactive empirical research to understand the causes, mastering and 
comprehending conflicts.39  
 
This study is significant and timely because, it affords us a lens through which to 
examine the sustainability of hybrid conflict management and resolution techniques in 
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Africa. The presence of France, ECOWAS, AU and UN in Ivorian crisis is a classic 
example of how division of labour in conflict management and resolution can be 
engendered. This study thus affords us the opportunity to examine the challenges and 
prospect posed by such endeavors. Most importantly though AU forces are not in 
Ivory Coast, one can by inference assess the strength and capacity of the African 
Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) to deal with conflicts in Africa. 
 
When is intervention legal and legitimate? By analysing French intervention in Ivory 
Coast, the study promises not only to help francophone Africa conceptualise and 
rethink it relationship with France, it helps policy makers and scholars understand the 
dilemma face by former colonial masters as they pursue their interest in their former 
colonies, especially countries in the Gulf of Guinea. 
 
Since globalisation seems the dominant paradigm that negotiates inter-state 
intercourse, it is worth mentioning that it has created huge income (poverty) disparity 
between states and within states. Neo-liberal economic policies upon which 
globalisation is grounded does not only exposes African economies to shocks of the 
global markets, it engenders marginalisation which encompasses economic 
deprivation of citizens, transnational exploitation of weak states by Multinational 
Coperations (MNCs); the erosion of state capacity and legitimacy, traffic in arms and 
privitisation of security. This study is important because it extends and sustains the 
debate around the effects of neo-liberalism (Structural Adjustment Programs, 
Globalisation) on the economy and capacity of Africa states thus their vulnerability to 
conflict. 
 
The revelation of Liberian, Burkinabe, and Angolan presence in the Ivorian conflict 
raises many interesting issues around the present regime of conflict prevention and 
management in Africa. When should a crisis be treated as a regional conflict? Should 
conflict prevention and resolution measures be engaged in a holistic manner 
encompassing the various states in the region?  
 
Finally, this study is essential to post-conflict peacebuilding in Ivory Coast. The 
present political climate in the country offers a unique opportunity for leaders and 
citizens of the country and the international community, to critically reflect on the 
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country’s political future and fundamentally address questions on the economy, 
contradictory nature of the state, the concept of ivoirite, its relations with France, 
global trade imbalances and durable peace. Questions of development and democracy 
must be taken seriously. If the country does not examine its past and cast an eye on 
the legacy left by Houphouët-Boigny, it risks endless strife and a serious identity 
crisis. 
Research Questions 
Within the context of this research, three central questions will be addressed.  
 Did religious and ethnic hatreds cause the crisis in Ivory Coast or has a 
politically motivated conflict assumed religio-ethnic tones? 
 What have been the salient features of the conflict and how have parties to the 
conflict sustained their war effort? 
 What have been the bases of international mediation and why have they failed 
so far? 
Literature Review  
Research on Ivorian conflict is still in its infancy, taking into consideration the fact 
that the conflict is young and rages on. The review in question does not comprise a 
distinct stand-alone body of literature, but rather it is a review of an extensive 
multidisciplinary literature grounded in the causes of Ivorian crisis and African 
conflicts in general. Literature on the Ivorian crisis is invariably the outcome of 
workshops, country visits and press coverage. 
 
The literature on Ivorian conflict is a repertoire of different but not necessarily 
diametrically opposed perspectives. There seems a general consensus that the Ivorian 
crisis is rooted in citizenship grounded around the concept of ivoirité. Authors have 
approach how citizenship has unravelled Ivorian society from two broad perspectives 
though most are steeped in qualitative research: political sociology and political 
economy. 
 
Generally, political economists argue that the present crisis in Ivory Coast is as a 
result of contestation over declining resources and the absence of mechanism of 
equitable distribution in a society where state power is the only mode of 
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accumulation.40  They argue that any analysis of the Ivorian crisis through ethnicity is 
a narrow construct of the crisis which will surely miss the political and conceptual 
understanding of ivoirité’. In essence, ivoirité can best be understood from an 
instrumentalist perspective as opposed to an essentialist perspective grounded in 
nationalism. Issues of identity do not exist in a vacuum. Identity in its very nature is a 
political question, determining who gets what, how and when. Consequently, identity 
becomes imperative in situation where resources are scare and access to them depends 
on state power.  
 
Che Ajulu, Lamin Abdul, Jessica kohler, Gberie Lansana, Addo Prosper, McPherson   
and International Crisis Group compellingly argue that, politics of exclusion is at the 
heart of the Ivorian crisis. They agree that, Boigny glued the country together because 
he was able to pacify different ethnic cleavages through patronage.41 Ajulu and ICG 
point out that nationalistic sentiment against Boigny’s immigration policy were 
insulated because people who lost out in the competition for arable land were 
compensated with government positions-function publique. The above authors argue 
that Boigny was able to maintain this model because of available resources. Once the 
country started to show economic strain during the 1980s, contradictions of the 
Boigny’s model were exposed. Ajulu and Kohler argue that with the opening up of 
political space, ethnicity became the only mode of political mobilisation because of 
the absence of economic alternatives, though politicisation of ethnicity is far from 
unique to Ivory Coast.42 
 
Eros Comfort and Temin Jonathan concur with the above mentioned authors but 
position their argument around the leadership qualities of Boigny. They observe that 
the rebellion in the country is an indication of a far more deep-seated national crisis in 
the country. The conflict in the country reflects the non-existence of a visionary 
leadership in Ivory Coast coupled with abuse of power. By providing a comparative 
analysis of Boigny’s administration and his successors; they argue, despite the fact 
Boigny was not a democratic leader in the traditional sense, Ivory Coast was better off 
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under Boigny because of his sensitivity to matters such as diversity and inclusion 
grounded by dispensation of rewards. On the contrary his successor happed on 
exclusionary policies by constantly playing ethnic card which affected and disrupted 
social interactions between ethnic and religious groups.43 But these authors seem not 
to appreciate the distinct socio-economic context within which these leaders operated. 
Definitely, the availability of resources did afford Boigny more manoeuvring space 
than his predecessors.  
 
Though the above analysis of ivoirité through the prism of political economy might 
shape our understanding of the conflict and the strategy of the various belligerents, the 
literature is nevertheless littered with limitations. First, the literature fails to provide 
concrete analysis on how Ivorian colonial state affected post-colonial politics. How 
Ivorian colonial political economy created different social class, societal interest, 
indigenous accumulation and how these in turn affected governance. Is the present 
Ivorian state an extrapolation of the colonial state which was skewed in favour of the 
metropole through the consolidation of power on a dependent bourgeois? And most 
importantly, what informed macroeconomic policies in Ivory Coast? 
 
Nanga and Lumumba have tried to explain how ivoirité unravelled Ivorian society 
through the prism of Structuralism which is an off shoot of Marxist neo-
dependency.44 Nanga argues that attempts to understand ivoirité in culturalism as has 
been the case in Rwanda and Burundi is misleading. He argues that ivoirité is a 
reactionary response to the structural crisis of neo-colonialism. He posits that a strong 
correlation exists between the development of neo-liberalism and the spread of 
xenophobia, chauvinism and hatred for those who are perceived different and other 
forms of exclusion.  Nanga and Lumumba argue that in the case of ivoirité, the 
ingredients were produced by colonial system, then by the ascendant phase of neo-
colonialism-indirect or reformed colonialis- of which Ivory Coast was really the 
"model.”45 
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The principal limitation of Lumumba, Nanga’s work and structuralism in trying to 
explain African conflict; is the fact that, the thesis does not seem to appreciate how 
internal dynamics have shape Ivorian polity. Though it is easy to criticise the west and 
colonialism/neo-colonialism for Africa’s ills, such arguments should be grounded on 
an apprecial of the role of Africans or Ivorians in shaping their political destiny. The 
role of kleptocrats and big men in plundering the continent has merely facilitated 
exploitation by the metropole. 
 
Two weeks after the rebellion broke out in September 2002, France’s then Foreign 
Minister, Dominique de Villepin, explained to the Senate in Paris: “The present crisis 
is the result of traditional tensions. Ivory Coast, with its north-south split, is an ethnic 
and religious patchwork that has been in crisis since the death of Houphouët-
Boigny.”46 de Villepin’s conceptualisation of the Ivorian conflict in primodialist terms 
means that, the crisis is a weird breakdown of social order, thus anarchy; reminiscent 
of the work of Kaplan. Kaplan in his works the “Coming Anarchy” and “The Ends of 
Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century” argues that African conflicts are 
essentially a result of a hobbesian state of nature-nasty, brutish and short.47 Hence, 
Conflicts in Africa are short of any moral underpinnings, but can be understood in 
terms of untamed natural forces. According to Kaplan, “physical aggression is part of 
being human, only when people attain a certain economic, educational and cultural 
standard is this trait tranquillised.”48  Kaplan further points out that, the lack of 
education and land hunger among the youth who have become “loose molecules in an 
unstable social fluid” is one of the principal causes of the Sierra Leonean conflict.49  It 
is against this backdrop, Kaplan suggest that the only the west can help Africa is to 
stay clear of its business and close it borders. It thus seems the recents restrictions on 
migration in Europe and the racial violence against Africans specifically in France 
might have been informed by this pessimist view of Africa.   
 
Francis Akindes, an Ivorian sociologist forcefully argues that the Ivorian crisis can 
best be understood through an analysis of state society relationship. He argues that the 
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Ivorian crisis is a break down of Houphetisme. A compromise grounded around the 
legitimacy of Boigny because of his ability to negotiate a peaceful coexistence 
amongst the various ethnic groups in Ivory Coast.50 Akindes argues that ivoirité has 
long historical roots in Ivory Coast. Boigny flirted with Ivorinisation but never to the 
exclusion of foreigners or compromise on efficiency. According to Akindes, 
Ivorinisation helped Boigny to co-opt political opponents and not exclude them. 
Akindes posit that ivoirité has in effect stratified Ivorian society not in relation to 
production but to sociatal and cultural construct. This in essence has engendered 
hatred and animosity thus conflict, because part of the population has been 
disenfranchised thus casting doubt on the legitimacy of the state.51 
 
Using relative deprivation theory grounded in quantitative and qualitative analysis, 
Langer argues that the Ivorian crisis is the result of perceived or actual political, social 
and economic disparity between north and south. He argues that under Boigny, this 
disparity was ameliorated but aggravated under Bedie, Gueï and Gbagbo. He points 
out that, this disparity though glaring along north south lines; also exist among ethnic 
groups in the south. He traces ethic equality through the various government in Ivory 
Coast and concludes that Gbagbo’s government which witnessed arm insurgent was 
the most ethnically imbalance. He concludes that the conflict is thus a reaction to the 
Baulisation of Ivorian politics.52  
 
What the above literature fails to tell us is why the politisation of ethnicity and why 
was Boigny’s reign relatively peaceful though there was still horizontal ethnic 
inequality? Though ethnicity is important in group mobilisation in politics, political 
economy is important to understand the rationale behind the decisions of the elites 
considering the fact that they are the main drivers of politics. 
 
In some instances, hegemonic leaders have acted in politically expedient manner by 
appointing ethnic intermediaries to high positions of state in order to balance 
representation as a way of insolating conflict. This strategy might be through power 
sharing (ministerial post) or encouraging private accumulation using state power 
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(government parastatals). For example, in Cameroon under Ahidjo and Biya, Ivory 
Coast under Boigny, Kenya under Kenyatta, these leaders avoided adversarial politics 
by sharing the spoils of the state among influential ethnic groups and at the same time 
allowing the dominant elite to negotiate policy questions quietly among themselves.53 
Important to note here is that, this regime strategy can only subsist provided there is 
enough resources to sustain it. Hence in circumstance where resources are scares, 
politics of exclusion might become the order of the day or in certain cases, outright 
repression. 
 
Conflict has been averted in certain scarcity-prone societies because of distributional 
principles such as proportional representation-the distribution of state resources, 
political and administrative positions among ethnic peoples and regional units on the 
basis of their relative numbers. In such societies, a political culture is developed 
where leaders bargain and compromise to bridge the gap between the relatively 
advantaged and the disadvantaged on the basis of; sub regional need versus derivation 
(extraction) in allocative policies (oil in Nigeria), merit versus proportionality in 
recruitment policies (Cameroon), legislative representation (South Africa), or 
centralisation versus decentralisation of power, and power sharing (government of 
national unity).54 
 
A major limitation of ethnicity as a cause of Ivorian conflict is its lack of consensus 
and clarity as to the exact make up of ethnic or tribal phenomenon. This is because 
ethnicity and tribalism is not simply a question of objective data such as languages, 
culture and religion. Ethnic identity is merely a question of perception than an 
absolute phenomenon and identity can be perceived by groups or family themselves 
or can be attributed by outsiders.55  In fact, the ethnic breakdown of Ivory Coast was 
done by Maurice Dalefosse (French) and ethnic division in Ivorian colonial state was 
a response to administrative expediency and colonial needs.56 
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If the conflict in Ivory Coast is so much an ethnic conflict, why northerners are 
present in government? Therefore, it has been contended that civil wars may be 
fought on ethnic lines but ethnicity is not a cause of civil war. Hizkias Assefa aptly 
concludes that a conflict stated by elites ends up being a self-fulfilling prophecy 
engulfing the entire ethnic group. He further argues that, 
 
There is growing evidence to posit the view that elites in African societies 
particularly those of the political class, have shown no restrain in 
manipulating the people through feeding them with ethic prejudice. Personal 
interests of such leaders are framed in ethnic terms and the bells of ethnic 
solidarity are rung to rally support even if at the risk of developing animosity 
against another group considered to be the enemy.57  
 
This view corresponds with Amilcar Cabral’s dictum that “there are no real conflicts 
between the people of Africa; there are only conflicts between their elites.58 Thus, it 
seems ethnicity has been instrumentalised by Ivorian elites to control state power and 
cocoa rents. In essence, Ivorian conflict is ultimately a struggle for land and cocoa 
rents fought along north/south lines. I thus concur with the Carnegie Commission on 
preventing deadly conflict that: 
 
The words ethnic, religious, tribal or factional-important they may be in 
intergroup conflict-do not, in most cases, adequately explain why people 
use massive violence to achieve their goals. These descriptions do not, in 
themselves, reveal why people would kill each other over differences. To 
label a conflict simply as an ethnic can lead to misguided choices by 
fostering a wrong impression that ethnic, cultural and religious differences 
inevitably result to violent conflict and that differences therefore must be 
suppressed. Time and again in this century, attempts at suppression have 
too often led to bloodshed, and in case after case, the accommodation of 
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diversity within appropriate constitutional forms has helped to prevent 
bloodshed.59 
 
Social realties demand that a sounder approach to the problem of ethnicity in Africa is 
to accept the reality of pluralism rather than fly in the face of facts and attempt at 
achieving monolithic structure through repression and coercion. Ethnicity is a reality 
not only in Africa, thus rather that shying away from it, any meaningful development 
on the continent must be steeped around accommodation and enhancing our rich 
diversity 
Methodology 
The methodology for this study will be qualitative; bearing in mind that qualitative 
analysis will be use to trace, process and establish a causal relationship between the 
variables (content analysis). Data collection is grounded around three interrelated 
pillars of analysis: economic, political and socio-economic. 
1) Economic Indicators 
Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines 
 Group-based inequality, or perceived inequality, in education, jobs, and 
economic status. 
 Group-based impoverishment as measured by poverty levels, infant mortality 
rates, education levels. 
 Rise of communal nationalism based on real or perceived group inequalities. 
Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline 
 A pattern of progressive economic decline of the society as a whole as 
measured by per capita income, GNP and human development index. 
 Sudden drop in commodity prices, trade revenue, and debt payments 
 Collapse or devaluation of the national currency. 
 Extreme social hardship imposed by structural adjustment programmes. 
 Failure of the state to pay salaries of government employees and armed forces 
or to meet other financial obligations to its citizens, such as pension payments. 
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2) Political Indicators 
        Criminalisation and/or Delegitimisation of the State 
 Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites. 
 Resistance of ruling elites to political representation. 
 Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes, e.g., 
widely boycotted or contested elections, mass public demonstrations, 
sustained civil disobedience. 
 Emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional 
and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated. 
 Politicisation of the army. 
Rise of Factionalized Elites 
 Fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines. 
 Use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of 
communal irredentism, (e.g. ivoirité) 
3) Social Indicator 
 Pressures deriving from high population density relative to sustaining 
resources 
 Pressures deriving from group settlement patterns that affect the freedom 
to participate in common forms of human and physical activity, including 
economic productivity, ownership and occupancy of land, 
 History of aggrieved communal groups based on recent or past injustices, 
which could date back centuries 
 Specific groups singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for 
persecution or repression 
 Institutionalized political exclusion 
 Public scapegoating of groups believed to have acquired wealth, status or 
power as evidenced in the emergence of "hate" radio, pamphleteering and 
stereotypical or nationalistic political rhetoric 
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This study is based upon an assessment of existing secondary sources of empirical 
data and literature on Ivory Coast. Sources for this study are books from libraries in 
the Witwatersrand University, University of South Africa, Africa Institute of South 
Africa, online libraries like Questia, and L’ Harmattan, online scholarly articles and 
journals; speeches from conferences and published policy documents. Both Ivorian 
and international press will be perused to ascertain the course and nature of the 
conflict, while keeping in mind their polarised nature.  At this point, it is important to 
point out that the bulk of the literature is in French, for example Politique Africaine. 
This would not pose a problem taking into consideration that I understand, speak and 
write French. The works of multilateral institutions and think tanks associated with 
conflict and the conflict in Ivory Coast in particular will be consulted. For example, 
International Development Research Centre: Ivory Coast Programme, International 
Crisis Group, Institute for Global Dialogue, African Human Security Initiative, 
Nordic Africa Institute, Institute for Security Studies, La Francophonie, ECOWAS, 
World Bank, IMF, World Trade Organization. 
Limitation of Study 
The fact that the Ivorian crisis still rages on, any conclusion at this point is tentative 
because time is an enormous constrain on the study. The time frame of this study is 
1944 to 2005 (0ctober). By the time of conclusion, new facts might be out which 
could have enhanced the comprehension of certain events. For example, information 
is needed to ascertain alliances between individuals and ethnic cleavages in order to 
understand why the rebellion occured. At this stage, some conclusions will be drawn 
from frank speculation and intellectual guess. 
 
Moreover, the dependence on secondary literature exposes the study to hidden biases, 
inclination and misinterpretation which might be embedded in the work of authors 
who have done field research in Ivory Coast. The absence of field work will also 
present difficulty in filling gaps in information and conflicting reports.  
Roadmap 
The rest of the study follows thus: Chapter one, as my point of departure sets out a 
theoretical framework that will inform the rest of the study. The chapter 
conceptualises conflict, conflict management and resolution; it egages with the 
political economy debate around the initiation and potractedness of African conflict.  
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I move on in chapter two, to examine the historical background of Ivorian crisis. In 
this chapter, I begin by examining Ivorian colonial state, how it was integrated into 
the world economy, its power structure and elite interest at the dawn of independence. 
This chapter in examining the post-colonial political economy of Ivory Coast, it 
shows the contradictory nature of Ivorian economy, the role of the state and the effect 
of neoliberalism. The chapter also examines how Boigny dealt with the issue of 
ivoirite within the context of a buoyant economy and one party state. 
 
In chapter three, I tease out the origin of the present crisis grounded in post-Boigny 
succession and the politicisation of ethnicity and how the crisis unfolded. The chapter 
shows that Political succession in Ivory Coast is a result of personal/elite ambitions 
and rivalries, a story of social cleavages and coalition building, political alignments, 
disalignments and realignments. The chapter also shows that succession battle in 
Ivory Coast is a struggle over power and the mode of distribution of resources as they 
became scares as a result of economic crisis, compounded by SAP. The chaper ends 
by examining how the conflict erupted and its regional dynamics. 
 
In chapter four, I proceed to analyse the various attempts at conflict management and 
resolution. From Paris to Pretoria, I examine the basis and rationale of each accord. 
 
Chapter five teases out why these accords have failed to be full implemented. The 
chapter looks at the subtantive and technical failures of the peace accords. It also 
points out that the conflict has generated its own dynamics which is economically and 
politically beneficial to some of the belligerents as against ordinary Ivorians. I 
conclude by analysing some policy considerations and at the same time proposing 
recommendations 
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                                CHAPTER ONE 
 
          CONCEPTUAL AND THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
                            The Political Economy of African Conflicts 
The aim of this chapter is to use the political economy of conflict as a framework to 
understand the cause and persistence of Ivorian conflict. Conflict management and 
resolution is almost entirely determined by our understanding of the concept conflict 
and not only by its symptoms. Thus, any plausible debate on the causes, nature and 
persistence of Ivorian conflict should be premise on a proper conceptualisation of 
conflict, conflict management and resolution. 
Section A: Concepts 
What is Conflict? 
Politics by definition functions in a context of scarcity: scarcity of resources, scarcity 
of power, scarcity of identity and scarcity of status.60 Competition is therefore 
inevitable whether between two or more individuals, groups or even states. 
Consequently, conflict is inevitable and a normal state of interaction between human 
beings and violent conflict is rather another form conflict expresses itself.61 This 
position is empirically questionable and normatively ambiguous, since people are 
more apt to cooperate and harmonise their incompatible and confliction positions.62  
Conflict is in fact a crisis which signifies a breakdown in the normal pattern of 
behavior. It involves a collision of incompatible positions resulting from a failure to 
regulate, reconcile and harmonise differences.  
 
Conflict here should be contrasted with peace. Peace is more than the absence of 
violence. The absence of direct violence in a relationship may mask a profound sense 
of latent conflict that may be brewing and waiting for a spark. The absence of conflict 
need not imply the lack of animosity among potential belligerents. Accordingly, 
conflict management and resolution should be more than arresting actual fighting but 
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also addressing the structural causes of conflict. For this study, conflict is define as  
every variety of force, coercion, militancy, destruction and aggression directed against 
persons, property or symbols of perceive discontent. This type of violence, because of 
its impact necessitates urgent recourse to conflict management and resolution. 
Conflict Management 
Conflict management refers to the containment of a conflict that has already broken 
out in the form of addressing solutions that will reduce the level of violence and 
prevent its escalation. These include measures that address the mobilising factors thus 
creating space for long-term resolution. Principal among these is peacekeeping by 
neutral parties which provides for cessation of hostilities.63 
Conflict Resolution 
Conflict resolution refers to a plethora of activities aimed at addressing the structural 
or root causes of a dispute that led to conflict. This includes initiatives such as 
mediation, arbitration and adjudication. Mediation is the thrust of this study.  Since 
the causes of conflict are complex and drawn from different sources, conflict 
resolution calls for multi-faceted response.64 Broadly, there are two theoretical 
approaches to conflict resolution: behavioralist and Structuralist /institutionalist. 
 
Behavioralist approach to conflict resolution locates an individual as the unit of 
analysis both at the societal and national level. An individual’s behavior is associated 
with conflict as a result of overreaction, overpeception, and ethnocentrism. Within 
this context, concepts such as socialisation and cost/benefit calculation, the 
dissonance between expected rewards and actual rewards is important to understand 
conflict. Gurr’s “relative deprivation”65 and Davies “J-Curve”66 are examples of such 
dissonance. Against this background, conflict resolution focuses on individuals and 
their roles in society in trying to change their perception and addressing their needs in 
order to establish social harmony. 
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Structuralist/Institutionalist approach posits that conflict is a result of failure of the 
mechanism through which resources are distributed. Structuralists argue that 
restructuring of the political environment is the best way to manage and resolve 
conflicts. According to Burton, democracy is the most viable but not the only 
option.67 SIDA argues that Structuralist approach should also include changes to the 
social, political and economic or systemic configuration of a society. For example, 
land redistribution and affirmative action such as Black Economic Empowerment.68 
 
Institutionalists are less concern with distribution matters; rather they concentrate on 
the most appropriate democratic institution. Harris and Reilly focus their analysis on 
elections.69 But Ohlson argues that elections can only work when politics is generally 
inclusive in nature.70 Using South Africa as an example, Hart argues that constitution 
drafting should be part of peace negotiations. She argues that constitution making 
concludes a conflict and a settlement in order to ensure permanence and stability.71  
 
These approaches seem to focus on democracy and democratic institutions much to 
the exclusion of the role of spoilers in the non implementation of peace agreements.  
Important to note here is the fact that despite their perceived short comings, these 
approaches are not mutually exclusive from each other especially in ascertaining the 
causes of conflict. 
Section B: Argument: The Political Economy of Conflicts 
If one agrees with Gurr, Zartman and Rugumamu that conflict in inherent in human 
intercourse, then causes of conflict is a misnomer. But as aforementioned, the gist of 
this debate is violent conflict which is not normal in human behavior. To explain why 
conflict arises, some analysts have distinguished between structural causes and 
triggering or mobilising factors.  
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Structural causes are deeply rooted, underlying causes of conflict that may not 
necessarily flare up into violent conflict. Structural factors include: state repression, 
lack of political participation, poor governance, the distribution of wealth, ethnic 
make up of the state and the history of inter-ethnic relations. Mobilising factors are 
more immediate to the conflict and often involve the actions of elites and/or masses. 
Mobilising factors include: discriminatory policies, repression of political groups. 
This distinction in some instances is purely academic and difficult to ascertain 
empirically. 
 
The political economy theory of conflict holds that conflicts stems from scarcity and 
contestation over resources. Thus, the manner in which resources are distributed and 
managed fuels and sustains conflicts.72 Lefwich argues that politics is principally the 
activities of conflict, cooperation; and negotiation involving the use, production and 
distribution of resources, whether materials or ideal, whether at local, national, or 
international level.73 Consequently, politics of resources distribution is at the heart of 
contemporary conflicts in Africa taking cognisance of Laswell’s definition of politics 
as a question of who gets what, how and when.74  
 
David Keen argues that to understand conflicts thus negotiating a successful peace 
accord, one has to understand the economic dimensions of the conflicts. He points out 
that, "War has increasingly become the continuation of economics by other means. 
War is not simply a breakdown in a particular system, but a way of creating an 
alternative system of profit, power and even protection.75 Keen argues that in the 
context of civil wars, members of armed groups can benefit from looting and 
governments can use violence to deflect opposition, reward supporters or maintain 
their access to resources. Under these circumstances ending civil wars becomes 
difficult, and defeating the enemy may not be desirable.76 
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Keen distinguishes between two forms of economic violence, namely "top-down" and 
"bottom-up". Top-down violence is mobilised by political leaders and entrepreneurs, 
and can be influenced by factors such as a weak state, an economic crisis, a strong 
threat to a regime and competition for valuable resources. Bottom-up violence is 
violence employed by citizens and/or low-ranking soldiers. It is fuelled by social and 
economic exclusion, the absence of a strong revolutionary organisation or ideology, 
and the belief that violence will go unpunished.77 
 
Mark Duffield, analysis the relationship between globalisation and protracted civil 
wars in developing countries. He argues that globalisation has not contributed to civil 
war in a significant way, but has led to increased disparity and instability in 
developing world, as well as the expansion and penetration of all forms of trans-
border activity, particularly, highly criminalised war economies. As war economies 
are dependent on external markets, Duffield argues market regulation could 
potentially be a useful conflict resolution tool.78 
 
William Reno, through an analysis of the political economy of violence in "shadow 
states" argues that in the context of civil war, economic interests of belligerent groups 
may seriously impede the termination of conflict. The reason for this is that war may 
be used to control land, commercial activities, labour, take advantage of emergency 
relief supplies, and ensure the financial well-being and status of elites. Hence, 
belligerent parties may have vested interests in the continuation of conflicts.79  
 
Another rubric of this theory is focused on the activities of rebel movements. African 
Guerrillas 1998 edited by Christopher Clapham undertakes case study analysis of 
rebel movements in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, Rwanda, Congo-
Zaire, Liberia and Sierra Leone, in analysing the initiation and persistence of conflict 
on the continent. In the case of Sudan, Douglas Johnson argues that, the Sudan 
People's Liberation Army diverted international relief supplies for military operations. 
With respect to Somalia, Daniel Compagnon points out the various militia groups 
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engaged in wide-scale looting, due to the collapse of the Somali state and formal 
economy. Within this context, Compagnon argues that a criminal economy has 
emerged in Somalia, characterised by theft, kidnapping and bribery which has 
perpetuated the war for the sake of economic benefits that it provides to the 
economically empowered.80 
 
Using quantitative analysis, Collier and Hoeffler argue that civil war is heavily 
concentrated in countries with low income, in economic decline and dependent upon 
natural resources.81 They distinguish between two possible motives behind civil wars; 
“justice-seeking” (grievance) and “loot-seeking” (greed). Anchored on utilitarian 
framework drawn from Grossman82 and Azam83, Collier et al argue that, war occurs if 
the incentive for rebellion is sufficiently large relative to cost. Greed is the desire by 
parties of a conflict to loot for their private gains. Rebels have an incentive to 
challenge government because the opportunity cost of engaging in conflict is seen as 
offering opportunity for extortion which finances and sustain a war. They argue that 
greed rather than grievance is the root cause of conflicts and the factor sustaining it.  
 
Collier et al main proxy for greed is the ratio of primary commodity export to gross 
domestic product and income per capital (natural resource dependence). Collier et al 
argue that the risk of war initiation and sustenance increases as the natural resource 
endowment of a country increases and decreases as the opportunity cost of rebellion 
increases. Five channels of causation are use to explain this scenario: The first 
channel of causation between natural resource dependence and conflict is the concept 
of the rentier state. Auty distinquishes between point and difuse resources; point 
resources includes resources such as minerals while difuse resources include 
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agricultural produc.84 Rents here mean profits that are much higher than the minimum 
level needed to keep an activity going.85 This concept posits that, resource dependent 
states are most invariably authoritarian and conflict prone.86  
 
Natural resource dependence leads to conflict because; natural resources are a ‘honey 
pot’ thus Politics becomes the contest for control of these revenues. This produces a 
spoil politics and politics of corruption – aided and abetted by foreign corporate 
behaviour – and sometimes directly a politics of violence. The stakes are highest in 
low-income countries because control of the state implies massive revenues relative to 
other income-earning opportunities grounded in the absence of a viable private 
sector.87 
 
Another channel through which natural resource dependence causes conflict is 
through bad governance. Bratton argues that countries in Africa where democratic 
transition and consolidation have failed are endowed with natural resources. He points 
out that there was a significant decline in the level of democracy in several African 
countries in the post-third wave democratisation period (1995-1997). From the 
founding elections that took place in the period 1989-1994 to the second elections that 
took place in the period from 1995-1997, there was a decline in the rate of leadership 
alteration (37% to 6.6%); an increase in the rate of opposition boycotts (11% to 73%), 
and an increase in the mean of winner’s vote share (61.4% to 69.1%) for presidential 
elections and (62.7% to 72.0%) in parliamentary elections.88 Bratton’s data reveals 
that election malpractices and opposition boycott took place in petro-states such as 
Cameroon and Gabon. In other countries such as Algeria and Republic of Congo, 
DRC and Sierra Leone, democratisation simply descended in to civil war. The 
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argument here is that pseudo-democratisation liberalised the political space thus 
increasing the struggle over resources through capturing state power. 
 
The reasons behind the lack of democratic transition and consolidation in resource 
rich countries are that: with huge profits from resource windfall, dictators are left with 
available resources to distribute to clients, co-opt political opponents, great façade 
opposition parties and bolster the repressive machinery of the state. Against this 
backdrop, top-down “good governance” and “democratisation” was easily shot down 
in these countries because “opposition” leaders were not challenging the system but 
simply vying to be part of it. Thus democracy and good governance that is 
engendered in a top-down process is unsustainable.89 
 
Fiscal sociologists argue that the bond between the state and its citizens is established 
through taxes thus accountabilityno taxation without representation. Therefore, in the 
process of the state extracting resources to meet is needs, it affords citizens a channel 
to hold government accountable. Thus the absence of social pressure through taxation 
entrenches authoritarianism.90 In many resource-rich societies, resource rents are not 
seen as belonging to ordinary people in the same way as income taken from them in 
taxes – hence the detachment.91 Consiquently, why would an old man in a cocoa 
plantation care about holding the government accountable when the gendarmerie stop 
visiting him, knowing fully well that la peur du gerdarme est le debut de la segesse?92  
 
The third channel of causation between natural resources and conflict is due to the 
availability of resources to the rebels to launch an insurgent. Collier et al argue that 
since primary commodity export are heavily taxed, it provide ready income for 
belligerents to exploit; taking into consideration the fact that primary commodity 
production does not depend upon complex and delicate networks of information and 
transaction as in manufacturing. It becomes profitable to belligerents because profit is 
base on exploitation of idiosyncratic natural endowment rather than the more 
competitive level playing field of manufacturing. Moreover, this situation is 
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compounded by the fact that natural resources in some instances are situated far from 
the capital city and within the reach of potential rebels taking into consideration the 
weak capacity of African states. 93   
 
Another channel of causation between resource dependent and conflict is the fact that, 
during resource boom, resource rents appreciate real exchange rate causing other 
sectors of the economy (mostly agriculture) to become uncompetitive thus the Dutch 
disease.94 Since citizens of resource rich countries concentrate on agriculture, they 
face sharply declining income despite the influx of wealth into the economy. In cases 
where a country is dependent on agriculture, appreciation of the currency might mean 
other produce in the agricultural sector become uncompetitive thus poverty.  
 
The prices of natural resources are usually extremely volatile. As a result, the 
economy becomes subject to booms and busts and this is compounded by the fact that 
burst last longer than boom.95 This pattern typically depresses the long term growth 
rate and it also implies periods of severe contraction bearing in mind that economic 
decline is itself a risk factor for civil war. Collier et al conclude that a country 
dependent on natural resources have a 27% risk of descending in to civil conflict.96 
 
Indra de Soysa argues concurs by arguing that, the abundance of renewable resources 
among poor countries is more likely to lead to violence and to lower economic, 
human, and institutional development. De Soysa further claims that the abundance of 
non-renewable resources is consistently associated with higher levels of conflict and 
lower levels of human and institutional development.97  
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Collier et al argue that, higher per capita income reduces the initiation and duration of 
war. They argue that the probability of a country descending into war is 0.63 if the 
country has half mean income, but only 0.15 if the country has double mean income. 
This is the case because conflict provides people with an opportunity to earn income 
rather than sitting at home, after all a hungry man is an angry man. They strengthen 
this point by pointing out that a society with a majority of the population being young 
men from 14 to 24 is vulnerable to conflict.98 
 
Collier et al argue that a society that is largely fragmented is not very vulnerable to 
conflict as compared to a society which is composed of two main tribal groups. Their 
argument is that, is societies where there are two main ethnic groups, it is easier to 
form rebellion base on ethnic cleavage. 
 
Collier et al also blame the lack of political rights as one of the lesser causes of civil 
wars. They argue that if the government is autocratic and repressive, people will have 
a natural and justifiable desire to overthrown it in the pursuit of change. For example, 
the uprising in Romania is seen as a quest for democracy.99 
 
Collier et al argue that if a government is seen to inflict sufficient economic misery on 
its population, it may face an uprising. This is proxied by growth in gross domestic 
product. Collier et al argue that other things being equal, an economy that has 
experience rapid decline might be more prone to rebellion than one that has 
experience rapid growth.100 President Obansanjo concurs and argues that there is a 
link between the level of poverty in Africa and incidence of violence and conflict on 
the continent.101  
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Table 1: Growth in real per capita GDP 1960-94 in Conflict Countries   
Conflict 
countries 
1960-75 1975-85 1985-1994 1960-1994 
Angola -10 -0.42 -4.06 -1.64 
Burundi 2.37 1.65 -1.32 -0.94 
CAR -0.30 O. 97 -2.12 -0.98 
R. of Congo  2.79 4.95 -3.94 1.76 
DRC - 1.46 -3.65 - 
Eritrea - - - - 
Ethiopia 1.16 -0.20 0.68 0.64 
Guinea Bissau 2.85 -1.690 0.47 0.88 
Kenya 1.83 -0.39 1.80 1.12 
Lesotho 5.91  2.49 1.44 3.72 
Liberia 1.77 1.00 - - 
Rwanda 1.44 1.74 -11.34 -1.98 
Senegal 0.14 0.33 -1.01 .0.23 
Sierra Leon 0.62 -2.82 .2.14 -1.29 
Somalia -0.48 -1.98 - - 
Sudan  - -0.15 0.85 - 
Chad -1.63 -3.71 -0.5 -1.94 
Uganda 0.23 -1.35 0.91 0-05 
Source: Dani Rodrik, Trade Policies and Economic Performance in SSA. Working 
Paper No 6562 (May 1998).102 
  
Table I tease out the relationship between per capita GDP and conflict from 1960-
1995 in some African countries that have witnessed conflict. 8 of the 13 countries had 
overall negative growth in real per capita GDP from 1960-94 and there are significant 
variations from one decade to another. Whereas from 1960-1975, only 5 countries had 
negative growth, from 1975-85, the number double to 11. During 1985-94, 10 
countries were witnessing growth deficit. What is important to read from this table is 
the fact that countries which have witnessed high negative growth for example 
Angola, Rwanda and DRC, have all witnessed protracted and intense conflict and the 
ones that witnessed positive growth are fairly stable. Despite the time limitation of 
this table, it ascertains that a strong and robust correlation exists between economic 
decline and conflict. The World Bank argues… 
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Countries with low, stagnant, unequally distributed per capital 
income that have remained dependent on primary commodities for 
export face dangerously high risk of prolonged conflict. In the 
absence of economic development, neither good political 
institution, nor ethnic and religious homogeneity, nor high military 
spending provide significant defence against large scale 
violence.103  
 
The link between economic development and democracy have been debated by many 
scholars notably Seymour Martin Lipset within the framework of the modernisation 
theory. Democracy and development often work in tandem reinforcing each another 
in preventing and managing conflict. Bangura argues  
 
although underdevelopment per se should not constitute a fundamental 
obstacle to democratisation, the establishment of stable and sustainable 
democracy requires substantial changes in the forms of accumulation; 
the promotion of an acceptable level of welfare that will allow the 
majority of the people to have confidence in the capacity of democratic 
institutions to manage, economic, social and political conflict.104 
 
The debate around democratisation and conflict still rages on.105 Though it is not the 
thrust of this study, it is worth mentioning that democracy seems to have a negative 
impact on violence depending on state capacity and the political elites. Alence argues 
that democracy will lead to conflict if it is not fully implemented.106 Olukoshi and 
Laakso argue that democratisation has led to the resurgence of ethno-political conflict 
in Africa.107 They argue that deep-seated economic crisis undermined the legitimacy 
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and capacity of the state whilst entrenching institutional authoritarianism. Thus 
authoritarianism was in certain circumstances capable of keeping ethnicity in check. 
But with the advert of democratisation, due to economic crisis and weak state 
capacity, the fight for economic resources became intense and politicians had to 
resort to ethnic rhetoric to mobilise political support. Consequently, the crisis of the 
nation-state in Africa is much a problem of governance capacity and state 
capacity/economic crisis. The collapse of Ivory Coast seems to validate this 
hypothesis taking into consideration the country’s changing political and economic  
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                                                CHAPTER TWO  
               HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF IVORIAN CRISIS 
This chapter intends looking back in time retrospect to understand the root causes of 
the Ivorian crisis. In doing this, the chapter examines the organisation of power and 
authority grounded in the relationship between the Ivorian colonial and post-colonial 
state and economy. Against this backdrop, the section engages questions such as: how 
was Ivorian colonial economy integrated into the world economy? How did this 
integration influence political competition and conflict prevention?  
 
The chapter argues that contemporary forms of accumulation, ethnicity and socio-
economic dominance along ethnic lines can be explained by the legacy of 
colonisation. Ivory Coast was integrated into the world economy as a mercantilist 
economy with the state playing a principal role in primitive accumulation due to the 
absence of a local bourgeoisie. I do not contend that colonialism created ethnicity in 
Ivory Coast. But rather a once slow evolving and fluid ethnic self-consciousness was 
transformed by colonial policies into a new harder tribal structure to the extent that 
ethnicity was stronger and more politically relevant with the advent of 
democratisation. 
Section One: Colonial State, Colonial Economy and Transition to Independence 
France made its initial contact with Ivory Coast in 1637, when missionaries landed at 
Assignee near the Gold Coast (now Ghana) border. Early contacts were limited to a 
few missionaries because of the inhospitable coastline and settlers' fear of the 
inhabitants. In the 18th century, the country was invaded from present-day Ghana by 
two related Akan groups-the Agnis, who occupied the southeast, and the Baoules, 
who settled in the central section.108 In 1843-44, Admiral Bouet-Williaumez signed 
treaties with the kings of the Grand Bassam and Assinie regions, placing their 
territories under a French protectorate. French explorers, missionaries, trading 
companies and soldiers gradually extended the area under French control inland from 
the lagoon region. However, complete pacification was not accomplished until 
1915.109 
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Ivory Coast officially became a French colony in 1893. Captain Binger, who had 
explored the Gold Coast frontier, was named the first governor. He negotiated 
boundary treaties with Liberia and the United Kingdom (for the Gold Coast) and later 
started the campaign against Almany Samory, a Malinke chief who fought against the 
French until 1898. From 1904 to 1958, Ivory Coast was a constituent unit of the 
Federation of French West Africa. Franch policy in West Africa was reflected mainly 
in its philosophy of "association," meaning that all Africans in Ivory Coast were 
officially French "subjects"-indignant-without rights to citizenship or representation 
in Africa or France.110 
 
During World War II, France's Vichy regime remained in control until 1943, when 
members of Gen. Charles de Gaulle's provisional government assumed control of all 
French West Africa. The Brazzaville Conference in 1944; the first Constituent 
Assembly of the French Fourth Republic in 1946 and France's gratitude for African’s 
loyalty during World War II led to far-reaching governmental reforms in 1946. 
French citizenship was granted to all African "subjects," the right to organise 
politically was recognised, and various forms of forced labour were abolished. 
Elections to French constituent assembly was organised and Boigny won. This victory 
provided Boigny the chance to hold various ministerial portfolios in France.  
 
A turning point in France/Africa relations was reached with the enactment of 
Overseas Reform Act (Loi Cadre) in 1956. The law transferred a number of powers 
from Paris to elected territorial governments in French West Africa. It also removed 
remaining voting inequalities. In 1958, Ivory Coast became an autonomous region 
within the French West Africa (Afrique Francaise d’Ouest AFO) and later gained 
independence on 7 august 1960. 
 
The French instituted the policy of assimilation in Ivory Coast., though at times it is 
very difficult to differentiate between assimilation and indirect rule. The French 
entered into indirect association with pre-colonial structures when it served their 
interest. For example, local chiefs such as Gbon Coulibaly of Krohogo, Moro-Naba 
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Sagha 11 and Gyamanhere Kouadio were made Chef de Caton and Chef de Circle111 
respectively and close collaborators of French colonial administration.  
 
Nationalism in Ivory Coast as in most African countries took a momentous turn after 
World War Two. Ivorian nationalism rose from agitation from grievances connected 
with the war and its effect on the economy. Cocoa was introduced in Ivory Coast by 
the early 1900s and by the 1940s its production had become wide scale. The 
introduction and development of cash crop agriculture under colonisation in Ivory 
Coast was a critical juncture in Ivorian politics, it provided a watershed for ethnic, 
political cleavages and nationalism. Plantation economy shaped different ethnic roles, 
created different class interest and regional development as the commercialisation of 
agriculture determined the political development of Europe.112  
 
Cocoa, coffee and forestry became the main economic activities of French colonial 
administration. Plantation agriculture was intensified between 1910-1930 mostly in 
the southern part of the country specifically south east and center because of good 
climatic conditions and its proximity to Atlantic Ocean. By the end of 1930s 
production shifted to the Center and West. While the northerners were engaged in 
trading and agriculture, the westerners were forced to march along with foreign 
exploitation of their land considering their late entering into agriculture.113   
 
In order to strengthen the colonial economy, contradictions of the colonial economy 
produce huge regional disparity in development between the north and south. Cohen 
argues that the colonial plantation economy influenced urban policy planning which 
was considered a strategic instrument for determining the political economy of Ivory 
Coast.114 The southern region of Ivory Coast was developed relatively to the north.115 
The only meaningful economic development in the north was a rail way transporting 
migrant labour to the plantations in the south.116 Jean-Pierre Dozon argues that 
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“ethnic significance became really operational, overloaded with the sense of that 
unequal structuring of Ivorian society, manipulated by the colonial state…117 
 
World War Two instigated colossal economic strain on the economy of the metropole. 
Thus, enormous pressured was exerted on the colonies to increase their l’effort de 
guerre (war effort). In the case of Ivory Coast, by 1944 there was no industrial 
activity and even though trade unions were legalised in 1944, it was only in areas 
were it was of immerse importance to the colonial economy.118 This meant increase 
production of cocoa and coffee to meet l’effort de guerre. This increase production 
came as a result of increase exploitation of labour and land and not capital.  
 
It is against this backdrop, force labour was intensified in Ivory Coast. In 1943 alone, 
4,537,520 working days were devoted to meeting food and labour requirement for the 
south. An equivalent of one year’s labour for 15,381 out of a male population of 
72,000.119  In 1944, Korhogo was forced to double its rice production which led to 
famine in subsequent years.120 For Africans to meet their quotas demanded from them 
by the colonial administration, they had to buy at higher prices and resell to the 
government at a lower price. For example, in one village, villagers had to buy rubber 
at 25 Franc per kilo and resell it to the government at 11 Franc.121 Consequently, 
African farmers did not only make a lost of 14 Franc, they had to forgo their 
traditional economic activities. Economic activities around the trading of kola were 
destroyed because it was of no benefit to the colonial economy despite the fact that it 
was the principal mode of accumulation, interaction and cohesion for Africans.122 
This situation was compounded by the fact that Africans were not allowed to sell to 
any person other than people designated by the colonial administration. Africans were 
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bound to sell their produce below market prices because the colonial administration 
fixed buying prices in a bid to protect price fluctuation which might affect the 
economy of the metropole. This colonial practice did not only expose neo-slavery 
perpetuated by colonialism, it also affected the economic viability of African farmers 
because their produce were constantly taxed and which they received pratically 
nothing in return either in development or accountability. 
 
In 1944, at the Brazzaville conference, as a show of reward to francophone African 
for the liberation of France, Africans were allowed to grow their own crops but were 
bound to supply quotas to the administration. The shortage of labour because of 
forced labour meant that African small holders could not compete with their colons 
counterparts. This formed the genesis of the Syndicat Africain Agricole (SAA) in July 
1944. Though SAA was not a political party per se, it prepared the path for the 
formation of the first political party in Ivory Coast, Parti Democratique de Cote 
d’Ivoire (PDCI) which had ties with Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA). 
 
The SAA enhanced the economic capabilities of African planters in many ways: 
African planters were able to recruit labour easily from the north. For example, 
Boigny build an alliance with Gbon Coulibaly of Krohogo for the supply of labour. 
Important to note here is the fact that, the creation of SAA also stimulated the 
influence of migrant from the north to the south because they could now earn 
wages.123  
 
The creation of SAA had two important political significances: first, it indicated 
political consciousness by Africans; second it reflected the emergence of an economic 
group whose interest conflicted with colonial administration. The economic interest of 
African planters did not only engender nationalism in Ivory Coast, but the protection 
of their interest dominated Ivorian politics since independence. In fact, most of the 
literature on Ivorian politics argues that the planter class dominated SAA and 
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PDCI.124 For example, Boigny and Philippe Yacé President and Secretary General 
respectively of the PDCI were both planters.   
 
Since a coalition between Baoule and north formed the strength of the PDCI and their 
subsequent alliance with RDA and French Communist Party, the colonial 
administration tried to destroy PDCI by instrumentalising ethnicity. The colonial 
administration created and funded other political parties.125 But since these parties 
were purely grounded on ethnic cleavages, they could not muster the same support as 
the PDCI.  The PDCI subsequent break from the French communist party in 1952 
meant that it had the full support of the French, conditioned on the party’s policy 
towards France.  
 
Though Boigny was a nationalist, he was not a radical calling for the total withdrawal 
of French interest in Ivory Coast as Sakou Toure in Guinea.126 This rapprochement 
between the colonial administration and the PDCI pushed other political parties to 
engender mobilisation through ethnicity and anti-colonialism which further alienated 
France. It is within this context; France manipulated the 1957 legislative elections in 
which the PDCI won all seats, thus effectively killing “democracy and multiparty 
politics in Ivory Coast at the eve of independence.127 
 
Three important conclusions can be drawn from Ivory Coast metamorphosis from a 
colonial to an independent state. First, Ivorian economy was integrated into the world 
economy as a mercantilist, plantation economy, primary producer of cocoa and coffee 
to satisfy the needs of the metropole and more important as a junior partner 
perpetually at the mercy of price fluctuation.128 Amin, Wallerstein and Prebish argue 
that economies that are very dependent on primary commodities are very vulnerable 
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to economic crisis because of their inability to withstand fluctuations in world 
prices.129  
 
Second, contradictions of Ivorian colonial economy led to huge development 
discrepancy between south and north regions of the country. Catherin Aubertin points 
out that until the late 1930s when the French settlers pressured the colonial regime to 
intensify its policy of forced labour for plantations in the south, economic and social 
development between the north and south was on par.130 But on the eve of 
independence, the disparity between the north and south was large and growing. Eddy 
Lee estimated a seven-to-one ratio for average income difference between the two 
regions in 1981.131  
 
Third, the political economy of Ivorian colonial state produced a bourgeoisie class, 
which benefited from the economic trajectory espoused by the colonial 
administration. Bakary argues that the development of a plantation economy led to a 
consensus on economic policy, which is the main source of conservative politics in 
the country.132  
 
Ethnic cleavages, mobilisation and access to resources, was also heightened by the 
degree of interaction between the various groups in Ivory Coast with the colonial 
master- France. At the top of the list were Akans, specifically Baoules because of 
their early encounters with Europeans and their ability to accept and propagate the 
civilising mission. As the first region to be colonised by the French, the first schools 
were opened in the southeast and center because of the concentration of colonial 
economic activities.133 Next were Dioulas and the Senoufo from the northern part of 
the country, mainly because most of them are Muslim and France had experience with 
Islamic people in North Africa. At the bottom of the classification were the Bété, 
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because of their late colonisation and the very difficult military pacification of their 
territory, negative traits were ascribed to its inhabitants.134 Houphouët-Boigny's 
victory in 1945 and again in 1946 can be described as the political translation of the 
social hegemony of an ethnic group.135 Lemarchand argues that the area of colonial 
penetration and the manner in which colonial rule spread, influenced the character of 
social stratification in African states.136 
 
Fourth, ethnicity was engendered by French colonial administration as a tool to 
destroy the PDCI as a formidable political force in Ivory Coast. The parties' strong 
regional roots (Ivory Coast Progressive Party-PPCI in the Southeast, PDCI-RDA in 
the center, and African Socialist Movement-MSA in the West) were the political 
expression of the internal socioeconomic divisions of the Ivorian population.  
 
On the eve of independent, Ivory Coast largely inherited a colonial state with 
boundaries drawn devoid of any reference to the interest of local population. 
Administrative expediency demanded the colonial regime to elevate small entities into 
ethnic groupings. Until 1947, the colony of Ivory Coast included the largest portion of 
current Upper Volta.137 The present stratification of Ivory Coast into 60 ethnic groups 
is the work Delafosse-French-devoid of any first hand knowledge of Ivorian 
ethnology.138 His identification of ethnic groups was strongly influence by 
administrative expediency and murky parameters such as culture/language which as 
have been argued are constructive.139  
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It is within this background that official speeches and academic writings of many 
disciplines perpetuate the idea of sixty tribes in Ivory Coast as a "human puzzle"140 or 
"racial dustbin”.141 Indeed, Ivorians do not fit so well into the social attire more or less 
designed for them by the coloniser, because they themselves did not provid the fabric, 
the political economy of the colonial state shaped it.  
Section Two: Post-Colonial Political Economy 
 
“If you don't want to vegetate in bamboo huts, concentrate your 
efforts on growing good cocoa and good coffee. They will fetch a 
good price and you will become rich."142 
 
Cocoa is Cote d'Ivoire, it has built this country and it has also 
helped ruin it.143 Daniel Abo 
 
A World Bank report on Ivory Coast entitled “the challenge of success”144 
underscored the development success of Ivory Coast almost twenty years after 
independence. While the economies of other African countries grew at an annual rate 
of 3.7 Niger, Senegal 2.5% and Ghana -0.1,145 Ivory Coast grew at a rate of 7.5%146 
making it the fastest in Africa and 15th in the world.147 Though Ivory Coast witnessed 
economic boom for 20 years, by 1980 due mainly to fall in world prices, the country 
descended into economic chaos and has really never recover since then. In short, most 
of the progress achieved by Ivory Coast between 1960 and 1979 was lost in the 1980s 
and 1990s making the 1980s a lost decade for the country. Within this context, it is 
important to note that cocoa and coffee form almost 40% of the country export and 
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20% of government revenue and almost 80% of the working population is engaged in 
this sector.148  
 
The economic success of Ivory Coast has been credited to its development trajectory 
and comparative advantage.149  While many developing African countries instituted 
import substitution policies; Ivory Coast adopted an export oriented development 
trajectory grounded in liberal migration and land tenure policy greased with a liberal 
tax regime to attract foreign investment.  
 
At constant prices, the valve of cocoa and coffee production more than double 
between 1960 and 1981, from 188, 800 million to 493,200 C.F.A francs.150 
Agriculture grew at 5% annually while industrial sector was weak due to lack of 
indigenous capital.151 Increase productivity was achieve by increasing the cultivation 
of arable land which meant increase labour force which was made affordable by 
cheap migrant labour from up north and neighboring countries like Burkina Faso, 
Mali and Guinea.152  
 
Having achieved a real GDP level of $1,379 per capita in 1978, real output fell to 
$867 in 1990153 and under $776 per capita in 2002, which is lower than the $849 
achieved in 1964,154 hence by 2002 Ivorians were poorer than they were at eve of 
independence. To sum up Ivory Coast economic malaise, it is the most indebted sub-
Saharan Africa African country in relation to debt per capital ratio thus a HIPC.155 
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According to United Nations Development Programme, Ivory Coast is the 14th 
poorest country on earth ranking 163 out of 177 countries.156 
 
Table 2: Economic Growth in Ivory Coast, 1961-2004 
Year GDP/growth 
% 
Year GDP/growth 
% 
Year GDP/growth% Year GDP/growth 
% 
year GDP/growth 
% 
1961 9.93 1971 9.46 1981 3.50 1991 0.04 2001 -2.6 
1962 1.23 1972 4.24 1982 0.20 1992 -0.24 2002 -2.9 
1963 14.49 1973 5.94 1983 -3.90 1993 -0.19 2003 -2.1 
1964 17.61 1974 4.33 1984 -2.70 1994 0.81 2004 -2.3 
1965 -3.11 1975 8.25 1985 4.50 1995 7.13   
1966 11.58 1976 12.92 1986 3.26 1996 7.73   
1967 4.60 1977 7.31 1987 -0.35 1997 5.72   
1968 12.55 1978 10.91 1988 1.14 1998 4.75   
1969 9.54 1979 2.39 1989 2.95 1999 1.58   
1970 10.38 1980 -10.96 1990 -1.10 2000 -2.3   
Source: World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) 
 
Table 3: Human Development/human security in Ivory Coast 1973-2003 
Year HDI/human security 
1975 0.409 
1980 0.441 
1985 0.448 
1990 0.442 
1995 0.427 
2000 0.428 
2003 0.420 
Source: UNDP Human Development Report 
 
The mechanism through which agricultural production translated into macroeconomic 
growth was through government intervention in the marketing of cocoa and coffee. 
This was done through the Caisse de Stabilisation et de Soutien des Prix des Produits 
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Agricoles, CSSPPA or marketing boards.157 The stabilisation fund-Caisse- was the 
heart of Ivorian economy.158 The role of the Caisse included setting an official export 
price, releasing export negotiated by private exporters, selling a proportion of the 
crop, setting farm-gate price (price that farmers get) and ensuring quality and 
transportation.159  
 
The management of cocoa was clouded with secrecy.160 At the national level the 
Caisse worked closely with the Presidency and other ministries. The Caisse was 
responsible for issuing quotas, licenses to exporters and transporters. Among the 30-
40 French Lebanese and Ivorian big companies involved in the exportation of cocoa 
and coffee, the big six who export around 55% of the crops were mainly French. At 
the local level the viability of the Caisse is ensured by Prefets (divisional officer) and 
police officers in consonant with the Service de Controle de la Commercialisation des 
Prodcuits Agricole and the Service de Controle du Conditionment des Produits 
Agricoles a l’Explortation by ensuring unscrupulous practices and quality.161 
 
The Caisse offered sufficiently high payments for cocoa and coffee to maintain their 
output, albeit well below world prices thus allowing the government to channel the 
difference into its coffers through Budget Special d’Invetissement et Equipement 
(B.S.I.E).162 For example, between 1975 and 1977, farmers received only 18% of the 
world prices despite the fact that world prices doubled and tripled during this 
period.163 Transfer to B.S.I.E rose from 24,000 million Francs C.F.A in 1975 to 
179,000 million in 1978, 93,000 million in 1982 and 116,000 in 1983.164 Between 
one-half and two third of all public-sector investment originated from the Caisse.165 
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Mindful of the dangers of specialisation, Ivorian government tried to diversify its 
economy. This was made possible by surpluses acquired through the Caisse. The 
government embarked on import substitution industries and other industries that were 
vital to the economy such as transportation and food processing; for example, fruit, 
beverages, rice mostly in the south and sugar and cotton in the north.166 According to 
the Ministry of Finance, government total investment was 26% in 1981 and 22% of 
GDP in 1982.167 By 1980, Ivory Coast had more than a two hundred state own 
enterprises.168 The government also invested heavily in education and health facilities. 
Daddieh argues that by 1980, school enrollment in Ivory Coast had more than double 
thanks to the government drive to improve its education facilities.169 
 
Gilles et al points out that investment in Ivory Coast were carried out not only through 
the surplus of cocoa boom. Investments accounted for 35-40% of external debt 
acquired through the strength of cocoa boom and Ivory Coast geopolitical situation 
during the Cold War.170 During 1970-1980, Ivory Coast external debts doubled from 
7% to 14% of GDP.  In nominal terms, the stock of Ivorian debt moved from 136, 4 
billion CFAF in 1971 to 2, 525, 5 billion CFAF in 1990. In 1985, the ratio of 
debt/GDP stood at 151.7% and debt/GNP stood at 35%. By 1987, Boigny ceased 
paying Ivory Coast external debt. In total, from 1970-2004 Ivorian external debt rose 
from 58.8% to 190% of GDP,171 while debt services rose from 1.75% in 1971 to 8.52 
in 1980 to 37% of GDP in 1999172 and 74.8% of GDP in 2004.173 It is against this 
backdrop that structural adjustment was initiated in Ivory Coast. 
 
From 1981 to 2005 Ivory Coast has been on structural adjustment. It was one of the 
first African countries to solicit SAP in 1981 though it abandoned it in 1987/88. In 
1981-86 SAP called for macroeconomic reforms. From 1989-1999, IMF fiscal 
adjustment requirements were introduced in an effort to reduce the government 
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budget deficit. These included substantial reductions in current government 
expenditures (-30%) and capital expenditures (-15%), privatisations and some 
financial reforms.174 In order to reach the budget surplus target, the IMF required 
labour market deregulation, price decontrol, trade reform, reductions in civil service 
employment and faster privatisation.175 The IMF also advocated devaluation of the 
currency. The Caisse was completely privitatised in November 1999 and divided into 
three private branches: Autorite de Regulation du Café et du Cacao (ARCC), Bourse 
du Café et du Cacao (BCC) and Fund de Regulation et Controle (FRC).176  
 
Under the new privitised system, the price risk has been transferred to farmers 
specifically under an auction system thus exposing them to world price shocks. 
Amidst incremental benefits, the liberalisation of cocoa has worsened the plight of 
Ivorian farmers. They were exposed not only to shocks of world prices, but also to 
unscrupulous activities of buyers.177 This situation was compounded by the fact that 
farmers were not prepared for liberilisation as 57% of the population is illiterate.178 
Devaluation of the CFAF in 1994 by 50% increased poverty levels of Ivorians 
because their purchasing power decreased due to inflation despite 10-15% increased 
in salaries.179 
 
There is a strong positive correlation between SAP and poverty in Ivory Coast. 
During 1988-1995, the incidence and intensity of poverty doubled, with the number of 
people earning less than $1/day increasing from 17.8% of the population to 36.8%.  
By 1999, 47% of Ivorians in urban areas were living below poverty line as compared 
to 50.4 in rural areas. In Abidjan, Ivory Coast’s largest city, the rate of urban poverty 
rose from 5% to 20% between 1993 and 1995.180  
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The National Institute of Statistics measuring poverty using human development 
index posits that during 1990-1995 almost 43% of the population was affected by 
different form of poverty.181 By 2000, about one third of rural population had to walk 
for more than 5 km to reach a health center.182 Income disparity increases, by 1998; 
the richest 10% of Ivorians accumulated a total income level 12.4 times superior to 
that of the poorest 10% as against 9.1 in 1993 and 8.8 in 1995.183 in 1995, the GINI 
Index was 36.7 but by 1998, it was 45.2.184 
As part of the policy reforms required by the Fund, user fees were introduced into the 
public health care system in 1991. The devaluation of the franc CFA made it difficult 
for the urban poor to pay for health care services, and as a result there was a shift 
towards traditional medicine as health problems worsened. For example, the incidence 
of stunted growth in children increased from 20% in 1988 to 35% in 1995. As access 
became more expensive, health issues became a more pressing concern. A survey by 
UNICEF and the Government of Ivory Coast found that when women were asked to 
identify their problems, health ranked first 185 
In the educational sector, Data from a UNICEF study of Ivory Coast shows that there 
was a consistent decline in per capita spending on education. From 1990 to1995 there 
was a drop of more than 35%,186 from CFAF 20,000 per year to approximately13, 
000.187 In 1991 the wages of teaches where slashed by half, students could no longer 
afford food because subsidies were withdrawn, subsidised houses for teachers were 
also withdrawn. This sparked a series of demonstration of university students and 
teachers in Ivory Coast especially in the early 1980s and1990s. Despite an 
improvement in gross enrolment in primary schools over the period 1986-1995, 
educational indicators overall showed poor results. By 1995, only 45% of girls from 
the poorest quintile of households were receiving primary education. At the secondary 
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level, the gross enrolment rate declined from 34% to 31% between 1986 and 1995. 188 
Attempts by the government to reduce the salary of the army and police were received 
by mutinies in 1990.   
 
Politically, SAP reconfigured political cleavage in Ivory Coast. Crook argues that 
SAP is one of the principal triggering events for political liberalisation in Ivory Coast. 
He points out that “it was the measures forced upon the government by the crisis of 
1989 which led directly to the change to multi-partysm and the uncertainties of 
[Houphouët-Boigny’s] final three years in office, rather than the carefully graduated 
‘democratisation’ process of the 1980s.”189  According to Crook, cuts in civil service 
spending and increases in taxation strengthened Laurent Gbagbo’s opposition Front 
Populaire Ivorien (FPI) which gained the support of the disgruntled teachers’ and 
lecturers’ unions.   
 
Three important inferences can be drawn from the effect of structural adjustment on 
the vulnerability of Ivory Coast to conflict. The reduction of public expenditure and 
liberalisation of the Caisse meant that the Ivorian state did not only run short of 
revenue, it could not meet up with its functions especially in relations to health care 
and education. This was compounded by the fact that in raising taxes to service its 
debt, the state had to tax farmers who were left at the mercy of market prices. 
Consequently, the disengagement of the state from the economy meant that safety 
nets that had hitherto protected citizens were removed thus exposing them to the hard 
realities of demand and supply. This in turn had a ripple effect on the vulnerability of 
Ivorian society to ethnic rhetoric. 
 
Moreover, in trying to release resources from the state, structural adjustment 
engendered a parallel economy in Ivory Coast which escaped the control of the 
government. This did not only create corruption and criminalisation of business, other 
centers of power were created which were not within the purview of the state. Most 
importantly, avenues for rewards to placate political opponents became restricted. 
Against this backdrop, demand-bearing groups whose interest could not be protected 
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withdrew their support from the government mostly students and teachers as evidence 
by teachers, student strikes and military mutinies in the early 1980s and 1990s. 
Furthermore, it became difficult for the state to maintain development projects and 
regional balance. 
 
Important to note is the fact that, Ivorian development drive was mostly concentrated 
around cocoa producing areas of the south. Agglomeration economies and economies 
of scale favoured a highly concentrated pattern of local development. The southern 
region represents more than 80% of total employment in the formal sector of Ivory 
Coast. In the period 1980-1996, the region registered an average annual growth in 
labour productivity of about 67% higher than in the rest of the country. The main 
losers were the regions in the north (Denguélé, Savannahs, Worodougou and 
Zanzan).190 In 1974, the income per capita of the four northern departments: 
Boundiali (CFAF 28,480), Ferkessedougou (CFAF 49,554), Korhogo (CFAF 45,041) 
and Odienne (CFAF 29,034) were far below national average of CFAF 67,679.191 
 
The disparity is very glaring in terms of socio economic indicators. In the table below, 
Indicators of social infrastructure are proxied by education: the rates of primary 
(ELEM) and secondary (SECON) enrolment or by access indicators measured by the 
number of classes per square kilometer (CLASSelem and CLASSsecon).  As for 
health services, indicators used are demographic pressure (DEMO) measured by the 
number of inhabitants per health center, and spatial access (ACCESS) estimated by 
the distance (in Km) travelled to the nearest health center.  
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Table 4:  Levels of Economic and Social Infrastructure Endowments by Region, 
1995 
 ROAD POST WATER CLASS 
elem 
CLASS 
secon 
ELEM SECON DEMO ACCESS 
Agnéby (Agboville) 0.41 182 61 - 0.04 - 0.57 12,430 1.25 
Bas-Sassandra (San 
Pedro) 
0.15 246 167 0.07 0.01 0.69 0.46 21,058 1.39 
Lacs (Yamoussoukro) 0.27 83 32 0.40 0.09 0.81 0.62 8,591 1.03 
Lagunes (Abidjan) 0.30 55 20 1.09 0.32 0.72 0.51 24,859 0.43 
Montagnes (Man) 0.20 153 146 0.13 0.02 0.94 0.49 10,960 0.90 
Denguélé (Odienné) 0.15 93 73 0.07 0.01 0.57 0.34 5,540 2.29 
Marahoué (Bouaflé) 0.17 202 140 - 0.02 - 0.46 14,348 1.20 
Moyen-Comoé 
(Abengourou) 
0.30 171 59 0.15 0.04 0.72 0.60 11,554 1.29 
N’Zi-Comoé (Dimbokro) 0.26 83 47 - 0.02 - 0.53 5,962 1.08 
Savanes (Korhogo) 0.21 162 75 0.05 0.01 0.63 0.45 7,661 0.92 
Sud-Bandama (Divo) 0.18 223 180 - 0.02 - 0.56 14,225 1.12 
Vallée du Bandama 
(Bouaké) 
0.20 105 38 0.13 0.38 0.72 0.67 10,556 0.96 
Worodougou (Séguéla) 0.17 206 128 - 0.00 - 0.38 7,183 1.57 
Zanzan (Bondoukou) 0.21 237 111 0.04 0.01 0.53 0.31 6,768 1.22 
Sud-Comoé (Aboisso) 0.28 168 35 - 0.02 - 0.56 7,488 1.11 
Haut-Sassandra (Daloa) 0.24 200 127 0.26 0.05 0.78 0.66 14,379 0.77 
          
National average 0.23 161 90 0.15 0.07 0.71 0.51 11, 473 1.16 
Standard deviation 0.07 58 51 0.27 0.11 0.11 0.10 5.257 0.39 
Source : Urbandata (BDUR) of BNETD. Sanogo (2001) and authors’ estimates.192 
 
From the table above, a cursory review will reveal that northern areas like Odienne 
Zanzan and Worodougou fared far below center areas like Yamoussoukro, southern 
areas like Abidjan and national average. This disparity is even more glaring across 
ethnic groups 
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Table 5: Comparison of socio-economic inequalities across ethnic groups 
between 1994 and 1998 
 Socio-economic prosperity index Education and literacy index 
            1994           1998           1994            1998 
 N U R N U R N U R N U R 
Akan 1.40 1.44 1.52 1.45 1.34 2.03 1.33 1.35 1.36 1.38 1.28 1.69 
Kru 1.12 1.41 0.79 1.18 1.11 1.10 1.62 1.68 1.79 1.67 1.53 1.97 
N. Mandé 1.19 0.87 1.62 0.93 0.90 0.57 0.74 0.69 0.44 0.57 0.59 0.26 
S. Mandé 0.61 0.76 0.33 0.64 0.92 0.32 0.99 1.16 0.83 0.92 1.10 1.0 
Voltaic 0.65 0.70 1.05 0.79 0.96 0.68 0.71 0.88 0.59 0.80 0.99 0.53 
Foreigners 0.59 0.57 0.30 0.60 0.57 0.54 050 0.51 0.40 0.54 0.56 0.43 
ELIMa - - - - - - 0.39 0.44 0.56 0.45 0.39 0.71 
SEIMb 0.35 0.38 0.52 0.30 0.23 0.57 - - - - - - 
Source: Langer, Armin 
a) Education-Literacy Inequality Measure 
b) Socio-Economic Inequality Measure 
 
Table 6 shows socio-economic prosperity and education-literacy indices for the 
different ethnic groups. The indices refer to the relative positions of the different 
ethnic groups with respect to the average within particular group in relation to urban/ 
rural setting. Socio-Economic Inequality Measure (SEIM), measures variables such as 
availability of drinking water access to electricity, toilet facilities and housing. 
Education-Literacy Inequality Measure (ELIM), measures variables such as 
educational level at least primary school and ability to read. From the table, one 
would realise that generally, the three southern ethnic groups (Akan, Kru and 
Southern Mandé) were better off in socio-economic prosperity and education and 
literacy in urban areas than the two northern tribes (N. Mande and Voltaic) in 1994. 
But by 1998, though the inequality was still very glaring, northern ethnic groups were 
improving their status while that of southern ethnic groups was deteriorating. This 
might be explained by the fact that northerners were mostly farmers and traders vis a 
vis southern tribes who depended on government jobs which had became scares 
because of SAP.  
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A cursory review of post colonial Ivorian political economy will reveal many 
structural failures of the Ivorian model. The economy was too dependent on the 
production and exploitation of cocoa and coffee which made the economy vulnerable 
to prices shocks thus economic crisis. Ivory Coast witnessed negative growth during 
the early 1980s mainly due to fall in world prices. There is a strong coloration 
between structural adjustment and poverty in Ivory Coast. The intensification of 
structural adjustment in the 1990s and the fall in human development or human 
security is important to note.193 Though there was an improvement in growth rates in 
the late 1990s, there was a fall in human development. Structural adjustment alone 
cannot explain this paradox; income inequality during this period might also be a 
reason though income inequality mighthave been caused by SAP. Corrupton which at 
this point was indemic in Ivorian life might be a reason. Moreover, increase in growth 
rates might have been increase in production which does not necessarily translate to 
improvement in quality of life taking into consideration the effect of inflation and 
devaluation on the purchasing power of Ivorians. Keeping to the thesis of Collier and 
World Bank, Ivory Coast descended into chaos at a point when the country had fours 
consecutive years of sustained economic decline (1999-2002) 
 
Post Ivorian political economy did not only create economic and social disparity 
between regions and ethnic groups, it induced a huge debt burden. A local bourgeoisie 
class was created and who benefited from the economic trajectory of the country. This 
elite class included funtionnaires/civil servant and absentee landlords. Thus when 
structural adjustment came, it was this elite class that was the first to withdraw their 
support from the state keeping in mind that they have been well taken care of under 
Boigny.  
Section Three: How Boigny Dealt with Ethnicity 
Félix Houphouët-Boigny as head of state until his death in 1993 was able to manage 
political demands and political conflicts since the beginning of autonomous political 
life in 1945, albeit the fact that ethnic groups are said to be at the core of the state and 
Ivorian politics.194 The bedrock of politics in an ethnically diverse society is the 
ability to build coalitions amongst various demand-bearing groups, the ability to 
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sustain inclusive politics most invariably through the distribution of rewards. The 
question then is; how did Boigny managed a harmonious co-existence between the 
various ethnic groups thus ensuring relative political stability? 
 
I argue that Sustained economic growth helped transformed the political landscape, 
eroding ideological outcroppings, shifting commitments and reducing or removing 
conflicts. The buoyant Ivorian economy during 1960-1979 afforded Boigny 
manoeuvring space to engender the politics of inclusion and distribution, le modele 
houphetiste or le compromise houphoutiste.195 Available supply of resources meant 
that he met the demands of demand-bearing groups, co-opted political adversaries, 
buy off the military, appease potential enemies and kept ethnic animosity in check 
through regional development.  
 
Thus in the absence of democratic institutions in negotiating the distribution of 
resources, Boigny became, the mediator and adjudicator on who gets what when and 
how. Though inclusive and distributive politics were the hallmarks of Ivorian politics 
under Boigny, he episodically used dialoques and repression to ensure societal 
cohesion and political stability grounded in his paternalistic style of leadership.196  
 
Understanding how Boigny managed to preserve relative political stability in Ivory 
Coast can be divided into two time frames: taking over of power and the management 
of power. Within these two time frames, I will analyse the actors or demand-bearing 
groups involved (the social basis/elite), the issues (demands) at stake, the values and 
the modes of action (strategies, political action repertoires), and the outcomes.197 
 
During the heydays of political activism in Ivory Coast in 1945, Boigny understood 
the importance of building political coalitions across different professional, 
associational and ethnic groups. SAA which later transformed itself into a political 
party (PDCI) served an as organisation to harmonise the various interest of demand-
bearing groups in the fight for political power in the advent of independence. Boigny 
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was able to win the 1945 legislative election because he was able to tap into the evils 
of colonisation and use it as political capital to garner support.  For example, the end 
of forced labour meant African farmers could have easy access to labour; the 
northerners could work in plantations on their own terms and even earn wages. It is 
against this background that Boigny built a powerful coalition with Gbon Koulibaly in 
the north.  
 
Unlike the colonial administration which was paying 6 CFAF for a days work, Boigny 
offered 20 CFAF. From a political perspective, this guaranteed him the support of the 
farmers who by this time numbered 40,000 in 1944, 120,000 in 1956, and around 
200,000 in 1959.198 Boigny perfectly understood French electoral politics, which was 
grounded in winner takes all. Thus since most of the constituency was concentrated 
around Abidjan he knew that building coalitions could afford him a simple majority. 
 
After World War II, the political and economic transformations induced by French 
colonial system produced three politically active set of players: traditional elites-old 
chieftaincies or new creations of French administration; economic elites-planters, 
traders, and educated elites--"evolués" or "lettrés."199. Boigny did not only build a 
coalition around planters and traders/north center, educated elites where promised 
political advancement through the machinery of the party. As it has been argued, the 
PDCI was merely representing the interest of various professional organisations in 
Ivory Coast for example, teachers association, and student union.200  
 
Boigny understood that grapping state power does not only warrant building national 
coalition, but also having external leverage to negotiate with colonial administration. 
The alliance between PDCI and RDA with Boigny as the President meant that Boigny 
had leverage in dealing with France grounded in the notion that if he could be co-
opted by the colonial administration all other parties in francophone Africa who were 
members of RDA would follow suit. 
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Boigny was able to establish cohesion in Ivorian politics through state intervention in 
the economy due to the lack of indigenous capital and investors. In spite of its liberal 
and capitalist preference and the existence of a private sector, the Ivorian state was a 
major economic actor through the development of a more dynamic and important 
public sector and the establishment of a welfare system.201 Since the Ivorian state 
represented a resource in itself, its control was equivalent to the control of the 
economy. Political competition became competition for economic resources, just as 
economic allocation was used to manage political corruption. The modest origins of 
Ivorian leaders made conflicts over the control of political position the only door to 
economic resources.202  
 
Patrimonialism was one of the hallmarks of Boigny’s regime.203 Co-optation was 
frequently use by Boigny to appease individuals and regions he considered as threat. 
Zartman and Delgado point that until 1980s “all former opposition leaders have found 
a place in the Ivorian economy, and there are no opposition leaders either in jail or 
exile”.204 An over expanded service publique (public service) meant that Boigny was 
able to distribute political rewards to clients through their absorption into the 
bureaucratic apparatus of the state. Civil servant salaries accounted for about 60% of 
state budget.205 By 1980, the state was the highest employer in the formal sector 
employing around 40%.206 Increase economic growth translated into increase salaries 
for civil servants. Political institutions of the state were also increased to 
accommodate clients. For example, Boigny divided the Ministry of Education into 
four ministries and the Ministry of Agriculture into three.207  The expanded 
ministerial portfolios served as rewards for potential enemies and clients. Boigny also 
expanded the Economic and Social Council from 85- 120 persons. PDCI’s political 
bureau was enlarged from 100-208 to accommodate demand-bearing groups notably 
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the young and educated class.208 Deputies were given special privilege as parliament 
became a place for reward.209 The administrative apparatus of the state was increased, 
64 new communes des plein exercise were created down from 34,210 and the military 
was used for administrative purposes.211 Public parastatals also served as rewards for 
clients. State-owned enterprises grew to 266 in 1979, employing 43,000 people.212  
 
By late 1970s, Boigny instituted ivoirianisation because of increase in demand-
bearing groups. This meant that he was able to place his cronies in important foreign 
companies. For example, Charles Donwahi, the president of CFAO-Cote d’ivoire 
from 1975-1991 served as parliamentarian, Minister of Agriculture, and member of 
PDCI political bureau. Though such Ivorians were paid on par as Europeans, they 
were beneficial to foreign companies because of their political clout.213 Also 
ivoirianisation meant Ivorian clients could hold shares in important foreign 
companies. For example: all the Ivorian shares in a leading exporter Dafci, were held 
by Gbon Coulibaly, political baron of Korhogo and long time deputy and member of 
political bureau of PDCI. Boigny’s son Françoise presided over Etablisements Jean 
Abile-Gal, nerve center of JAG group.214   
 
The ivoirianisation of trade was another instrument of distributing rewards.215 For 
example, Programme d’Action Commercial was created in 1970 to ivoirainise 
commerce and was placed under Henri Konan Bédié then Minister of Economy and 
Finance. This programme was meant to serve as a financing mechanism to potential 
traders/retailers. But it turned out to be an instrument to dispense rewards.216 
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Boigny was also able to sustained patrimonialism through the liberalisation of the 
marketing of cocoa. Through the quota system, licenses were awarded to certain 
designated person to buy and export cocoa. This meant making money/rent seeking 
which amounted to about CFAF 37 million in 1990s and $3-6 million in the late 
1980s.217 These quotas were more or less politically motivated and most of the 
political elites benefited. For example: SAIE was linked to the Ouegnin family and 
Mr.Ouegnin Georges, in 1982 was Chef de Protocole at the Presidence de la Republic 
and Directeur du Protocole in 1977 at Ministry of Foreign Affairs while Mme.218 
Goergette Ouegnin was member of the Economic and Social Council. SOCIMEXY, 
was linked to the Mayor of Yamoussoukro; HACCANDY, linked to M. Haccandy, 
Mayor of Tiebissou; SIDEXCA, directed by Blaise N’Dia Koffi, former deputy, 
member of politburo and Minister of State in charge with tourism; EMIMAT, owned 
by Emmanuel Dioulo mayor of Abidjan.219 
The expansion of the welfare system also meant clients were kept happy. The 
National Fund for Social Benefits provided fund for health care. An important part of 
conflict management through redistribution of income under Boigny was the 
proliferation of special statuses. Following recommendations from the General Status 
of the Civil Service, higher salaries were awarded to specific categories of civil 
servants such as university and secondary school professors, magistrates, police and 
doctors.  For example, education as the "priority of priorities," took 40% of the total 
budget.220 Education was subsidised, housing, transport and boarding facilities were 
almost free for students and teachers. Scholarships were easy to get. When the 
economic crisis came in 1980, attempts by Boigny to curb these benefits met stiff 
resistance as in 1990.221 
Like most African countries, Boigny understood that urban areas were the most 
politically threatening.222 Consequently, he instituted certain policies in a bid to 
placate urban dwellers; for example, by staying within the franc zone. Ivory Coast and 
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13 other countries mostly former French colonies (12) form the Communauté 
Financier Africaine. The CFAF is pegged to the French franc at a fix exchange rate. 
As a result, the value of the CFAF was determined by the French franc. Politically, 
this arrangement was good for France and Boigny. Domestically, the appreciation of 
CFAF due to depreciation of US dollar vis a vis French franc meant that, the urban 
population in Ivory Coast could afford expensive consumer goods from abroad. 
Consequently, Boigny could have decided to remain in CFA zone and resist 
devaluation because it protected his political constituency.223  Boigny also pacified 
urban dwellers by subsidising housing in major cities. Cohen argues that by 
subsidising housing up to 50% in the mid-1970s Boigny was able to garner the 
support of the middle class in the cities though it had huge repercussion on the 
economy.224  
 
Boigny was effective in controlling the patronage system in Ivory Coast thanks to the 
adoption of de facto single party system. With the PDCI as the only political party in 
Ivory Coast, Boigny was able to manipulate and control the various demand-bearing 
groups. Since membership in the party meant access to state resources, the PDCI 
became a mechanism for political elites to negotiate the spoils of the state within 
themselves. Against this backdrop, movement within the party structures was 
tantamount to resource mobilisation. With this framework in place, Boigny was not 
only able to control resources at his disposal, other centres of power where within his 
control.   
 
Boigny did not only establish clients within Ivory Coast, he maintained a very cordial 
relation with France. This relationship allowed French interest specifically business to 
grow while Boigny benefited from France through security agreement and the 
stationing of Régiment Inter-Armée d'Outre-mer (4ème RIAOM – 4th Overseas Inter-
Army Regiment) which later became the Bataillon d'Infanterie Marine Airporté (43ème 
BIMA – 43th Airborne Naval Infantry Batallion) and acted as a deterrent for any 
possible coup.225 France leveraged Ivory Coast position in the World Bank and IMF 
and at one point rescued Ivory Coast from economic collapse by buying all its cocoa 
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stock.226 This mutual relationship was cemented by the fact that Ivory Coast is a 
member of the CFA thus making financial dealings both countries very easy. 
 
In a bid to established regional and ethnic balance, Boigny used two strategies. 
Politically, Boigny tried his hand on inclusive politics through ethnic quotas in an 
attempt to establish a balance between ethnic groups within state institution.227 The 
table below shows how Boigny tried to balance ethnic representation in political 
institutions. 
 
Table 6: Elite representation in political institution from 1959-1980 
Ethnic 
group 
Total 
political 
elite 
Ministers  Deputy  Economic 
and social 
council 
PDCI 
politburo 
Total 
population 
 No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %     % 
Akan  163 50.9 39 53.4 100 50.0 50 56.1 43 55.1 41.4 
Kru  33 19.6 15 20.5 41 20.5 13 14.6 10 12.8 16.7 
N.Mandé 33 10.3 7 9.5 19 9.0 10 11.2 8 10.25 14.8 
S.Mandé 17 9.06 2 2.7 13 6.5 4 4.4 4 5.1 10.2 
Voltaic  29 9.06 6 8.2 9 4.5 4 4.4 7 8.9 15.7 
Others  13 4.06 4 5.4 6 3.0 7 7.8 5 6.4 1.2 
Unknown  1 0.3 - - 1 0.5 - - - - - 
Source: Bakary, T. 1984: 36228 
 
From the table it is clear that a skilful system of ethnic “quotas” allowed all major 
ethnic groups to be represented in post-independent political institutions from 1959-
80, though the Akans dominated. The Akans represented half the leaders in 1980 
(50.9) though they formed about two fifths of the population in 1977. Voltaic and 
south Mandé had representation about half their numerical importance. Kru and 
Malinke had representation roughly equal to their size.  
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Table 7: Ethnic representation in political institutions under Boigny 1980-93 
Ethnic 
groups 
Governmenta National Assembly Economic and Social Council 
 Nov.80 Jun.86 Oct.89 Nov.91 Nov.80 Nov.85 Nov.90 Feb.86 Feb92 
 % RRb % RR % RR % RR % RR % RR % RR % RR % RR 
Akan  0.49 1.16 0.41 0.99 0.47 1.12 0.61 1.46 0.46 1.09 0.45 1.07 0.47 1.12 0.55 1.32 0.58 1.38 
Baoule  0.22 1.29 0.24 1.46 0.20 1.20 0.17 1.04 0.19 1.14 0.21 1.23 0.21 1.27 0.28 1.70 0.33 1.95 
Kru  0.19 1.30 0.20 1.34 0.20 1.37 0.17 1.19 0.20 1.40 0.19 1.33 0.17 1.17 0.19 1.31 0.23 1.54 
S.Mand
é 
0.05  0.51 0.10 0.91 0.13 1.25 0.04 0.41 0.11 1.02 0.10 0.91 0.10 .91 0.03 031 0.03 0.31 
N.Man
dé 
0.08 0.51 0.17 1.07 0.13 0.84 0.09 0.55 0.10 0.60 0.14 0.90 0.16 1.01 0.14 0.89 0.12 0.73 
Voltaic  0.14 0.83 0.10 0.60 0.03 0.20 0.09 0.53 0.14 0.63 0.12 0.74 0.10 0.63 0.04 0.26 0.02 0.10 
No.      N=37    N=41  N=30  N=23  N=147  N=175  N=175  N=120  N=120 
PIMc       0.36     0.27    0.46    0.47    0.30    0.22        0.21    0.52    0.63 
Source: Armin Langer 
a) The following government positions were taken into account: President, 
Ministers of State and Regular Ministers. Deputies were not included in the 
calculations 
b) Relative Representation (RR) is calculated by dividing an ethnic group’s 
relative proportion in government by its relative size in the entire population 
c) Political inequality Measure (PIM) equals the standard deviation of the 
relative representation of the different ethnic groups 
 
From the table above, one can deduce that Boigny maintained relative ethnic balance 
though the Akans still maintained their dominance. The Krus were relatively over-
represented in all three political institutions during the entire period. This might be 
due to increase social and economic violence that erupted in the region and the 
eventual appearance of FPI as a political opponent in the region. Also the National 
Assembly seems be the political institution where equality was ensured. This might be 
the out come of semi-competition introduced in 1980. But one most bear in mind that 
ethnic balancing does not necessarily reflects in numbers because of the different 
levels of decision making and the political weight of certain ministerial portfolios. 
 
Economically, Boigny engendered development projects in the north specifically in 
the 1970s. In 1970, the government launched a very ambitious regional development 
programme worth CFAF 21milliard. From this initiative, towns like Korhogo in the 
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north benefited a lot in relation to infrastructure. But this programme was abandoned 
to the economic crisis in the 1980s.229  
 
Table 8: Public investment per region 1971-1977 (CFAF) 
Region 
 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975a 1976a 1977a 1971-
1977 
1973 
populationb 
North  1.3 10.8 21.3 18.4 27.0 28.8 29.4 137.0 554.6 
East 5.3 0.4 0.4 1.1 1.5 1.1 1.5 11.3 266.5 
South 6.5 7.7 6.3 8.2 12.3 13.2 13.6 67.9 1,193,6 
West 0.3 3.4 2.3 3.7 4.6 2.8 3.1 20.2 701.9 
Center 
West  
0.3 0.1 0.1 0.7 2.5 3.2 0.6 7.6 712.0 
Center  10.8 11.5 9.2 11.0 13.5 10.4 4.3 70.7 1,490.4 
Southwest 49.4 17.9 13.5 33.3 60.3 75.0 102.6 351.9 156.0 
Abidjan  11.7 14.5 23.0 31.1 41.4 33.0 22.4 177.0 840.0 
Non-
allocated 
2.3 2.8 3.0 4.2 6.2 6.8 6.9 32.2 NAc 
Total  9.6 11.0 12.4 16.1 22.9 22.1 19.8 113.8 5,910.0 
Source: den Tuinder 1978: 151 
a) Projected 
b) In thousands. The 1973 population was used for all years. Thus, figures for the later 
years are biased upward in comparison with earlier years. 
C) Not applicable 
 
From the table above, one would realise that despite its relatively small population, 
development budget of the north increase substantially and by 1973 it was third to 
Abidjan and southwest as compared to center and south. This discrepancy seems to 
suggest that Boigny understood and valued a coalition with the north while at the 
same time trying to keep his enemies-southwest (Bétés) closer.  
 
Boigny sparingly resorted to repression to manage conflict in Ivory Coast. One 
illuminating example is his high handedness in the Guebie crisis in 1970. The crisis 
emerged after Kragbe Gnagbe from the village of Guebie demanded the right to create 
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a political party. Government forces killed about 4000-6000 people.230 Also in 1963, 
after an allege plot Boigny terminated most of his political opponent and jailed others, 
though he later pardon and co-opted them.231 
 
Boigny also used dialogue as a conflict management mechanism. In an event of 
national crisis, Boigny would invite every facet of Ivorian life for a national discuss 
where he would listen to grievances and decide on solutions. In this manner he did not 
only get close to people to understand their quarrels, but it provided him a strategy to 
test the waters of what policy option he had in mind. For example, in the 1980s and 
1990s when he had to institute austerity measures, he convened a national dialogue to 
explain the reasons.232 Unquestionably, how effective Boigny’s other strategies at 
conflict management were feasible depended ultimately on his ability to rewards 
demands. This was clearly visible after the 1989 National Dialogue. Boigny convened 
a national dialogue to explain reasons for austerity measures, though delegates agreed, 
once the measures where instituted and their full impact realised, the nation almost 
slipped to civil war because of civil disobedience. 
 
Though economic growth and political stability were interactive, political and 
economic ills were also interactive creating a vicious circle reinforcing each other. 
Pork barrel politics led to the creation of parastatals which were clearly 
uncompetitive. For example, the rice complex in the west and sugar complex in the 
north were running at a loss though the state maintained them. Corruption became 
rampant in state companies; for example the demise of the rice complex in 1970s 
which led to the dismissal of Bédié as Minister of Economy and Finance. Political 
rationalities forced Boigny to accommodate corruption grounded in his famous 
proverb do not look too closely at a peanut-roaster’s mouth.233  
Conclusion 
This section set out looking back in time retrospect to understand the root causes of 
the Ivorian crisis. The section is premised on the notion that a thorough understanding 
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of the Ivorian crisis most be ground on understanding the creation of the Ivorian state 
and its position in the global market. 
 
Some silent issues have been teased out. First, Ivory Coast was integrated into the 
world economy as a junior partner, to satisfy the economic wants of the metropole. 
Thus validating Wallenstein and Samir’s argument that such as economy is a recipe 
for disaster and this was not long before they were proven right with the eventual 
economic collapse in the 1980s. Second, French colonial policies did not only create 
ethnic awareness and animosity among ethnic cleavages, it created regional economic 
and social disparity between the north and south. Moreover, the traditional African 
trading systems were destroyed thus destroying the social glue that bounded different 
ethnic groups. Third, colonialism created and empowered a bourgeoisie class that 
strengthened their position by exploiting and entrenching the colonial system put in 
place. Within this context, Boigny was able to maintain relative political stability in 
Ivory Coast because the buoyant economy meant that clients could feed off the spoils 
of the state. This was made possible by state intervention in the economy. As demand 
bearings groups increased, so was state intervention most invariably because of the 
lack of indigenous capital. Thus as the spoils of the state were in decline because of 
economic crisis and SAP which aimed at snatching resources from the state, political 
mobilisation had be engendered through different means. The mode and mechanism 
of distribution was challenge in favor of democracy; keeping in mind that democracy 
is a mode of contestating of resource. 
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                                            CHAPTER THREE  
 
ORIGINS OF IVORIAN CRISIS: POST-BOIGNY SUCCESSION AND THE 
                                     POLITICISATION OF IVIORITE 
 
Political succession in Ivory Coast is a result of personal/elite ambitions and rivalries. 
It is also the story of social cleavages and coalition building, political alignments, 
disalignments and realignments that occurred with the rise and fall of successive 
potential heirs or présidentiables.234 As this section will show, the succession battle in 
Ivory Coast was a struggle over power and the mode of distribution of resources as 
they became scares as a result of economic crisis, compounded by SAP. As resources 
became scares to sustained political mobilisation and support, politicians turned to 
ethnic rhetoric for political mobilisation mindful of Ivorian electoral politics which is 
grounded in a winner takes all system (FPTP) 
Section One: Departure of Boigny/Succession Battles 
 
No one may know the identity (of a successor) while the chief is 
still alive. Ivory Coast has its own tradition and the West should 
take us for what we are-not what you would have us.235  
 
Bakary points out that many Ivorians stressed the need for a consensus succession to 
Boigny. Ivorians argued that a “bad ethnic choice” would bring tribal war since 
political power means access to economic resources. Thus the ethnic group which 
obtains supreme power will also obtain the means to enrich itself.236  Succession 
struggle dates back to the day Boigny was elected to the first French Constituent 
Assembly in 1946. It remained a hidden issue during the 1959 crisis, resignation of 
Jean Baptiste Mockey and during the "plots" of 1963-64.237 The issue was raised by 
Boigny himself during the first congress of the PDCI and from then on, it gained 
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momentum which reached its apogee following the 9th conference of the PDCI in 
1990 entitled renovation and continuity.238 
 
The three principal contestants in the late 1950s and late 1970s were: Jean-Baptiste 
Mockey (Apollo, died 1981), Auguste Denise (Baoule, died 1991), and Philippe 
Grégoire Yacé (Alladian). A "hero and martyr of the RDA," Mockey by 1959 was 
vice Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, he later became Political Secretary of the 
PDCI de facto President when Boigny was out of the country.239 In 1959 Mockey was 
forced to resign because he was perceived of being too radical and close to the young 
intellectuals who challenged the government. After Mockey’s resignation, Philippe 
Yacé was next in line. He became Party Secretary and President of the National 
Assembly. In 1966, Bédié emerged as heir apparent though his position weakened 
when he was dismissed as Minister of Economy and Finance and became Ambassador 
to the US. Auguste Denise was Secretary General of PDCI and Minister of state but 
lost in favour of Bédié. The political reforms that were introduced in 1980 specifically 
the elimination of Party Secretary weakened Yacé’s position while at the same 
consolidate Bédié’s, due to his election as President of the National Assembly in 
1980, 1985 and 1990. Couple with amendments of article 11 of the constitution which 
allowed the President of the national assembly to finish the mandate of his 
predecessor. 
 
Toungara argues that succession battle in Ivory Coast was grounded around 
generational and policy orientation issues. Les anciens were made up of the old 
guards or cadres of the party who were very conservative; les renovateurs were the 
party cohorts around the mid 1970s and 1980s who wanted a graduate change and the 
radicals or jeune loups/young Turks wanted total change.240 
 
In accordance with article 11 of the constitution, Bédié succeeded Boigny on the 7th of 
December 1994. Ouattara who was Prime Minister and Gbagbo leader of FPI objected 
arguing that a transitional government should be formed and elections conducted 
because the succession was illegitimate and hereditary. Within months of Bédié’s 
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accession to power, RDR was formed by Djeny Kobina, as a pro Ouattara reformist 
party and accused the PDCI of corruption and betraying the memory of Boigny. 
 
RDR was accused by Bédié of being a northern regionalist party with sinister Moslem 
agenda.241 This argument was grounded in the fact that the party was allied to 
Ouattara and his reform programmes though, Kobina was an appolo from the east. 
Conscious of the electoral strength of the north during its coalition with PDCI under 
Boigny and the 26% garnered by Lancine Gbon Coulibaly when he defected to FPI in 
the 1990s elections, Bédié tried to co-opt certain northern politician notably Gbon 
Coulibaly. In other to entrench his power, Bédié purged the civil servants of all 
suspected sympathisers of Ouattara for example, Ali Coulibaly (head Ivorian TV), 
Kone Moussa (Editor Ivoire Soir) Yacouba Kebe (managing director fraternité 
Martin). 242 
 
The accession of Gueï to power is also a continuation of the succession battle in Ivory 
Coast. In fact Gueï alleged that while he believes in Hophuetistme, the mantle of 
power must change hands from its “traditional” holders the Baoules.243 Gbagbo, since 
the legalisation of FPI have always criticised the political status quo of the country 
lamenting it for its inequality. The above scenario begs the questions, why was 
political succession in Ivory Coast intense? What informed the position of the various 
parties? 
Section Two: Contestation of Power and Resource 
As mentioned above, despite the adoption of a neo-liberal economic policy, the 
Ivorian state intervened extremely in the economy. The absence of viable indigenous 
capital meant that control of the state was control of the economy thus the only viable 
mode of accumulation. Against this backdrop, the succession battle in Ivory Coast 
was contestation over the mechanism of distribution of resources; a battle between 
reformists and conservatives. Any attempt to interpret the succession battles as a 
contest between Ouattara and Bédié; Ouattara and Gbagbo is simplistic and 
reductionist. These respective contestants represented the interest of particular groups 
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which cuts across generational lines depending on their positions in the machinery of 
the state and their experience. Reformists rallied around Ouattara while conservatives 
rallied around Bédié. This dichotomy was not grounded around ethnic cleavages but 
around the experience of each group and how they perceived democratic and 
economic change. Moreover the divide was not constant, its’ fluidity was grounded in 
perceived benefits and the probability of victory. 
 
The first generation of political cohorts in Ivory Coast were those involved in the 
liberation struggle, planters and chiefs or descended or chiefs. Upon independence, 
they control practically all the levers of power. The second generation are mostly 
politicians who during the struggle, where learning and got integrated into the system 
in the 1960s. They also benefited from the spoils of the state through their 
appointment as directors of public cooperation. The third generation comprise those 
who were recruited into the political system in the 1970s and depended on patron 
client relationship for their upward mobility in the political system. These groups 
constituted the old guards and were generally conservative. The fourth generation 
constituted those who were integrated into the political system in the 1980s amidst the 
dawn of economic crisis. They witnessed little opportunity in terms of patron client 
relationships and their mobility in the political arena depended on contesting 
“democratic elections”, which was partially instituted in 1980. The firth generation 
was initiated into the political arena from the 1990s amidst calls for political reforms. 
They constituted political elites who believed the future of the PDCI depended on its 
ability to contest democratic elections.244 
 
Empirically, this distinction is purely cosmetic because people from different 
generations supported different sections of the succession battle. This nuance can be 
explained by the fact that generational interest depended on personal benefit in 
relations to distribution and contestation of resources and power. 
 
The basis of succession conflict was the increasingly serious threat posed by 
neoliberal policies (SAP) introduced by Ouattara and supported by the World Bank 
and IMF, which would have witnessed resources being taking away from the old 
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guards and people who have made their career in the public service.245 Ouattara, 
World Bank and IMF reform programmes attempted to destroy the patronage system 
that had held the state together much to the benefit of the old guard and career 
politicians in the public service. For example, the dissolution of leading parastatals 
meant the main supply channels of resources to sustained patrimonialism were to be 
cut off. Against this backdrop, Ouattara was painted unpatriotic because of his 
privatisation programme, since a true Ivorian would not sell what le veux built. This is 
in fact reminiscent of a similar situation to that of Kengo Wa Dondo, Mobutu’s Prime 
Minister in Zaire, whose zeal in implementing structural adjustment resulted in people 
remembering his Polish and Tutsi origins thus he was not a citizen because a "genuine 
Zairean" wouldn’t have done that.246 
 
In fact, Nanga argues that attempts at theorisation of Ivorite’ by the organic 
intelligentsia of the Bédié faction, after his victory over Ouattara in the battle to 
succeed Houphouet-Boigny, was not only an operation aimed at legitimising the 
patrimonialist-capitalist hegemony of this faction of the PDCI, but also a 
legitimisation of Houphouetist Francafrican tradition, threatened by orthodox and 
self-serving neo-liberalism of Ouattara. The point here is that, patrimonialism has 
always been part of Ivorian polity. Thus any attempt at dislodging it will definitely 
invite resistance. Because any new modus operandi will redefine power, influence and 
modes of accumulation which might be detrimental to certain interest. 
 
This is why holders of transport licenses and quotas strongly objected to the 
privatisation of the Caisse. Also the dissolution of many state para-statal meant 
economy opportunities for career politicians was under threat.247 Consequently, under 
Bédié’s regime, Ivory Coast became one of the most corrupt countries on earth with a 
corruption index of 3.1 out of 10 in 1998. For example, in 1999, there was a major 
scandal over the embezzlement of 20 billion CFA francs of European Union aid by 
top Ivorian government officials.248 For the time being corruption has effectively 
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become a mode of accumulation sanctioned by government, seemingly because of its 
lack of legitimacy.249  
 
On the other hand, Ouattara’s support came from technocrats-those who had benefited 
and hope to benefit from SAP through a learner and fitter public services.250 The first 
anti-Ouattara offensive, conducted by Bédié before the death of Houphouet-Boigny, 
was the obstruction that he organised, as President of the National Assembly, to the 
privatisation of Ivory Coast Telecom (CIT). Bouygues (French company) was ready 
to acquire CIT, after having inherited the Société des Eaux de Côte d’Ivoire and 
Energie Electrique de Côte d’Ivoire under scandalously undervalued shady deal 
orchestrated by Alassane Ouattara.251 This might have strengthened Ouattara’s hand 
politically because; he would have been seen as capable of preserving French interest 
in a face of liberalisation. Also, with liberalisation, he would have been able to 
dispense rewards to his clients through government equity in privatised companies. 
Ouattara also instrumentalised privatisation to dislodge his political opponent from 
their rentier fiefs thus denying them opportunity to mobilise support through 
rewards.252 
 
Succession battle in Ivory Coast can also be examine from the institutional devolution 
of power in the country. Like most Gaullist state, Ivory Coast adopted co-habitation 
as a political system. This means that the day to day running of the state was left to 
the Prime Minister who heads the government much to the dislike of old party barons 
who used to dispense control through party structures. Accordingly the appointment 
of Ouattara, a novice with no political base was a great disappointment to the old 
cadre of the party.253 Quattara also doubled as Minister of Economy and Finance. This 
effectively meant that, he was not only given a carte blanch to run things as he sees fit 
taking into consideration Boigny’s ill health; concentration of power on him 
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effectively curtailed the influence of old cadre of the PDCI and their economic 
interest. Crook argues the carte blanch given to Ouattara enabled him to slowly build 
a political base for an eminent attack on article 11 and the succession of Bédié.254 It 
therefore seems Ouattara’s attempt at co-opting Gbagbo was grounded in his desire to 
build a coalition for an eventual fight against Bédié’s succession. It seems to me, as 
much as Boigny wanted economic renewal of the country grounded on his acceptance 
of painful austerity measures, he also wanted to preserve the interest of the old cadre 
by effectively positioning Bédié as his successor with the reactivation of article 11. 
Thus Boigny in trying to play his hand on balancing the interest of various political 
cleavages unwittingly positioned Ivory Coast on the path of a costly succession battle.   
 
Political and economic contestation in Ivory Coast was very much enmeshed in the 
international political economy. Any change to Ivorian political economy would 
definitely affect not only the political base of local politicians but also the interest of 
their international clients. Economic policies are a reflection of a leader’s political 
security no matter his public rhetoric.  Therefore, one is tempted to ask the question: 
does Ivory Coast have an independent bourgeois class capable of making their own 
decision based on moving the country forward? What informs the macroeconomic 
policies of such leaders? Why did Gbagbo a confessed socialist suddenly pursue the 
same neoliberal policies he had objected in the early 1990s? Taking cognisance of the 
absence of viable indigenous capital, the liberalisation of Ivorian economy definitely 
led to economic and geopolitical contestation from western powers specifically in the 
privatisation business.  
 
Shortly after the proclamation of independence, talks were opened between France 
and Ivory Coast, resulting in cooperative arrangements, a new concept to describe the 
"new" relationships between the “former mother country” and her “former colony”. 
This cooperation is multifaceted and all-inclusive: military, political, diplomatic, 
economic, financial and cultural. Specifically, the defence agreement between France 
and Ivory Coast was in reality legitimising neo-colonialism. In fact, according to 
article 2 of the agreement, "the French Republic regularly informs the Republic of 
Ivory Coast of the policy that it intends to follow concerning strategic raw materials 
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and products, taking into account the general needs of defence, the evolution of 
resources and the situation of the world market.” According to article 3, "the Republic 
of Ivory Coast would inform the French Republic of the policy they intend to follow 
concerning strategic raw materials and products and the measures that they propose to 
take to implement this policy.” And to conclude, article 5 stipulates that: "Concerning 
these same products, the Republic of Ivory Coast for defence needs, reserve them in 
priority for sale to the French Republic, after having satisfied the needs of internal 
consumption, and they will import what they need in priority from France.”255 Clearly 
reciprocity could not and have never been maintained because of the position of 
dominance France had at the eve of independence. It is within this framework that 
France has emerged as Ivory Coast biggest trading partner. 
 
Ivory coast principal export partners are US 11.6%, Netherlands 10.3%, France 9.5%, 
Italy 5.5%, Belgium 4.7%, Germany 4.7% (2004); while its principal import partners 
are France 24.3%, Nigeria 19.2%, UK 4% (2004). Consequently, the trade deficit in 
France’s favour is 14.8%.256 Ivory Coast is home to around 20000 French, by 2001, 
there were around 210 subsidiaries of French companies, primarily around land 
transport, communication, electricity and water sectors of Ivorian economy; which 
together chipped in more than 2.2 billion into French economy in 1999.257 
 
By examining the interest of the following French companies in Ivory Coast, Nanga 
succinctly establish that France had an inherent interest in who ever rules Ivory Coast. 
Bolloré (leader in French maritime transport in 2003), is the principal operator of 
maritime transport along with Saga, SDV and Delmas practically controls the port of 
Abidjan, the leading transit port in the West African region and the second container 
port in Africa, whose main container terminal at Vridi was recently acquired by 
Bolloré in a scandalous fashion.258  Bolloré also controls the Ivorian-Burkinabe 
railway.  
 
Bouygues through privatisation, controls water distribution (Société des Eaux de Côte 
d’Ivoire-SECI), production and distribution of electricity through the Compagnie 
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Ivoirienne d’Electricité and the Compagnie Ivoirienne de Production d’Electricité. It 
has also been involved in the recent exploitation of Ivorian oil.259 Total (the biggest 
French oil company) holds a quarter of the shares of the Société Ivoirienne de 
Raffinage (SIR) and owns 160 petrol stations.260 
 
France Telecom (seventh in rank among companies in France and leader in the 
telecommunications sector) is the main shareholder of Côte d’Ivoire Telecom and of 
the Société Ivoirienne des Mobiles (it holds about 85 per cent of the capital), since 
concessions were granted in this sector, in the context of the privatisation of public 
enterprises. 
 
In the banking and insurance sector, there is the Société Générale (sixth bank in 
France -the Société Générale des Banques de Côte d’Ivoire has 55 branches) the 
Credit Lyonnais, BNP-Paribas, AXA (the second largest company in France and 
leader of the insurance sector, which has been present in Ivory Coast since the 
colonial period). 
 
The most long-established of French companies is the Groupe Compagnie Francaise 
de l’Afrique de l’Ouest de Côte d’Ivoire (CFAO-CI) which operates in many sectors 
(cars, pharmaceuticals, new technologies) after having for a long time monopolised 
exports and the retail trade) and whose profitability (not a single year of loss, from its 
creation in 1887 until 2003) led to it being recently taken over the Pinault-Printemps-
La Redoute group. It occupies the ninth rank among companies in Ivory Coast, after 
having ceding its interests the logging industry, in which it had been very much 
present for decades.261 To sum it all, France is the highest exporter to and the third 
largest import from Ivory Coast.262  
 
Another sector of the Ivorian economy which has witnessed stiff international 
contestation is the energy sector. Increased economic and political cost of importing 
oil from the Middle East due to the fragile political situation there means the Gulf of 
Guinea has suddenly become very important. In fact US expect to import 25% of its 
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oil from Africa.263 Consequently, the discovery of oil in Ivory Coast has invited the 
normal crowd of oil vultures with little penchant for governance: US based chevron 
Texaco, Vanco; France Totalfinaelf, China Sinopec, India (ONGC) have all been 
posturing for oil licenses.264 
 
Realism, greed and national chauvinism thus demands that any political economy 
transition that seems to threaten France’s interest will necessitate indirect or direct 
intervention. Empirical evidence suggests that there is strong positive correlation 
between regime change and French interest in francophone Africa. For example: 
Ahidjo was catapulted into the presidency in Cameroon after nationalist leaders 
termed terrorist were killed by the help of French intelligence. Eyadema replaced 
Sylvanus Olympio with the help of French when the latter sought to revise contracts 
for the exploitation of Togolese phosphate which he considered as giving the lion’s 
share to French capital. Hamani Diori, was overthrown when he wanted to liberalised 
Niger’s uranium thus making them accessible to other nations in the height of the 
Cold War and oil crisis;265 Marien Ngouabi (Congo-Brazzaville) was assassinated in 
1977, a few hours before a Franco-Congolese meeting in Paris to discuss the revision 
of the oil contract which benefited ELF,266 Pascal Lisomba was overthrown when he 
invited US companies to prospect for oil in Congo Brazzaville.267 France illegally 
intervened in Gabon to crush a popular uprising and installed Leon Mba in other to 
preserve their oil and uranium rights.268 
 
It is within this context, Nanga argues that the privatisation process in Ivory Coast 
threatened French interest and by extension a critical player in the succession drama.  
He uses competition between Bolloré and ADM Carghill to picture the competing US 
and French interest. Bolloré was very close to Quattara while Bédié owns 12% of 
SIFCOM also co-owned by ADM and Carghill (US).  Nanga points out that the 
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eventual take over of the cocoa sector by ADM and Cargill (US) has driven Bolloré to 
shed its subsidiary to the annoyance of the French. Bedie invited Vanco (USA Oil 
Company) in 1994 to prospect for oil against the established tradition that ELF 
(French Oil Company) is the natural explorer of oil in francophone Africa. Nanga 
further argues that it is plausible to make a French connection with the coup that 
overthrown Bédié based on the basis that most of the soldiers that took part were 
mutinous soldiers who had served in the United Nations Mission in the Central 
African Republic under the command of French Army, coupled with the fact Gueï 
upon his accession to power immediately visited France.269  
 
Nanga further points out that, the continuation of neoliberal policies which benefited 
the US much to the liking of Gbagbo informed his abandonment of socialist rhetoric, 
grounded in his attempt to diversify his international clients.270 Sharing the proceeds 
of privatisation has been the rationale behind successive governments in Ivory Coast 
even during the war. For example the award of contract in 2004 to Bouygues for the 
construction of Abidjan seaport under mysterious circumstances angered the PDCI 
because it was not done through parliament, where have two seats less of FPI (ruling 
party). This of course would have necessitated a deal between the two largest parties 
in parliament.271 
 
Against this backdrop, Ivory Coast clearly lacks an independent bourgeoisie with a 
vision to stare the country towards development. From the creation of SAA, PDCI to 
the accession to power of FPI, macroeconomic policies have almost invariably been 
dictated by political rationalities skewed in the narrow interest of the comprador 
bourgeoisie during colonialism and strengthened by neoliberal policies in an era of 
economic and political liberalisation. Thus the advent of political and economic 
liberalisation in Ivory Coast was skewed in recapitalising patrimonialism in an effort 
to preserve elite interest and those of their international clients. 
 
The above analysis seems to validate Rogowski’s argument that neo-liberal economic 
policies affects political cleavages in a country depending on the supply and demand 
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of factors of production.272 Clearly Ivory Coast adopted liberal economic policies 
because it benefited the political elites at the dawn of independence cognisance of the 
fact that they were planters and their revenue depended on export. Increase revenue 
from the heydays of economic boom meant the supply of revenue could easily meet 
the demand-bearing groups through the creation of import substitution industries. But 
when the country witnessed economic crisis in the early 1980s, the supply of revenue 
was restricted while demand bearings groups increased. Thus political elites who 
benefited from the old system resented change knowing fully well that it will not 
benefit them since competition will not favour them. While educated technocrat who 
had never fully benefited from the system saw liberalisation as a chance for political 
mobilisation. At this point, the state was at a critical junction, disequilibrium was 
created because demand could not meet supply.  
 
From the above analysis, Presidential succession in Ivory Coast to me is the modality 
through which conflict of interest groups (local and international) are playing 
themselves out – a conflict about the terms of transition, nature of macro-economic 
policy and distribution of resources. The Ouattara/Bédié; Ouattara/Gbagbo contests 
were merely a modality, instrument and mechanism through which such conflicts 
played themselves out against a backdrop of foreign interest. Within this context, lack 
of resources to garner political support meant ethnic rhetoric became an instrument of 
political mobilisation for such interest groups taking cognisance of Ivorian electoral 
politics. 
Section Three: Politicisation of Ethnicity 
African states as is the case with Ivory Coast are a mosaic of ethnic groupings. 
Ethnicity has and will also be at the core of African politics let alone Ivory Coast 
taking into consideration the advent of liberal political contestation. Ivory Coast is 
made up 60 ethnic groups within 5 major ethnic groupings. The Akans (6 967 272, 
42,1 % of the population) occupy the south, south east and center, they comprise the 
following groups Abron, Agni, Alladjan, Attié, Abbey, Abidji, Abouré, Adjoukrou, 
Ahizi, Appollo, Attié, Avikam, Baoulé, Ébrié, Essouma, Éhotilé, Éga, Mbato. Akans 
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belong to the branch of the Niger-Congo language family and most of them in Ivory 
Coast are descendents of eighteenth century migrants from the Ashante Kingdom.273 
 
The Mandé (4 385 575, 26, 5 % of the population) situated in the north and West. 
Northern Mandé: Bambara, Dioula, Djimini, Gbin, Kamara, Koyaka, Malinké, Nigbi, 
Siaka. Dioula is the largest of the northern Mandé ethnic group. Southern Mandés : 
Bêrê, Gagou, Gouin, Gouro, Mahou, Moua, N’Gain, Ouan, Toonie, Toura, Yacouba, 
Yaouré. Yacouba is the largest of the southern Mandé ethnic group. 
 
The Gur or Voltaïques (2 912 684, 17, 6 % of the population) are situated in the north 
and comprise of the Birifor, Béré, Dégha, Samogho, Siti, Sénoufo, Tagbana, Djimini, 
Lobi, Lohron, Komona, Koulango et Nafana. Sénoufo is of the Voltaïques ethnic 
group 
 
The Krou (1 820 427, 11 % of the population) situated in wouth west and west and 
include the following group: Ahizi, Bakwé, Bété, Dida, Gnaboua, Godié, Gouja, 
Guéré, Kodia, Krabou, Kouya, Kouzié, Kroumen, Néyo, Nianbwa, Niébiboua, Nigbi, 
Oubi, Wané, Wobbé. Krus are the oldest ethnic group in Ivory Coast and Bété is the 
largest Kru population.274 
 
Specifically, group configuration of Ivorian population is as follows Baoulé: 26 %; 
Dioula: 15 %; Agni: 12 %; Bété: 15 %; Guéré: 12 %; Ébrié: 8 %; Yacouba: 7 %; 
Appolo: 5 %. Religiously, Moslems comprise 38, 6 %, Catholics 9, 4 %, protestants 6, 
6 % and animist 11, 9 %. The various ethnic groups are spread across the country’s 
regions as thus 
Table1 8: Ethnic groups are their respective regions 
Régions Ethnies 
1. Agnébi Abbey, Abidji, Attié 
2. Bafing Yacouba, Moua, Ngain, Ouan, Mahou 
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3. Bas-Sassandra Baoulé, Bakoué, Kroumen, Néyo 
4. Denguélé Malinké, Gbin, Kamara, Koyaka, Nigbi, Siaka 
5. Fromagers Bété, Bakoué, Gouro, Dioula 
6. Haut-Sassandra Dida, Bété, Gouro, Gagou, Godié  
7. Lacs Baoulé, Yaouré 
8. Lagunes Ébrié, Alladjan, Adjoukou, Abidji, Ahizi, Attié, Appollo, 
Avikam, Essouma, Mbato, Nzima  
9. Marahoué Gouro, Dida 
10. Montagnes Guéré, Oubi, Wané, Wobbé 
11. Moyen-Cavaly  Guéré, Wobbé 
12. Moyen-Comoé  Agni, Éga 
13. Nzi-Comoé Baoulé, Dioula 
14. Savanes Dioula, Sénoufo  
15. Sud-Bandama Dida, Godié 
16. Sud-Comoé Agni, Appollo, Abouré, Éhotilé 
17.Vallée du Bandama Baoulé, Tagbanan, Dioula, Gouro 
18. Zanzan Abron, Birifor, Bêré, Dégha, Komona, Koulango, Lobi, 
Lohron, Nafana, Samogho, Siti 
19. Worodougou Malinké, Bambara, Djimini, Gbin, Nigbi, Yakouba 
Source: Commission Nationale de coordination de Côte d’Ivoire. « Les ethnies de 
Côte d’Ivoire » Enquête Entreprise sur le Terrain, 1992-1997.275 
 
Cognisance of the fact that no ethnic group commands an absolute majority in Ivory 
Coast, electoral politics demands that he who can negotiate a strong coalition which 
can last till the eve of an election will definitely snatch state power. This situation was 
compounded in Ivory Coast because the electoral system is grounded in FPTP. In 
presidential elections, where a candidate fails to get more than 50% on the first round, 
the first two candidates will go head to head and the result is based on a simple 
majority. In parliamentary elections, the electoral system is grounded in simple list 
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majority without preference.276 Since power is mostly concentrated on the president, 
politics in Ivory Coast is a zero-sum game.277 
 
Ethnicity has always been a backup plan for Ivorian politicians in desperate times. 
Tiemoko Coulibaly argues that Houphouët-Boigny was a proponent of tribalism, 
though he never admitted it. He effectively used ultra-nationalist campaign against a 
French Federal Union of former colonies in 1958 and elections of the national 
assembly. His argument was that the Ivory Coast, as it then was, had no wish to be a 
milk cow for French West Africa fuelled violent attacks against Dahomeyans that 
year, orchestrated by Pepe Paul, a henchman of Houphouët-Boigny. The pretext was 
that Dahomeyans held the best teaching posts.278 
 
The strength of the PDCI was built on a coalition between the northerners and south. 
With the death Boigny, northerners were expecting to be compensated considerably 
for their unwavering support. Clearly, they were dissatisfied with their situation in the 
alliance. This was evidenced by the notorious Le Charte du Grand Nord in 1992, 
which called for fuller recognition of Moslem religion, regional development in the 
north, increase political representation, access to public jobs and the de-
baoulelisation/tribalisation of the state.279 The electoral strength of the north and the 
political ramification of ethnic allegiance were clearly seen in the 1990s presidential 
and parliamentary elections. Though the PDCI won the elections, FIP which is mostly 
seen as a Bété bulwark to Baoule dominance, performed relatively well in Bété region 
specifically southwest. Also the fact that FPI got 29% of northern vote because of the 
defection of Gbon Coulibaly meant that an effective walk away by the north from the 
PDCI will greatly reduce its political support.280  
 
Electoral politics is not only about demography but also about the system in place. On 
the eve of the 1990 elections Ivory Coast adopted a single constituency simple 
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majority system and foreigners were allowed to vote much to the annoyance of the 
opposition.281 This effectively forced the opposition to adopt a nationalistic stand 
grounded in identity politics. This had a ripple effect because the opposition was seen 
in this case as an ethnic party design to foster the narrow interest of the Bété people. 
This gave Boigny an easy win over his mean rivals in the elections though they 
performed well. 
 
By 1995, Bédié was faced with a difficult situation with regard to the October 
presidential election. Ephemeral benefits of 1994 devaluation were gone, economic 
crisis was having a severe repercussion on social cohesion of the country and RDR 
and FPI has formed a coalition to contest the elections. Against this backdrop, Bédié 
had no option but to strengthen his political base-Akan/Baoule-by doing what many 
student of politics would suggest, play the ethnic card. Thus Bédié effectively took on 
the opposition platform in 1990. Bédié instituted the notorious concept of ivoirité into 
Ivorian legal parlance. According to a 1995 amendment of the electoral code, only 
candidates born to both Ivorian parents could vote or contest. This effectively 
disenfranchised and excluded a majority of northerners from any decision on who get 
what, how and when considering their generational roots in Burkina Faso Guinea and 
Mali. 
 
Before the inception of ivoirité, ethnic differences were grounded in culture and 
history. Northerners were labelled gros boubou et long chapeau by southerners. 
While northerners called southerners bousmani or bushman. These derogatory 
epithets did not flare up into conflict until the inception of ivoirité. From thereon, 
Gros boubou et long chapeau were viewed as boyorojang-somebody coming from 
afar, allogenes or foreigners while bushmani were viewed as natives or 
autochtones.282  
 
The concept of ivoirité was defined by Bédié as  
 
Le projet culturel qui fera l’homme nouveau, un home ivoirien pétri de 
toute la substance de nos diverses cultures ethniques, porteur d’une 
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culture nationale qui fonde son ivoirien mais en même temps le tienne 
ouvert a tout les souffles des cultures du monde.283 
 
Ivoirité is a cultural project, which will construct the new man, an 
Ivorian full with all the ingredients of our ethnic culture, a man who will 
bear the national culture that shapes his ivorianness but at the same time 
keeps him receptive to other cultures of the world. My translation 
 
Bédié further argues that  
 
Ivoirité ce n’est pas une loi, c’est une nature, une qualité au Coeur de la 
fraternité et de l’humanisme, un comportement, une attitude pour le 
rayonnement de notre identité collective et l’affirmation de notre 
indépendance parmi les souverainetés nationales et internationales.284 
 
Ivoirité is not a law; it is a state of nature and value at the heart of 
brotherhood and humanism; a behavior and an attitude, which aims at 
projecting of our collective identity and affirming our sovereignty 
amongst independent nations. My translation 
 
Clearly Bédié wanted a new social order that will ensure his moves to keep political 
power in his grip. Bédié’s definition of ivoirité was championed by Akan 
intellectuals, in order to give it theoretical and conceptual underpinnings. According 
to Prof Niamey Koffi, in constructing an Ivorian nationality a distinction between 
them and us is imperative.  
 
Pour construire un NOUS, Il faut le distinguer d’un EUX. Il faut parvenir 
a établir la discrimination NOUS/EUX d’une manière qui soit 
compatible avec le pluralisme des nationales. 
 
In constructing an US, it has to be distinguished from THEM. One has to 
establish the discrimination between US and THEM in a way that to 
compatible to ethnic pluralism. My translation. 
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The Economic and Social Council also justified ivoirité arguing that,   
 
Une exigence de souveraineté, d’identité, de créativité. Le peuple 
ivoirien doit affermir sa souveraineté, son autorité face aux menaces de 
dépossession et d’assujettissement : qu’il s’agisse de l’immigration ou du 
pouvoir économique et politique.285 
 
For the purpose of creativity, identity and sovereignty, the people of 
Ivory Coast must reaffirm their sovereignty and authority in the face of 
threats of dispossession and subjugation whether in immigration, politics 
or economic. My translation 
 
This new concept of who an Ivorian ought or should be replaced what is an Ivorian 
enshrined in article 6 of Nationality Code Law No 61-December 14, 1961 modified 
by Law No 72-852 of December 21, 1972. This law was strongly grounded in jus 
sanguinis and jus soli. A clear reading of ivoirité will reveal that, its difference from 
nationality under Boigny was its use of coordinate conjunctions or and and. 
Nationality laws under Boigny was inclusive vis a vis Bédié, Gueï and Gbagbo. 
Though ivoirité can be defended on grounds that every country needs some kind of 
particularity to identify itself as a state or nation-state within the Commonwealth of 
Nations, it was a horrible law grounded in political rationalities. At what point can we 
conceptualise the existence of an Ivorian state? Should it be at the dawn of 
independence or Berlin conference? These are difficult conceptual questions, but 
what is clear in the Ivorian case is that: by refusing nationality to somebody who 
lived all his life in Ivory Coast even before independence is purely churlish. Also, the 
law seemed to have targeted a particular ethnic groups-Voltaïques and northern 
Mandé, fiefdom of opposition leader Ouattara. What about Akans who migrated from 
Ghana? It thus seems ivoirité was twisted nationalism in a succession battle between 
Bédié and Quattara.286 
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Even within religious circles, religious leaders did not distance themselves from the 
rhetoric of politicians. Religion became politicised with the advent of ivoirité as a 
political discourse. For example Imam Boubabar Fofana, the spokesperson of the 
Superior Council of Imams of Ivory Coast spoke of martyrdom of Moslem killed by 
Gbagbo. He argued that  
 
Nous n’avons aucun complexe pour dire que la communauté musulmane 
soutient Alassane. Si la communauté pense qu’il est le meilleur candidat, 
qu’il elle le soutienne. Tout comme on ne reprochera pas du tout aux 
Baoule d’avoir soutenu Bédié. Tout comme on ne reprochera pas non 
plus a majorité des Bété de soutenir Gbagbo.287 
 
We Muslims should have no reservations giving our support to Ouattara. 
If the community deems him the best candidate, there is no problem that 
we support him. People should not punish us for our support because it is 
as legitimate as the support that Baoules give to Bédié and majority of 
Bétés to Gbagbo. My translation 
 
Some Christians on their part argue that 
 
Aux yeux du people, certaines candidatures soulèvent plus des problèmes 
qu’elles n’en résolvent. Pour l’amour de notre paye, pour la paix a 
laquelle aspirant ardemment tous les ivoiriennes d’origine et d’adoption, 
nous souhaitons que ces leaders aient le courage- un grand courage alors- 
et la sagesse nécessaire de reconsidérer leur position pour se retirer. Il 
n’est jamais trop tard pour bien faire.288 
 
In the eyes of Ivorians, some candidacies raise problems rather than 
solutions. For the love of our country and peace aspired by all, 
naturalised or native, we pray for these leaders to withdraw from the 
political race. It is never too late to do and be good. My translation 
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Ivoirité was clearly a calculated move by Bédié to exclude Ouattara from the political 
process conscious of Ivorian electoral politics. Though Gbagbo had earlier played the 
ethnic card, he quickly learned that he could not win an election in Ivory Coast in so 
far as his political base is grounded around the Bété region mindful of their 
demographic inferiority. Within this context, Gbagbo joint forces with Ouattara 
knowing fully well that this was the best chance for any mobilisation of political 
support, thus abandoning his previous stand. Against this backdrop one can conclude 
that, it has dawn on Ivorian politicians from Boigny, Bédié and Gbagbo that a grand 
coalition with the north is very imperative. This might be the rationale for the 
proposed coalition between Ouattara and Bédié in the up coming elections in case 
none of them gets an outright majority. 
 
Unsurprisingly, Bédié won the 1995 presidential and parliamentary elections because 
of boycott by RDR and FPI. In trying to consolidate his position, Bédié abandoned 
ethnic balancing in favour of Baoulisation or trabilisation of Ivorian politics. 
 
Table 9: Ethnic representation under Bédié  
      
Ethnic 
  group 
                    
Government  Inner circle of political power National 
assembly 
Social and 
economic 
council 
 Nov.91a Dec.93 Jan.96 Aug.98 Nov.91a Dec.93 Jan.96 Aug.98 Nov.95 Mar-98 
 % RRb % RR % RR % RR  RR % RR % RR % RR % RR % RR 
         
Akan       
0.61 1.46 0.52 1.24 0.52 1.23 0.59 1.41 0.73 1.74 0.67 1.58 0.67 1.58 0.75 1.78 0.46 1.10 0.58 1.39 
       
Baoule 
0.17 1.04 0.24 1.43 0.28 1.64 0.31 1.86 0.36 2.18 0.42 2.48 0.42 2.48 0.42 2.48 0.22 1.29 0.33 1.98 
          
kru 
0.17 1.19 0.24 1.89 0.21 1.63 016 1.23 0.09 0.62 0.17 1.31 0.17 1.31 0.08 0.66 0.19 1.52 0.23 1.84 
    
S.Mand
é  
0.04 0.41 0.04 0.40 0.10 1.03 0.06 0.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.94 0.03 0.25 
   
N.Man
dé  
0.09 0.55 0.08 0.48 0.07 0.42 0.03 0.19 0.09 0.57 0.08 0.51 0.08 0.51 0.08 0.51 0.12 0.74 0.13 0.76 
    
Voltaic  
0.09 0.53 0.12 0.68 0.10 0.59 0.13 0.71 0.09 0.56 0.08 0.47 0.08 0.47 0.08 0.47 0.12 0.70 0.02 0.09 
       
No.   
N=23 N=25 N=29 N=32 N=11 N12 N=12 N=12 N=171 N=120 
       
PIMc 
0.47 0.62 0.49 0.49 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.33 0.74 
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Source: Armin Langer 
a) The November 1991 government was formed under Boigny  
b) Relative representation (RR) is calculated by dividing an ethnic group’s relative 
proportion in government by its relative size in the entire population 
C) Political Inequality Measure (PIM) equals the standard deviation of the relative 
representation of the different ethnic groups. 
 
From the table above, one would notice that under Bédié, relative representation of 
Baoules increased from 1.04 under Boigny to 1.86 in the august 1998 government. 
Relative to Boigny’s government, the big losers in Bédié’s government appeared to be 
Kru and northern Mandé, the fiefdom of Gbagbo and Ouattara. Bédié also increased 
the relative representation of Baoules from 2.18 in November 1991 to 2.48 in 
December 1993 in the inner circle of political power at the expense of northern and 
southern Mandé. By 1998, Baoules represented almost 40% of the key political 
positions in Ivory Coast.289 
 
Ethnicity did not only play itself out in Ivorian political institutions. The once docile 
Ivorian military became extremely politicised through ethnic sensitisation. Contamin, 
Losch290 and Kieffer291 argue that Bédié progressively destroyed internal imbalances 
in the military and started a process of Baoulisation regarding the higher command 
positions. For example: the dismissal of General Gueï, Lansana Palenfo and 
Abdoulaye Coulibaly, who came from the west and north respectively. The 
ethnictisation/trabilisation of the military was also grounded in financial difficulties 
engendered by economic crisis. For example, Bédié could not adjust the salaries of 
the army to compensate for devaluation in 1994.292 It is within this contex that the 
military overthrew Bédié and entered Gueï with a changing concept of ivoirité.  
 
Gueï in line with Le Compromise Houphouetiste, promoted national integration and 
reconciliation and openly castigated ivoirité.293 Langer argues that Gueï’s government 
was the most ethnic balance in Ivory Coast from 1980-2003, though he also 
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debaoulised the military.294  But once Gueï harboured presidential aspirations, he 
exploited ethnicity for political mobilisation. On 24th July 2000, a new constitution 
was adopted in a referendum with the support of 86.5% of the vote in a 55% 
turnout.295 As per article 35, a presidential candidate should be an Ivorian by birth and 
his/her parents should be Ivorian by birth and he should never have acquired another 
nationality. It was generally conceived that these eligibility criteria were aimed at 
eliminating Ouattara from the presidential race, considering the fact that his farther 
was not only rumoured to be Burkinabe, he once worked as President of the Central 
Bank of West African states while he possessed a Burkinabe passport. 
 
Table 10: Ethnic representation in government under Gueï, 2000 
Ethnic 
group 
Government Inner Circle of Political Power 
 Aug-98a Jan-00 May-98 Aug-98 Jan-00 May-00 
 % RRb % RR % RR % RR % RR % RR 
Akan 0.59 1.41 0.50 1.19 0.30 0.72 0.75 1.78 0.38 0.89 0.11 0.26 
Baoule 0.31 1.86 0.13 0.74 0.04 0.26 0.42 2.48 0.13 0.74 0.00 0.00 
Kru 0.16 1.23 0.13 0.98 0.22 1.71 0.08 0.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
S.Mandé 0.06 0.63 0.08 0.83 0.17 1.73 0.00 0.00 0.13 1.25 0.22 2.22 
N.Mandé 0.03 0.19 0.17 1.01 0.17 1.05 0.08 0.51 0.13 0.76 0.44 2.69 
Voltaic  0.13 0.71 0.13 0.71 0.08 0.47 0.08 0.47 0.25 1.42 0.11 0.63 
No. N=32 N=24 N=23 N=12 N=8 N=9 
PIMc   0.49   018   0.57   0.66   0.55   1.22 
Source: Langer, A., op cit. 
 
From the table above, the relative representation of Akans in government decreased 
from 1.19 in January 2000 to 0.72, in the inner circle of political power from 0.89in 
January 2000 to 0.26 in May. The relative representation of voltaic in government 
reduced from 0.71 to 0.47 and in the inner circle of political power from 1.42 to 0.63. 
The relative representation of the northern Mandé in the government increased from 
1.01 in January 2000 to 1.05 in May 2000. The second government of Gueï confirms 
the role of ivoirité in his political calculations once he decided to stand for 
presidential elections. Consequently, he more than doubled the relative representation 
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of southern Mandé and increased that of Krus. This can be explained by the de facto 
coalition between Gbagbo and Gueï against their common political enemy-Ouattara. 
Important to note here is the fact that even though northerners: Seydou Diarra (no 
party affiliation), Mamadou koulibaly (FPI), Ahmed Timite’ (PDCI) and Moussa 
Toure (PDCI) were included; they belonged to parties that fervently opposed 
Ouattara.296 Gueï expanded the concept of ivoirité in the sense that his exclusionary 
policies also targeted Akan. 
 
Apart from changing electoral laws, Gueï also purged the army.  Soldiers from the 
north were harassed, general Palenfo and Coulibaly were dismissed for an alleged 
attempt on Gueï’s life. Chief Sergeant Ibrahim Coulibaly went to exile. In fact 
northern soldiers dismissed were instrumental in the September 2002 insurgent.297 
 
On October 6, 2000, a controversial Supreme Court decision disqualified fourteen of 
the nineteen presidential candidates, including Ouattara, on citizenship grounds, and 
former President Bédié for not submitting a proper medical certificate. The Supreme 
Court, headed by General Gueï’s then legal adviser, was widely believed to have been 
hand picked by Gueï himself.298 The October 2000 presidential election was 
effectively a two horse race between Gueï against Gbagbo. Against a backdrop of low 
turnout (35%) due to boycott because of the exclusion of Quattara for nationalité’ 
douteuse, preliminary results put Gbagbo on the lead and this propelled Gueï to 
disband the Commission nationale électorale (CNE-national electoral commission) on 
grounds of electoral fraud and declared himself winner.  
 
This sparked popular protest from Ivorians and official results stated that Gbagbo won 
with 59.36%. The RDR on the other hand called for fresh elections due to lack of 
legitimacy. Gbagbo vehemently refused and the stage was set for large scale street 
protest in Abidjan, Bouake and Korhogo which resulted in clashes between FPI and 
RDR supporters and the eventual discovery of Charnier de Yopougon (mass grave of 
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Yopougono) on 27 October 2000 which contained the body of around 57 RDR-
supporters with a northern background.299 
 
Ethnic tensions were exacerbated when Ouattara was barred from contesting 
parliamentary election in December 2000 which resulted in FPI wining with only 
33.12% turnout due to boycott by RDR.300  Gbagbo like his predecessors was bent on 
entrenching his power through ethnic politicisation.  
 
Table 11: Ethnic representation in political institutions under Gbagbo, 2000-
2003 
Ethic 
Group 
Government  Inner Circle of Political Power National 
Assembly 
 
Jan.01 Aug.02 Sep.03 Jan.01 Aug.02 Sep.03 Dec.00 
 
% RRa % RR % RR % RR % RR % RR % RR 
Akan 0.4 1.1 0.5 1.2 0.4 0.9 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.9 
Baoule  0.1 0.6 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 .05 0.1 0.9 
Kru 0.2 2.2 0.1 1.5 0.2 1.8 0.4 3.5 0.5 4.2 0.1 1.3 0.2 1.9 
S.Mandé  0.1 1.7 0.1 1.6 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.1 
N.Mandé  0.0 0.4 0.1 0.7 0.1 1.1 0.1 1.1 0.1 1.1 0.3 2.0 0.1 0.8 
Voltaic  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.9 0.0 0.4 
No. N=28 N=31 N-43 N=11 N=11 N=12 N=223 
PIMb 0.93 0.66 0.48 1.30 1.74 0.74 0.55 
Source: Armin Langer  
a) relative Representation (RR) is calculated by dividing an ethnic group’s 
relative proportion in government by its relative size in the entire population 
b) political Inequality Measure (PIM) equals the standard deviation of the 
relative representation of the different ethnic groups 
 
From the table above one would realise that Gbagbo favoured his ethnic group Kru by 
increasing their relative representation in government and inner political circles. The 
ethnic composition of Gbagbo January government was the most ethnically 
imbalanced in Ivorian political history much to the disadvantage of the voltaic and 
Northern Mandé.301  
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The outcome of the Forum de la Reconciliation Nationale-FRN-let to the inclusion of 
PDCI and FPI members in the government and the eventual increase in ethic 
representation of Akan, Baoules and northerners in government during Gbagbo’s 
august 2002 government. Though none was from the voltaic ethnic group between 
January 2001 and august 2002 despite the fact they form almost 18% of the 
population.302  
 
Ivorian land tenure laws under Gbagbo are a clear example of laws aimed at 
strengthening his political base by fuelling ethnicity. As shown above, Ivory Coast 
liberal land tenure laws under Boigny helped fuelled economic development because 
of easy access to land. This framework benefited Ivorians from the north, centre and 
southeast as against west and south westerners because of their late entry into farming 
due to the late introduction of cash crop by colonial administration because of land 
scarcity in the south east and center. Most of the farmers in the west and south east 
(Bété region) came from the north and south east after independence and were 
generally perceived as foreigners merely because of their names. 
 
In the height of economic decline, Ivorian youth who could not find jobs in the city 
returned to rural areas only to find that what they perceived as their land was in fact 
being occupied and exploited by strangers. Most invariably, strangers occupied these 
lands after working for the original owner for some time or through share cropping. 
As one Bété farmer puts it “When they came, they behaved as if they had nothing ... 
so we gave them everything." Now, he says, the "foreigners" are not giving their 
"masters" anything in return. "Right now, they don't care about anyone."303 
 
Gbagbo supports traditional land rights wherein indigenous groups can claim land 
along centuries-old ancestral lines. Such land rights were recognised in a 1998 law but 
were never implemented until Gbagbo accession to power. The law marked a U-turn 
from le Compromise Houphouetiste grounded in actual exploitation and occupation. 
Land tenure law that is not firmly grounded in equitable principles such as restitutio in 
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intergrum is unsustainable. Clearly I doubt if the Ivorian state can live up to this 
considering the difficult economic situation the government is facing. To my mine, 
the new land tenure law is mainly design as a mechanism for rewards and 
redistribution of resources. 
 
Another familiar genre of African politics depicted by Gbagbo is the politics of 
violence or the intrumentalisation of violence for political purpose. HRW has 
documented consistent and sustained use of state security apparatus by government to 
destroy the political base of opposition parties mostly RDR; by extrajudicial killings 
and intimidation of people perceived of being sympathetic to the party. Gbagbo has 
been accused of financing militia groups such young patriots notorious for vandalism 
and hooliganism; though one must bear in mine the rebels are also guilty.304 
 
Gbagbo like Gueï and Bédié also tried to establish a more favourable ethnic 
composition in the military. He tried to achieve this through the planned 
demobilisation of two contingents called Zinzins and Bahefoue that consisted 
predominantly of soldiers during Gueï’s reign.305 In response to their planned 
demobilisation, these soldiers started a mutiny which eventual turned into an 
insurgent perpetrated mostly by soldiers who went into exile during Gueï’s purge. 
Section Four: How the Conflict Erupted.306 
On the night of September 18-19, 2002, as many as 800 disgruntled soldiers took up 
arms against the government. It was the sixth coup or attempted coup in the space of 
less than three years. The uprising began before dawn after it was learned that 
hundreds of soldiers would be demobilized against their will. The city of Abidjan 
Bouake and Korhogo were attacked simultaneously. After the coup d-état failed, the 
rebels retreated to the Muslim dominated north; control of Abidjan was secured by 
loyalist forces with at least 270 people killed including Gueï, his entire family and 
Emile Doudou Minister of Interior.  
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On September 23, gunfire was exchanged in Bouake and the rebels took control of the 
town of Tebissou, located about 70 kilometres south of Bouake, near the political 
capital of Yamoussoukro. On September 24, 2002 heavy fighting broke out in 
Bouake. On September 27, French forces rescued more than 100 American children 
and staff at the International Christian Academy. Clearly this move was calculated to 
deter any possible US intervention in the crisis.  
 
On September 31st, a team of diplomats from several West African nations (ministers 
from Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Niger, Togo, and Guinea-Bissau) arrived in Abidjan to 
meet with Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo, in an effort to negotiate an end to the 
crisis against a backdrop of heavy fighting in Tiebissou, about 40-kilometers north of 
Yamoussoukro. 
 
By October 2, 2002, reports emerged that government security forces and supporters 
had been attacking and setting fire to Abidjan's many shantytowns, home to members 
of the country's large population of immigrant workers from other West African 
countries. The government argued that the move was aimed at smoking out rebels in 
their hide out. 
 
On October 5, West African ministers left Yamoussoukro empty handed after a fail 
attempt at negotiations. French peacekeepers had provided security for the events but 
government representation failed to secure a power of attorney authorising him to sign 
any deal on behave of the government. 
 
On October 12, Senegal's Foreign Minister Cheik Tidiane Gadio met with rebel 
commanders to put forth new proposals to advance the negotiations rebels attacked 
the city of Daloa, about 400-kilometers northwest of Abidjan. The fall of Daloa 
represented both a strategic and symbolic victory for the rebels. It did not only mean 
defeat for Gbagbo in his own turf but also Daloa formed part of the cocoa belt. 
 
While negotiations were going on in Togo, new rebel groups (MPIGO and MJP) 
emerged and took control of Man and Danane. MPIGO attacked Danane while MJP 
attacked Man.  Man is in the heart of Ivory Coast's coffee-growing region, Danane 
lies just 20km from the Liberian border, and is home to thousands of Liberian 
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refugees who had escaped conflicts. Man also served as a base for RUF and NPFL 
fighters.307The rebels claimed to be fighting against Gbagbo’s government to avenge 
the assassination of former military ruler General Robert Gueï. Strategically the 
emergence of MPIGO and MPJ meant that the rebels could now get around the 
ceasefire put in place by the French. The ceasefire agreement proved difficult to the 
rebels but beneficial to Gbagbo because the north was relatively poor, thus seizing the 
port at San Pedro would have been commercially strategic. Moreover capturing the 
port would definitely have bolstered rebel’s position before the January peace talks.308 
 
On December 20, MPIGO had taken control of the town of Bangolo in the west of the 
country, which is just 40 kilometers south of the strategic city of Man. Residents were 
reported as saying many of the fighters patrolling in Man were English-speaking and 
believed to be Liberian. French troops set up base in the town of Duekoue, another 40 
kilometers south of Bangolo. On December 21, the two forces met and clashes 
erupted just north of the town of Duekoue. This effectively prevented a southward 
drive by the rebels. 
 
On December 23, the three rebel groups met in Bouake to discuss increased 
involvement of French troops in blocking their attempt to overthrow the Ivorian 
government. They announced they would consider any future French attacks on their 
fighters to be an act of war. France had declared that it would not take sides in the 
conflict and that its presence was to protect its national and attempt to maintain the 
stability of the fragile cease-fire.  
 
Negotiations began in Paris on January 15 and Linas Marcoussis accord was signed 
on the 24 January 2003. The accord called for government of national unity, 
reconciliation, preservation of sovereignty, change on land tenure laws and electoral 
code. As soon as the accord was signed, protests erupted in the main city of Abidjan, 
denouncing the deal for being too conciliatory to rebel demands. 
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To help protect the fragile integration process on February 27, 2004 the UN Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1528 which established United Nations Operation in Côte 
d’Ivoire (UNOCI). UNOCI was designed to last an initial period of 12 months starting 
from April 4 2004, with a military strength of a maximum of 6,240 United Nations 
personnel. Its stated objective was to establish a presence in the Ivory Coast to 
supervise the disarmament of rebel forces and monitor the presidential elections due 
in October 2005. The council voted unanimously in favour of creating the new 
peacekeeping force after the United States dropped its earlier opposition to the 
proposal. While the US did not pledge to send any troops it did agree to pay for nearly 
a fourth of the $303 million dollar cost. UNOCI replaced the existing UN mission in 
Cote d’Ivoire, known by its French acronym MINUCI. 
 
The new timetable for DDR, disarmament, demobilization, and rehabilitation of the 
rebel armed forces set by Prime Minister Seydou Diarra was set to begin on March 8, 
2004. However, the New Forces, led by Soros said that they would only disarm in 
phases in conjunction with the specific implementation of important clauses from the 
French negotiated agreement. The disarmament was planned to occur in three stages, 
first demilitarizing the center area of the country, especially the rebel held city of 
Bouake, followed by a disarmament of the rebels in the east and west, and finally of 
those in the far north of the country.  
 
Armed conflict broke out again on June 8, 2004 pushing the country even closer to the 
resumption of full-fledged civil war. Helicopter gunships were used to attack rebel 
positions, killing 20 people, and marked the first time in nearly a year that 
government helicopters were used to attack positions on the frontline 
 
Later in June fighting occurred in the rebel held North in an apparent power struggle 
for leadership within the New Forces. Rebels claimed that many assassination 
attempts failed, and that the government was responsible for instigating the rift and 
planning to use mercenaries from Guinea to attack the rebel positions.  
 
On July 31 2004 the Accra Agreement was signed with the goal of getting the peace-
process back on track. On November 4 2004, the war resumed as military planes, 
namely Russian-made Sukhoi jets, carried out raids on rebel held positions in the 
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north. As airplane attacks and troop advancement continued, the United Nations 
suspended its humanitarian efforts and Mr. Soro declared that diplomacy was no 
longer an option.  
 
On November 6, 2004, aircraft from the Ivorian Government struck a French military 
base, resulting in the deaths of nine French troops, an American aid worker and the 
wounding of an additional 31. In retaliation, the French military destroyed two 
Sukhoi-25 aircraft, in addition to three helicopters and an Ivorian army weapons 
cache, effectively destroying the Ivory Coast Air Force. The order to retaliate was 
reported to have come directly from French President Jacques Chirac. 
 
The U.N. Security Council held an emergency session to discuss the situation in the 
country and called for an end to all military operations by Ivory Coast forces. In 
Abidjan, thousands of protestors supporting Gbagbo attacked and burned French 
owned property as the president called the resumed fighting, not only a war against 
the rebels who had refused to disarm, but also a war against colonialism. Loyal 
militants burned down French homes, schools, and businesses. On November 15, the 
U.N. Security Council took action by imposing an immediate arms embargo on Ivory 
Coast. By November 23, French peacekeepers had begun to withdraw from certain 
sites, including the airport at Abidjan in an attempt to restore the situation to a 
manageable level.  
 
The President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki was sent to the Ivory Coast at the behest 
of the African Union and ECOWAS. Even as the president arrived, French troops 
fired on protestors to disperse a crowd, killing at least 20 people on the streets of 
Abidjan. President Mbeki traveled to the Ivory Coast on December 2, 2004 to meet 
with the leaders of the warring parties individually in an attempt to renew the 
foundations of a peace process. Through these meetings, Mbeki was able to obtain 
pledges to commit to the peace process by all parties.  
 
Mbeki brought the warring parties together for the first time in 8 months in Pretoria. 
The negotiations in Pretoria, South Africa began on April 2 and yielded an agreement 
between the leaders to immediately and finally cease all hostilities. On August 25 
after a series of missed disarmament deadlines and a lack of electoral commission 
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readiness, Soro declared that the New Forces would not participate in election 
planned for October 30. After this failure, South Africa said it was ending its 
mediation of the Ivory Coast crisis and blamed the rebel and opposition parties. On 
September 9, Kofi Annan also conceded that the elections could not take place due to 
the leaders of the parties involved. In the absence of an election plan, the leaders of 
the Africa Union declared that Gbagbo should remain in office for another year to 
avoid a constitutional crisis. The U.N. Security Council supported the motion to set 
the elections back a year at the latest. Clearly, one aspect that cut across African 
conflicts and the Ivorian conflict inclusive, is their regional dynamics which is 
enmeshed in ethnic, economic and political rationalities 
Section Five: Regional Dynamics 
An examination of Ivorian history will reveal that the country was an epicentre from 
where France meddled in the affairs of African states grounded in the formidable 
partnership of Boigny and Jacque Foccart. By association, Ivory Coast has been guilty 
of meddling in the internal affairs of many African states for example, Nigeria, 
Liberia, Angola and Gabon. Regional interference in Ivorian crisis is not that 
surprising cognisance of limited state capacity and the fact that the country is situated 
in volatile West Africa. The crisis in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone affected the 
trajectory of Ivorian conflict reminiscent of most African conflicts. How and why did 
Ivorian conflict became a regional quagmire deserve a thorough examination. 
 
Liberian Connection 
It is not startling that Liberia and Ivory Coast found themselves enmeshed in each 
others conflict considering the history of their intercourse. ICG, HRW and Global 
Witness have established that MPIGO and MJP in the west of Ivory Coast were 
funded and aided by Liberian government troops including former RUF soldiers from 
Sierra Leone. Gbagbo armed former LURD-MODEL forces in their effort to dislodge 
Taylor; a number of veterans of the Mano River Union conflict effectively moved into 
the Ivorian crisis.  
 
The genesis of Liberia’s involvement in Ivorian conflict can be traced back to the 
warm and clandestine relations between Boigny and Taylor. Western Ivory Coast 
from which Taylor launched his insurgence on 24 December 1989 served as transit 
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route during Liberia’s first civil war for both arms and commercial links for Taylor; 
while at the same hosted refugees from Liberia and anti-Taylor forces, mainly of 
ethnic Krahns from Grand Gedeh County.309 ICG argues that Boigny’s decision to 
support Taylor was very much informed by the murder of William Tolbert a close 
friend to Boigny and Tolbert’s son Aldophus, who was married to Boigny’s 
granddaughter Desiree Delafosse.310  
 
The close relationship between Boigny and Taylor transpired into a close relationship 
between Gueï who was then Chief of Staff of the Ivorian army. The alliance between 
Gueï and Taylor might explain the former’s success in the 1999 coup exactly 10 years 
after Taylor’s success.311 In fact, ICG points out that a “pact was reportedly agreed 
whereby Taylor would support a coup if Gueï lost the October 2000 presidential 
elections. This seems to be plausible because soldiers loyal to Gueï were trained by 
Taylor’s able commander Kuku Dennis.312 ICG states that, based on the location of 
the rebels and their initial success, none could have launched their attacks without the 
financial or military support of Taylor or Compaore.313 
 
Taylor was very much interested in the outcome of the Ivorian crisis on various 
counts: first, MPIGO and MJP control of western Ivory Coast meant that Taylor 
would be assured of safe transit routes for the supply of arms and export of timber 
through the port of San Pedro. Important to note here is that san Pedro has the second 
largest sea port in SSA after Durban. This would have provided Taylor a viable means 
of sustaining his war effort.314 Also the control of western Ivory Coast from a 
strategic point of view would have prevented Taylor fighting a war on two fronts 
mindful of LURD’s presence in Guinea and Ivory Coast. 
 
ICG report points out that at the beginning of the war, Taylor was not directly 
involved in Ivorian crisis until Gbagbo effectively got involved in Liberia.  Gbagbo’s 
earlier contact with Liberia came with the accession of Samuel Doe to power in 
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Liberia. Relations between Doe and Boigny deteriorated and Gbagbo was able to 
capitalise on this to finance his party.315  The aiding of LURD-MODEL by Gbagbo 
pushed Taylor to get involved directly knowing fully well that the enemy of his 
enemy is his friend. Gbagbo on his part funded LURD-MODEL in order for it to act 
as a bulwark against Taylor’s incursion into Ivory Coast. ICG report posits that in a 
meeting in early January in Abidjan, Krahns and Guéré leaders agreed that “Liberian 
Krahns would give Gbagbo manpower for his war. In return, Gbagbo and FANCI 
would give free passage and military support to remove President Taylor.”316 
 
 This cross border support was facilitated by the ethnic makeup of the belligerents. 
While the bulk of MPIGO and MJP are from the Kru ethnic group, the bulk of 
Taylor’s NPFL are Gios, and the Gios and Krus are ethnic cousin. LURD-MODEL is 
made up principally of Krahns as opposed to Mandingos of LURD based in Guinea. 
The Krahns are ethnic cousins of Guéré in the west of Ivory Coast who happened to 
be amongst the fervent supporters of Gbagbo.317  
 
The Burkinabé Connection 
Compaore’s involvement in Ivory Coast was conditioned by his alliance with Taylor 
and Ouattara. Compaore met Taylor in the early 1980s while both men were training 
under Gadhaffi. Ouattara spoke of Compaore as a close friend and both men met 
when Ouattara was serving as director of the African department of the IMF. In fact 
Ouattara argues that he acquired a Burkinabe passport because, Burkina Faso had to 
fill the post of President of BEAO and Compaore turned to Boigny who proposed 
Ouattara. 
 
ICG argue that though it might be difficult to establish a tacit agreement between 
Taylor and Compaore in their involvement in Ivory Coast, “there are many indicators 
of a degree of coordination before the coup but it appears that the initial military 
action came from the North, with the support of Burkina Faso.”318 
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Burkina Faso harboured and trained most of the deserters of FANCI following Gueï’s 
purge and the attempted January coup of 2001. They were lodge by Burkinabè 
government in Ouagadougou’s Samgande neighbourhood.319 Important MPCI 
commanders were training in Burkinabé cognisance of the country’s prowess in 
military intelligence, communication and clandestine operation.320 Guillame Soro and 
Louis Dacoury Tabley prominent leaders of MPCI visited Burkinabe and stayed with 
Compaore’s brother Françoise Compaore. This in fact establishes the fact that a close 
relationship existed between the rebels and Compaore. More over ICG points out that 
there is a high possibility; the rebels were funded by Burkinabe government and 
businessmen close to the government. The fact that the World Bank in February 2003 
discovered that $25 million mysteriously disappeared from Burkinabe’s budget might 
inform any intellectual guess as to how the rebellion was funded.321 
 
Compaore had many reasons to see the back of Gbagbo: first from 1989-1999, he had 
been funding Gbagbo cognisance of the unstable alliance between the north and south 
within the PDCI. Gbagbo’s stand on nationality issue would definitely have been a 
personal embracement to Compaore. Moreover, there are over two million Burkinabes 
in Ivory Coast and their remittance is of immense help to the burkinabé economy. 
Thus any attempt at stopping this might prove politically dangerous.322  
 
Guinea-Bissau Connection 
It is an open secret that the government in Guinea was supporting LURD which was 
based in Guinea in the town of Macenta near the Liberian border. By allowing LURD 
to operate along the Guinea border, President Conte indirectly intensified the war in 
Liberia. The presence of LURD along the Guinea-Liberia border has provided Conte 
a cheap means of protecting his flank from possible attack by dissidents based in 
Liberia.323 Since the US supports the Guinean government, it is indirectly supporting 
LURD. Guinea is very rich in gold, diamond and bauxite. Thus while this might serve 
as reason for Taylor to attack guinea, it is reason for US support for Conte and the bad 
blood between Taylor and the US is an open affair. 
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LURD-MODEL which is competitor of LURD emerged in March 2003 in Ivory 
Coast with the backing of Gbagbo. Against this backdrop, the following question is 
important. Could the US have aided LURD-MODEL had they succeeded in 
positioning themselves in Ivory Coast?  
 
On 15 July, Guinean authorities reported exchange of fire between their troops and 
FN elements around Noumoudjila near Ivory Coast-Guinea border. This incident was 
pursuant to attempts by faction loyal to Ibrahim Coulibaly to recruit people from 
Guinea at the Sinko market.324 Moreover, ICG report states that helicopters used 
during the November 2004 raids on northern areas and French army were 
Guinean’s.325 Though the Gbagbo argues that the helicopters are in guinea for repairs, 
this argument is weak since I do not think Guinea has the expertise for that. It thus 
seems this argument is to disguise Gbagbo’s drive for rearmament. 
Conclusion 
This section set out to show that the root of Ivorian crisis can be found in the 
succession battle after Boigny’s death. This battle was grounded in contestation of 
resources and their mode of distribution. The old guards who supported Bédié resisted 
change, while Ouattara neoliberal economic policies won him the support of 
technocrats. The political divided in Ivory Coast was also accentuated by alignment 
with international interest groups and in the process creating a dependent bourgeois 
class devoid of any vision for the country. Sharing the spoils of privatisation dictated 
alignment in Ivorian politics.  Faced with dwindling resources and threat to their 
mode of distribution, Ivorian politicians have been guilty of trying to exclude their 
foes by instrumentalising ethnicity even if it meant engulfing the society in a violent 
conflict. What matters most to them is accessibility and preservation of the mode of 
accumulation.  
 
In examining the course of the conflict, one would realise that strategies employed by 
both sides of the conflict was highly influenced by commercial reasons. Battles for 
more economically viable zones were heated and protracted. This situation was 
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compounded by the regional dimension the crisis grounded in security and economic 
rationalities.  
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                       CHAPTER FOUR 
 
ATTEMPTS AT RESOLVING THE CONFLICT: FROM  
                             PARIS TO PRETORIA 
 
If people who made these plans think they will work then they 
are in for a surprise as our war is mystical and we will come 
back stronger then before.326 Denis Maho Glofiehi (General 
of FLGO) 
Like most African conflicts, the Ivorian crisis has witnessed a plethora of 
international and internal negotiation processes aimed at arresting the conflict and 
shepherding peace. This study will concentrate on international accords which started 
in Paris and ended up Pretoria. The Linas Marcoussis accord is basically the 
framework upon which other negotiations attempt are contingent upon. 
Section One: Linas Marcoussis Accord (Pax Marcoussis) 
French policy in Africa took a different turn after Operation Turquoise. While very 
willing to regard francophone Africa as its fiefdom, France very much wanted to 
publicly distance itself from Africa. Thus French intervention in Ivory Coast was very 
much a complete turn in its foreign policy trajectory in Africa since Rwanda. At the 
beginning of Ivorian crisis, France encouraged ECOWAS to search for a solution to 
the crisis. Cognisance of its economic interest in Ivory Coast and ECOWAS’s failure 
to find a solution, France and ECOWAS initiated ceasefire on 13 January leading to 
peace talks in Paris  
 
Linas Marcoussis stated on 15 January in Linas-Marcoussis, just outside Paris, and 
ended on 24 January 2003 with an Agreement that was signed by all the parties. 
France, cognisance of urgency to reach an agreement and most probably learning 
from Lord Carrington’s management of the Lancaster House Conference, practically 
imposed the agenda and restricted participation to political parties and rebels. The 
major parties-RDR, FPI, PDCI-RDA and UDPCI-had five representatives; the smaller 
parties-MFA, PIT, and UDCY-had one representative each. Rebels: MPCI had 5, 
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MPIGO 1, MJP 1. Also present were delegates from AU and UN. Important decisions 
during the negotiations were made behind close doors.   
 
Linas Marcoussis was grounded in four main issues: preserving territorial 
sovereignty, Power-sharing, political exclusion and disarmament. The Agreement 
called for the establishment of a Government of National Reconciliation with wide 
executive powers; composed of ministers from the main political parties and rebel 
groups on a roughly equal basis but with Gbagbo as President; despite the 
appointment of a Prime Minister with wide-ranging powers.327 The accord also 
addressed the issue of identity or nationality. The Agreement stated that… 
 
foreign nationals…have made a major contribution to national 
wealth and have helped bestow on Ivory Coast its special position 
and responsibility within the sub-region,” noting that “the petty 
annoyances perpetrated by the administration and the police and 
security forces, which often disregard the law and human rights and 
which often affect foreigners, can be caused by using willful 
misapplication of identification laws.” The new government, 
therefore, “will immediately eliminate the residence permit 
requirement…for nationals of ECOWAS countries and will carry out 
the immigration inspection needed by using means of identification 
not subject fraudulent misuse...”  
 
The Agreement also called for changes to land ownership laws, in order to grant 
immigrants access to land.  
 
The accord called for disarmament of rebels and militias, the re-organisation of the 
army, the granting of amnesty - only slightly qualified - to the army mutineers and 
other militia forces which constituted the insurgent forces.328 Also, appropriate 
measures were to be taken to ensure the freedom of the media. The egreement 
condemned “the incitement to hatred and xenophobia propagated by certain media.” 
Measures were also to be put in place to facilitate the liberation of prisoners of war.  
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While the rebels welcomed the accord and described it as a victory, Mamadou 
Koulibaly described it as a constitutional coup.329 Implementation of the Agreement 
has been slow and at best tenuous. Gbagbo, with a reputation of “publicly endorsing 
agreements while privately ensuring that they are undermined”330 has been accused of 
bad faith.  With respect to the Agreement, Gbagbo is said to have found “a way to 
resist the peace pact and stay in power without actually saying no, artfully flicking a 
switch on when he wants a protest and off when it is time to appear cooperative.”331 
The rebels on their part are steadfast on elections before disarmament, realising that it 
is their only guarantee. 
Accra Accords: An African Solution to an African Problem. 332 
The Accra 11 accord was born out of difficulties in implementing Linas Marcoussis 
specifically around the contentious issue of forming a reconciliation government and 
the appointment of defence and interior ministers. Accra II took place in Accra from 
6-7 march, barely 42 days after the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis Accords in 
France. All parties who attended Linas Marcoussis were present, including 
representatives of AU and ECOWAS and leaders of other African states.  
The accord called for total adherence to Marcoussis; the implementation by 14 March 
2003 provisions of the accord relating to the delegation of power to the 
Reconcilement government and the setup of a government of national unity. 
Accra II made recommendations on the setting up of a National Council of Security 
made up of 15 members charged with management and monitoring of Defense and 
Interior ministries. The President was also tasked with the appointment of the defense 
and interior ministers after consultations with the National Council of Security. This 
was a positive point because Accra II did not grant the defense and interior ministries 
to the rebels as it was the case in the LMA. The Accords also reiterates the LMA 
recommendations on the safety of the belligerents and government’s members by 
ECOWAS and the French. 
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Accra III signed a year later in July 2004 was an attempt to save Linas Marcoussis. 
Anchored on LMA, Accra tried to retrace the roadmap for peace in Ivory Coast 
grounded in pragmatic as opposed to the emotionally induced process at Paris. The 
summit was termed the last chance to right the wrongs of Marcoussis, a chance to 
uphold reality as against rhetoric and also grounded in the realisation that the crisis 
was also a regional crisis. Most importantly, Accra was a forum to honestly accept 
that, in the words of Michel de Bonnecorse-President Chirac’s adviser on African 
affairs- “African crisis is an African problem.”333 
Accra 111 had two components: political and security. The political element focused 
on eligibility issue, legal powers of the Prime Minster government of national unity 
and reconciliation. On eligibility issue, the accord stressed the necessity to revise 
criteria of eligibility based on Gbagbo’s discretionary powers and through the 
adoption by parliament legal reforms surrounding the issue. On government of 
national reconciliation, Accra III emphasised the need for all parties to commit 
themselves to the implementation of the agreement as a way forward in the conflict 
resolution process.  
On the security level, the DDR process was seen as an impediment. Armed factions 
were expected to disarm by 15th of October 2004. That was certainly not the case. No 
recommendation was made as to how to deal with their failure to disarm on time.334  
Pretoria Accords (Pax Pretoriana): Understanding the Ivorian Mind. 335 
After three days of closed-door meetings and intense negotiations in Pretoria, 
belligerents to Ivorian crisis signed a peace deal on April 7 2005. Pretoria accord like 
its predecessors was grounded in Marcoussis. Under the Pretoria accord, President 
Mbeki was given powers to decide on the infamous article 35 after consultation with 
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and African Union Chairman Olusegun Obasanjo. 
It might seem plausible to speculate that a deal was already in place  but the delay was 
to give Gbagbo a face-saving week to prepare his troops on the ground for the bad 
news that his rival is ready to bounce back on the political scene. Under the Pretoria 
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agreement, the UN will be responsible for organising elections scheduled for October. 
Rebels and militias were to be disarm demobilise and reintegrated.  
 
Pretoria was supposed to usher presidential elections on the 31st of October, thereby 
ending a conflict resolution process that stated more than two years ago. But like 
earlier accords, the deal crumbled and everyone from Gbagbo, rebels and the UN 
acknowledged the impossibility to hold elections. Rebels in the north refused to 
disarm, pro-Gbagbo militia in the south failed to hand in weapons, electoral registers 
have not been updated and the country is still divided. South Africa’s Minister of 
Defense Mr. Lekota accused the rebels of torpedoing the accord aguing that Gbagbo 
had kept his own side of the bargain. In response, rebels declared South African 
persona non grata.   
 
The AU met in Nigeria in September to discuss a new proposal within the framework 
of the previous initiatives. Though Gbagbo did not attend arguing that negotiation 
processes had been exhausted and he keep his own side of the bargain, AU proposed 
to the UN that a powerful Prime Minister should be nominated and Gbagbo should 
stay in power for a year. President Mbeki, Obasanjo and Mamadou Tadjan were 
charged with finding a Prime Minister acceptable to all. Charles Konan Banny was 
appointed. It remains to be seen if he will be allowed to carry out his job. The 
international working group in Ivory Coast has called for the dissolution of parliament 
since its mandate is coming to an end; cognisance of the fact that it is very loyal to 
Gbagbo. This move is a calculate manoeuvre to neutralise Gbagbo’s last power base 
thus strengthening  Prime Minister Banny hands in implementing LM 
Conclusion 
Attempts at conflicts resolution in Ivory Coast is a process that started with LMA and 
culminated into failure after Pretoria. Four things cuts across these initiatives: power 
sharing, eligibility, elections and disarmament. Participants to these initiatives were 
very eager to participate and sign them just to return home for political dilly dallying. 
The move from Pretoria to Accra was clearly engendered because France was deemed 
part of the problem. Accra definitely had good intentions but it seems ECOWAS 
because of its past history with Ivory Coast lack the moral standing and leverage to 
carry the process through. On all account, Pretoria was again an African initiative 
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grounded in South Africa’s experience with politics of inclusion. These initiatives by 
tackling issues of electoral eligibility and land tenure steeped around the concept of 
ivoirité can best be describe as trying to solve the mobilising factors of the Ivorian 
crisis rather than structural causes. Can this explain why despite the fact that most 
clauses of these initiatives have been implemented there is still no peace in Ivory 
Coast? 
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                                            CHAPTER FIVE  
 
          FAILURES OF ATTEMPTS AT RESOLVING THE CONFLICT 
 
Like most conflicts on the continent, the Ivorian crisis has teetered between cessation 
of hostility and peace. At best, the Ivorian conflict can be described as a situation of 
no peace no war. From Paris to Pretoria, the signatories of these initiatives committed 
themselves to peace. They agreed that peace was the best thing for the Ivorian people 
and it was incumbent on them to ensure it. Not to the surprise of the international 
community, once these parties left for their respective fiefdom, it became increasingly 
clear that diplomacy has once again received a bashing from reality. Each side of the 
political divide played the game of standing by these peace accords while at the same 
repudiating it and blaming other for its demise. At one point, President Gbagbo 
pointed out that there is no need for further negotiations because they have reached 
their natural terminus.336 Why are these accords very difficult to be fully 
implemented? What informed the decisions of the belligerents not to fully commit? 
 
This section argues that lack of political will is at the heart of failure to fully 
implement LMA. Parties to LMA are faced with a prisoner’s dilemma skewed in the 
nature of the Ivorian state and political economy generated by the war. The Ivorian 
state is still grounded in politics as a zero sum game. In essence, any political 
negotiation that means loosing power is doom for failure. On the other hand, the war 
has generated a political economy that provides opportunities to certain parties of the 
conflict. 
Section One: Substantive and Technical Failures  
From a substantive standpoint, the LMA was very much concern about arresting the 
conflict/fighting and preparing parties for election. Issues of nationality, electoral 
eligibility, land reforms and ethnic hatred are not specific to Ivory Coast. As the study 
has attempt to show, ethnic animosity in Ivory Coast is the residue of economic 
decline and the failure of equitable distribution of resources skewed in the politics of 
patrimonialism and enforced democratisation. Of course, nationality determines who 
gets what and how, but by not taking a radical approach on a substantive diagnosis of 
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Ivorian state, the accord was addressing the symptoms of political decay in Ivory 
Coast rather than the causes. 
 
Elections have been seen as a sustainable way to usher peace in conflict societies. The 
outcome of an election is the will of the people as to who will govern them and how. 
But in Ivory Coast, the electoral system is almost invariably skewed in favour of 
political mobilisation without consideration of what is good for the people. 
 
Ivory Coast is made up of 60 ethnic groups spread all over the country. Thus any 
mechanism in the distribution of resources in Ivory Coast must be grounded in a 
system that protects the interest of every ethnic group. Against this backdrop, 
proportional representation is best suited in Ivory Coast rather than the present 
system-simple majority in parliamentary elections.337 A simple majority means that 
some ethnic group will definitely find themselves in a minority thus loosing out in the 
decision making process of the country. While should an ethnic group be part of a 
political system where its interest will not be reflected taking into cognisance the fact 
that voting patterns in Ivory Coast as in most African countries is along ethnic lines? 
 
As shown above, electoral manoeuvring has been at the heart of Ivorian polity since 
the introduction of multiparty politics in the 1990s. Boigny manipulated the electoral 
system in favour of a simple majority cognisance that a coalition between Dioulas and 
Buoales will ensure him a simple majority because of their demographic superiority. 
In such circumstance, the Bétés will clearly loose out. This situation is compounded 
by the fact that, power in Ivory Coast is centred on the President. Thus he who 
controls la présidence controls both the economic and political life of Ivorians. 
Moreover, the organisation of elections in the country has not helped the situation. 
  
Despite the creation of an independent electoral commission, election outcome can 
easily be determined by who controls state power. Voter’s registration is in the hands 
of the national statistics agency, created and control by the state. Against this 
backdrop, why would a party to LMA fully accept the accord knowing that it will 
eventually loose power in an election that is skewed in favour of who controls state 
                                                 
337
 Electoral Code, op. cit 
 112 
power? LMA should have been radical in bestowing the organisation of elections in 
the hands of UN like the case of East Timor. Within this context it is safe to say LMA 
was very exclusivist in its thinking. 
 
The exclusivist nature of LMA was also pictured by restriction imposed on 
participation. Only political parties and rebels were allowed to participate much to the 
chagrin of civil society organisations (CSOs). The Ivorian crisis was viewed as an 
elite struggle and not an explosion of Ivorian society. Any sustainable peace 
agreement and its implementation thereof depend on ownership and the active 
participation of the citizenry. By not including civil society, LMA denied Ivorians an 
opportunity to engage with the rejuvenation process of their country and a chance to 
vet their political leaders and hold them responsible. LMA’s exclusivist nature denied 
Ivorian the same rights there have been denied by various regimes (political 
participation). Consequently I agree with Lijphart that any exclusivist peace 
agreement is doom for failure.338 
 
René Lemarchand argues, in "exclusionary" political calculus/zero-sum in which 
accession to power by one group is automatically considered by the losers as the 
precursor to their own destruction, there is no room for compromise; "the preservation 
of ethnic hegemony is perceived as a condition for physical survival" by the 
incumbents, with "the elimination of rival claimants as the only means by which 
survival can be assured."339 
 
LMA was also exclusivist in nature for its failure to recognise the regional nature of 
the Ivorian crisis. In an era of interconnectedness against a backdrop of weak state 
capacity in Africa, politics is a two level game; national and international. At the 
national level for example; though Gbagbo accepted LMA, he realised that he could 
not implement it because it was politically dangerous to a majority of his cronies. The 
appointment of a powerful Prime Minister mindful that Ivory Coast operates a 
cohabitation system meant Gbagbo’s powers were weakened and his control over 
parliament reduced. Political influence of Gbagbo’s cronies was reduced, for 
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example, Affi N’Guessan lost out as Prime Minister, Mamadou Koulibaly and 
Simone Gbagbo, President and Vice President of National Assembly respectively lost 
their political clout since the government was now responsible to the Prime Minister. 
This might explain why they have been the most vocal against LMA. 
 
On the international plane, by leaving out representatives from Guinea, Liberia and 
Burkina Faso, LMA in essence left out major stakeholders in Ivorian conflict. Though 
bringing these parties on board would have strengthened the hand of the rebels, their 
presence and subsequent adherence to the accord would have strengthened the 
position of the international community to act against Compaore’ and Charles Taylor. 
 
Mutual distrust has had a negative impact on the implementation of LMA. We would 
disarm until all texts are voted into law: no vote on laws until state authority is 
restored in national territory, these are the arguments put forward by rebels and 
government. LMA by calling on all parties to disarm without a credible third party to 
enforce the peace is viewed as suicidal by the rebels. The rebels’ military strength is 
their priciest bargaining chip. Calling on them to disarm and become vulnerable 
demand much more than words. Concrete guarantees that they will not loose their 
existence and military strength which translates into political gains is imperative. 
Soro’s recent outburst that rebel’s control of over 60% of Ivory Coast should 
guarantee them the post of Prime Minister demonstrates the importance of rebel’s 
military strength in political discusses. Why should rebels give up their military 
strength if there are no guarantees of their existence and military gains? Government 
attack on their position in November 2004 might have strengthened their stand on 
disarmament. This situation has been compounded by the fact that both belligerents in 
the crisis have been guilty of stock pilling weapons despite a UN embargo of arms 
sale to Ivory Coast.340 
 
Mutual distrust in Ivorian conflict has also been fuelled by an irresponsible and bias 
press. Ivorian press is guilty of fuelling distrust amongst parties to the conflict by 
circulating speculative articles alleging massive violation of arms embargo and bad 
faith by each party. The following headline illustrates this point: “Mbeki arms sale to 
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Gbagbo: New revelations” (Soir Info, 16 august 2005), “Gbagbo wants return to war: 
300 mercenaries trained at Akouedo military camp” (Le Patriote, 14 July 2005), 
“balance sheet of Gbagbo trip to west: 500 million and distribution of weapons to 
militia” (le Front, 21 June 2005).341 These allegation and others that one of the 
helicopters destroyed by French was from Guinea are false.342 All they help to do is 
harden the position and galvanise support for of the belligerent. 
. 
Distrust between the belligerents has also been compounded by the lack of a credible 
power broker in the Ivorian crisis. France seems the only party that has leverage over 
the belligerents. But as shown above, enormous French interest in the country has 
made France a problem rather than a solution. French implicit support swung from 
rebels to government. It thus seems that the destruction of the Ivorian air force and the 
harmonious relationship between France and the rebels is meant to pressurise Gbagbo 
to make economic concession to France. The award of a contract for the construction 
of Abidjan seaport to French company under suspicious circumstance in December 
2004 is illustrative.343 Gbagbo on his part has been using anti-French rhetoric as a 
mechanism to solicit French cooperation. The military strength of the rebels puts 
France in a very tricky position. Any military success by government demands French 
overt involvement, something Champ d’Elise does not want. On the other hand by not 
supporting the government, France is sending wrong signals to his other clients like 
Bongo and Biya. Thus I concur with Azam and posit that the persistence of the crisis 
in Ivory Coast might be as result of the fact that there is no credible winner for the 
international community to back as was the case in Liberia;344  mindful that natural 
resource exploitation is financing the war.  
Section Two: War Economy (war is more lucrative than peace) 
War is not a bad thing in itself depending on one’s position in the political ladder. 
While ordinary Ivorians have been lamenting under the excruciating effect of the 
present crisis, it has become a means of accumulation to others.345 A UN panel of 
expert report document the exploitation of natural resources to fund and sustain the 
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war in Ivory Coast.346 Both the government and the rebels have been guilty of 
exploiting the war for their benefits. Resources such as cocoa, coffee and diamond 
have been the most exploited. 
Cocoa 
Cocoa accounted for $3.5 billion of Ivory Coast budget of $3.5 billion in 2003. With 
the suspension of loans and the tax system in disarray, Ivorian government have been 
able to stay solvent thanks to rents from cocoa. The state has been able to collect rents 
through organisation such as: l’Autorité de Regulation du Café et du Cacao, Fond de 
Développement et de Promotion des Activités des Production de Café et Cacao, Fond 
de Regulation et de Contrôle (FRC). These organisations are involved in cocoa 
business especially exportation. Though they are privately run, their owners are 
political backers of Gbagbo and have powerful links with producers’ organisation 
such as Association Nationale des Producteurs de Café-Cacao de Cote d’Ivoire 
(ANAPROCI) and Syndicat Autonome des Producteurs de Cafe-Cacao de Cote 
d’Ivoire (SYNAPROCI). These organisations have been able to extract rents and 
channel them to the state for its war effort. This seems plausible because by August 
2004, farmers were rioting arguing that though FRC have taxed their produce, they 
have not stabilised the price of cocoa. 
 
The Ivorian crisis has witnessed the usual crowd of arms dealers profiting from 
deregulation and increased military expenditure. According to CIA, government 
defense expenditure by 2004 increased by $180.2 million representing 1.2% of GDP 
though the World Bank puts it at $150.347 Off the budget expenditure more than 
doubled during this period. Almost 60% of military expenditure (1.1% of GDP) was 
for the purchase and supply of military hardwear, wages, allowances, food, medical 
care and bonus for mostly new recruits.348  According to the African Development 
Bank, government expenditures as a share of GDP increased less in 2003 (0.2 
percentage point to 19.7 percent) than they did in 2002 (2.9 percentage points). This 
evidence can be corroborated by the fact that thegovernment consumed 8.2 percent of 
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GDP in 2003, down from the 11.4 percent reported in the 2005 Index.349 20% (0.2% 
of GDP) of all military expenditures came from cocoa sector.350 
 
Table: 12: Ivorian Government Military Expenditure 
                                  Sept-Dec.2002.        Jan-Dec. 2003           Total 2002-03                 GDP% 
                                                   Millions of CFA francs 
other 3.3 13.1 16.4 0.2 
Financing  57.5 88.8 146.3 1.8 
Treasury  44.8 78.5 123.3 1.5 
Cocoa institutions 10.0 10.0 20.0 0.3 
Private 
institutions 
2.7 0.3 3.0 0.0 
Source: Ivorian Authorities and IMF351 
Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, UK and South Africa have been guilty of selling 
weapons raging from 82mm, BM-37 mortars, 122mm and 120mm mortars to the 
government. Metalika AB Ltd in Bulgaria, Belspetsvneshtechnika (BSVT) in Belarus 
and Darwood in Togo352 are the fore runners of military supplies to Ivory Coast.353 An 
AK47 in the north of Ivory Coast cost just $70.354 
 
Both rebels and government militias have benefited from anarchy in the country. The 
2006 Economic Freedom shows that informal economy in Ivory Coast have blossom 
from a 4.5 score this year—0.5 point worse than last year.355 Militias, rebels and 
junior army officers have enriched themselves through roadblocks or cash point. ICG 
and UN have documented the extraction of rents from pedestrians and trucks 
transporting cocoa.356 Along the Abidjan-Daloa highway, Korhogo-Bouake highway, 
rebels and government militias are making large sums of money. Between Daloa and 
Abidjan, the cost of a roadblock rages from CFAF 500 ($0.90) to CFAF 3000 
($15.40), generally in rebel held areas, the cost rages from $1.80 to $3.6 and in 
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government held areas from $180 to $270.357 This business is flourishing well taking 
cognisance of the fact that the prices of cocoa in Ghana is 15% higher than those in 
Ivory Coast. Thus most Ivorian cocoa is been transported to Ghana were they fetch a 
higher price. International cocoa organisation reports that 150,000 tons of cocoa is 
been smuggled to Ghana every year.358  
 
Roadblocks in government held areas are manned by militia groups who consider it 
legal self-help. These groups inclue: Jeune Patriotes (FESCI/UPLTCI), Front pour la 
Libération du Grand Oust (FLGO), Front pour la Sécurité de Central Oust (FSCO), 
Lima/Model, Union Patriotique de Résistance du Grand Ouest (UPRGO). These 
groups are being paid CFAF 10000 to fight and CFAF 1000-1500 to participate in 
protest marches. Rebels on their part are paid CFAF5000 ($9.68) a month to fight.359 
 
Looting and robbery has also become a viable mode of accumulation for rebels and 
military. On the 27 of august 2002 in Abidjan, MPCI seized more than CFA 2 billion 
($3.87) from local branch of Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest 
(BCEAO). Also in September 2003, CFAF 20 billion ($3.87) was stolen from a local 
bank.360 
 
From a logical point of view, considering that upon demobilisation, each militia will 
receive $950, 25% upon demobilisation, 25% after 45 days and 50% after 90 days, it 
does not make economic sense for them to drop their weapons. On the government 
side, there are reports of mutiny by soldiers for increase pay and better working 
conditions.361 
 
Cotton 
Cotton is mostly produced in rebel held areas. 55 % of Ivorian cotton is been diverted 
to Mali and Burkina Faso were prices are CFAF 210 per kilogram compared to CFAF 
160-180 in Ivory Coast. The rebels are able to extract rents from these activities by 
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taxing transportation and a profit from Ivorian textile industry.362 Cognisance of the 
ripple effect transportation of cotton might have on the war effort in the south; the 
rebels have stopped transporting cotton through the south.363 
 
Diamond is another resource that has kept the rebels afloat. Ivory Coast is a small 
producer of rough diamond. Though a member of the Kimberly Process (KP), it has 
never issued a KP certificate though al export of diamonds were banned per 
ministerial order No 0070 issued 19 November 2002.364 
  
Diamonds are located in Seguela, Bobi and Diarabala in the north. Production is 
estimated at 300,000 carats and it is been exported through Mali and Guinea where it 
is then transported to Antwerp Dubai and Tel- Aviv.365 Locals working for the mines 
are paid CFAF 20,000 a week and the industry is control by Groupement Vocation 
Cooperative (GVC). This industry created in 1986 now pays its taxes to the rebels. 
The rebels have been able to extract rents from this industry through imposing taxes 
on vehicles in exchange for number plates. The security of the diamond mines is 
within the purview of rebels. 
 
Interestingly, no matter the unavailability of data on Ivorian petrol industry, it would 
be naïve to run out the influence of oil on the present crisis. The importance of oil in 
international political economy and local politics has seen some conflicts flaring up 
and sustaining themselves because of struggle over its control. Angolan government 
was able to pursue its war with UNITA thanks to its control of oil, the crisis in Sudan, 
Chad, Nigeria and Cameroon is mainly because of oil. Against this backdrop, though 
speculative it sounds reasonable to argue that, cognisance of the role of oil in world 
politics and increase difficulty in Persian gulf, oil deposits in Ivory Coast though very 
small has been an important assert to the government in the present crisis. 
 
From a political standpoint, power structures and how one acquires it changes in times 
of war. It is very clear that the present crisis has in some ways legitimise the hand of 
Gbagbo to came down extremely hard on his political foes in the name of security 
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national sovereignty. Gbagbo has not hesitated in using extraordinary powers vested 
on him during emergency crisis.366 Laws have been instituted in the course of the 
crisis, for example media laws and curfews which clearly limit the manoeuvring space 
of his political opponents. More importantly, Gbagbo term of office has been 
extended for another year without a popular mandate. For the time being deputies are 
also seeking their own extension despite the absence of election. Clearly anarchy has 
been very beneficial to Gbagbo.  
 
The rebels have also benefited from anarchy. A few months before the crisis, Soro 
political head of the rebels was an employed young man who had fallen out of favour 
with Gbagbo after heading the Ivorian student union, which was a stooge supporter of 
Gbagbo. But as head of the rebels, he commands almost the same respect and 
influence as Gbagbo. Though Gbagbo’s legitimacy has also been in doubt,  achieving 
political prominence through bullets rather ballots at a time the continent is in a 
renewal process is something we must be cautions about. As for Ouattara, the crisis 
has drawn international sympathy and support to his cause cognisance of international 
attention on the crisis. But this should also be taken with a bit of salt because the 
prominence of Soro in the north might overshadow Ouattara as the flag bearer of the 
north. As for Bédié the architect of ivoirité, the present crisis have given him space to 
reshuffle his cards as position himself as victim of a situation which not of his making 
but due to political greed of Gueï and Gbagbo.  Since in politics interest never 
changes but allies do change, the crisis have provided a platform on with Bédié and 
Ouattara can join forces professing Houphtisme in their quest to oust Gbagbo. Against 
this backdrop, it seems the crisis in Ivory Coast has become a political cheese board 
where political elites negotiate and compromise the management and control of 
political power. 
 
Conclusion 
From the paragraphs above, one would realise that difficulties in implementing LMA 
stems from technical and substantive defects of the accord. From a technical part, the 
accord was exclusivist in nature by restricting representation. Thus every facet of 
Ivorian life was not represented. On the contrary representation was grounded in the 
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view that Ivorian crisis is an elite struggle.Moreover, by not dealing with issues 
around the nature of Ivorian politics such as electoral system, politics in Ivory Coast 
is still a zero sum game. Thus, since implementation of the agreement will alter power 
and influence of the belligerents, there is no incentive for them to give up their 
positions. 
 
The crisis has generated in its own dynamics which have witnessed winners and 
loosers. The crisis have become of accumulation for the belligerents depending on 
their location, avalaibility of natural resources and access to world market. From a 
political perspective, the crisis seems to legitimate the positonsof waring parties. 
Against thsis backdrop, there is little incentive to fight unless defeating the enermy is 
assured. 
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                              CONCLUSION  
 
         POLICY IMPLECATION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
This study set out to examine why implementing Linas Marcoussis accord, the 
framework for peace in Ivory Coast has been tenuous. The study argued that the 
accord did not deal with the structural causes of Ivorian crisis. It dealt with symptoms 
of the crisis and not the disease. The study has attempted to show that the Ivorian 
crisis is a conflict grounded in scarcity of resources and attempts to control 
mechanism of resource distribution. As resources became scares, politicians exploited 
political grievances and instrumentalise ethnicity in order to capture state power. 
 
Using the Ivorian colonial state as a point of departure, the study attempted to show 
that colonialism did not only harden ethnic rivalries where none exited, it created a 
dependent bourgeoisie that used state power for primitive accumulation. Moreover, 
colonialism integrated Ivory Coast into the global political economy as a plantation 
economy perpetually at the mercy of price fluctuation and international bailiffs.  
 
Boigny was able to maintain relative peace in Ivory Coast because he used surplus 
from economic boom (cocoa and coffee rents), to compensate, co-opt and appease 
demand-bearings groups. This was made possible not only because of economic boom 
but also by the fact that he had control over political and economic space within the 
context of a single party system. He engendered pork-barrel and inclusive politics to 
appease the Krus and northerners. At the dawn of imposed democratisation, economic 
decline and decline in human security compounded by SAP; Ivorian politicains 
exploited the weakness of unguarded democracy to strengthen their political position. 
Mindful of electoral politics and the absence of economic rewards for political 
mobilisation, ethnicity became politicised in the run up to the succession of Boigny.  
 
The instrumentalisation of ethnicity has produced violent conflict in Ivory Coast 
because, politics in the country under Bédié, Gueï and Gbagbo has been a zero-sum 
game cognisance of the fact that control of the state is control of the economy due to 
the absence of indigenous capital. Against this background, the present electoral 
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system has not help matters since it is grounded in a winner takes all system (FPTP), 
thus he who lost out in a political contest will surely starve to death. 
 
The Linas Marcoussis agreement and subsequent peace initiatives, in happing on land 
tenure, citizenship and nationality laws and not the nature of Ivorian state, dealt with 
symptoms of decay in Ivorian polity rather than with the disease. Thus as long as 
politics is still a zero sum game in Ivory Coast, the existence of weak political 
institution, limited state capacity, dependent bourgeoisie and an unscrupulous political 
leadership, Linas Marcoussis carries gems of conflict.  
 
I am not being a pessimist here, but my reasoning is firmly grounded in the facts 
before me. I must confess the absence of fieldwork and the fact that the crisis still 
drags on affords me no authority to make a sacrosanct conclusion. Thus, research is 
still needed to explain certain gaps in the conflict. For example: the nature and extent 
of war economies relative to diamond and oil needs futher research. The deals and 
compromises that were made behind close doors at various time of the conflict. 
Nevertheless, with the facts presented in this study, I conclude that the groundwork 
for peace in Ivory Coast as elsewhere in Africa must be grounded, not merely through 
the silencing of AK47s and mortars, but through the making of an atmosphere where 
development, justice, equality and respect are treasured and respect. As Haile Selassie 
once said 
 
…until the philosophy which holds one race superior and another inferior 
is finally and permanently discredited and abandoned; that until there is 
no longer any first-class and second-class citizens of any nation; that 
until the colour of a man's skin is of no more significance than the colour 
of his eyes; that until the basic human rights are equally guaranteed to 
all, without regard to race -- until that day, the dreams of lasting peace 
and world citizenship and the rule of international morality will remain 
but a fleeting illusion, to be pursued but never attained. …until bigotry 
and prejudice and malicious and inhuman self-interest have been 
replaced by understanding, tolerance and good-will; until all Africans 
stand and speak as free beings, equal in the eyes of all men as they are in 
Heaven -- until that day the African continent will not know peace. We 
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Africans will fight, if necessary and we know that we shall win, as we 
are confident in the victory of good over evil.367 
 
The above ingredients are still present in Ivory Coast for an explosive cocktail. 
However, for a sustainable framework that might bring peace to Ivory Coast, the 
following points might be helpful.  
 
First and foremost, from a contextual and theoretical perspective, the general focus of 
conflict management and resolution debate has become pre-occupied with armed 
conflict. Though warranted because of its excruciating impact on human lives- 
poverty and development (human security)-they tend to overlook the low profile and 
simmering conflict over resources and exclusion. As a consequence, conflict 
resolution should be addressing the structural causes of conflict rather than immediate 
causes which are merely a result of structural decay in the society; after all prevention 
is better than cure. On a policy level this calls for greater attention to early warning 
signals rather than waiting for conflict to expode. 
 
Conflict prevention and management tend to focus on global and systemic strategies 
of change steeped around neo-liberal approaches to “governance” and economic 
reforms. Democratisation in the early 1990s was simply interested in the outward 
trappings of democracy; for example, elections and new constitutions. But without 
due regard to the distributive side of democracy and the socio-economic realities of 
African polity. Democracy is a process and not a one size-fit-all event extrapolated 
from the west. Thus democracy in Africa needs to be contextualised taking note of 
African realities both socio-economic and cultural. 
 
Neo-liberal economic policies imposed on Africa was grounded in the belief that 
African states were: “neo-patrimonial,” “unsteady,” “omnipresent but hardly 
omnipotent,” “a lame leviathan,” “soft,” “sultanic,” “prebendal,” “hemmed in,” 
“kloptocratic,” “predatory,” “parasitic,” “crony,” “humpty dumpty”368 and in the 
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process becoming a nuisance to market and in la vie quotidienne of its citizens as a 
result unfriendly to democracy and development.369 Per the Berg Report, they were 
asked to delink themselves and leave the markets alone. The de-linking of the state in 
Africa has clearly compounded the lack of capacity faced by many African states in 
the discharge of their duties. Can we totally delink the state from the market? Does 
the state have a role to play in the accumulation and distribution of resource in the 
absence of indigenous capital? The strength of the Asian tigers was grounded in the 
strength of the developmental state. Definitely, the state in Africa despite its perceived 
lack of capacity has a big role to play (democratic developmental state) in the 
development process of the continent cognisance of the lack of a constructive 
bourgeois class and international vultures in the name of multinational corporations. 
The above recommedations can go along way to strengthen the following specific 
recommendations 
 
To the African Union (AU): 
 The AU must take a more decisive role in the peace process. If possible adopt 
a confrontation trajectory.  
 The AU mindful of limited resources should increase its appearance in Ivory 
Coast in terms of peacekeepers and administrative personnel. 
 Request the UN Security Council of targeted sanctions against those who 
constitute a threat to the peace and national reconciliation process in as 
specified in Security Council Resolution 1572. 
 The AU should negotiate a single approach to the crisis and should not be seen 
as pushing the agenda of certain countries. 
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To the United Nations Security Council: 
 Apply targeted sanctions, as specified in Resolution 1572. 
 UN should increase its troops and a rapid reaction unit that can effectively 
replace departing Licorne troops;  
 Play a constructive role in organising and holding elections; organising and 
undertaking DDR in collaboration with the AU;  
 Orders immediate publication of the report of the International Commission of 
Inquiry on Allegations of Serious Violations of Human Rights and of 
International Humanitarian Law in Côte d'Ivoire. 
 Keep the peace in Liberia and Sierra Leon. 
 Organised consented effort to fund Ivorian demobilisation and reintegration 
reconstruction project 
To France: 
 Keep a low profile but should remain engaged with and continue to contribute 
to the Ivorian peace process and the UN peacekeeping mission in the 
accomplishment of its new tasks. 
 Do not begin withdrawing Licorne forces before they can be replaced by a 
credible, strengthened UN force with a rapid reaction unit. 
 Persecute military personnel that have been guilty of human rights abuse 
 Forgive Ivorian debts, initiate constructive cooperate governance in Ivory 
Coast and urge the EU to increase development aid to Ivory Coast. 
To the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI): 
 Cease support for armed "patriotic" militias and use the Forces Armées 
Nationales de la Côte d'Ivoire (FANCI) to stop all breaches of the ceasefire 
between those militias and the Forces Nouvelles. 
 Ensure discipline and cohesion in the military 
 Negotiate unity and consented policy that the party should pursue. 
To the Forces Nouvelles: 
 Guarantee freedom of movement and access to all AU and UN staff working 
on elections and DDR. 
 Maintain unity within its rank 
 Respect of human rights 
 Accept the result of free and fair election 
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To the international community at large 
What Africa needs is not handouts but fair trade deals. The international community 
should keep their pledges at Monterey mindful of the defects of Uruguay up till Hong 
Kong   
Immigration out of the continent to an extent is the making of the west. Rather than 
strengthening immigration control, increase the capacity of African states.  
The international community should exercise restrain over the activities of MNCs 
Democracy is not a one-size-fit all prescription. It is a process that is engendered from 
within and not an event imposed from above. 
 
To all other political parties in Ivory Coast 
They should accept the diversity of their country and strive to realise that it is actually 
a blessing in disguise. Participate in different elections organised by the AU and the 
UN. Most of all they should try to duplicate and capitalise on the exploits and 
achievement of their national football team. A consensus around sport might just be 
the mobilising factor that could make Ivorians realise what virtue lies in unity. 
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                        Appendices 
 
A Chronology of Key Events:370  
1842 - France imposes protectorate over coastal zone. 
1893 - Ivory Coast made into a colony. 
 1904 - Ivory Coast becomes part of the French Federation of West Africa. 
1944 - Felix Houphouët-Boigny and other nationalist leaders in French West Africa 
form RDA. 
1946 SAA is formed which later changed into PDCI 
1958 - Ivory Coast becomes a republic within the French Community. 
Independence 
1960 - France grants independence under President Felix Houphouët-Boigny. He 
holds power until he dies in 1993. 
1963- Allege plot to topple Boigny  
1970-Gueberi massacre 
1980- Semi-competitive election is introduced. Post of party secretary scraped and 
article 11 of the constitution amended to allow President of the National Assembly to 
succeed the President 
1987-Ivory Coast suspends payment of external debt and stop SAP 
1990 – Multi-partism is introduced; Houphouët-Boigny wins presidential election, 
beating Laurent Gbagbo of the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI).  
                                                 
370
 This chronology of events draws much impetus from coverage by British Broacasting Coperation. 
www.bbcnews.co.uk   
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1993 - Henri Konan Bédié becomes President following the death of Houphouët-
Boigny. 
1995 - October - Bedie re-elected in a ballot that is boycotted by opposition parties in 
protest at restrictions imposed on their candidates. 
1998 – One of the biggest corruption scandals in Ivory Coast. BWI cease lending 
money to Ivory Coast  
1999 - July - Alassane Quattara, a Muslim, leaves job at International Monetary Fund 
and returns to run for president in 2000; his plan to challenge Bédié splits country 
along ethnic and religious lines. Opponents say he is national of Burkina Faso, not 
Ivory Coast.  
Coup  
1999 - Bédié is overthrown in a military coup. 
2000 October - Gueï proclaims himself President after announcing he has won 
presidential elections, but is forced to flee in the wake of a popular uprising against 
his perceived rigging of the poll.  
2000 October - Laurent Gbagbo, believed to be the real winner in the presidential 
election, is proclaimed president. Opposition leader Alassane Quattara, excluded from 
running in the poll, calls for a fresh election. 
2000 October - Fighting erupts between Gbagbo's mainly southern Christian 
supporters and followers of Quattara, who are mostly Muslims from the north. 
2000 December - President Gbagbo's Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) emerges as the 
biggest single party in parliamentary elections.  
2001 January - Attempted coup fails.  
2001 March - President Gbagbo and opposition leader Quattara meet for the first time 
since violence erupted between their supporters in October 2000 and agree to work 
towards reconciliation.  
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2001 March - Calls for fresh presidential and legislative elections after Alassane 
Quattara’s party gains majority at local polls. 
2001 October - President Gbagbo sets up National Reconciliation Forum. General 
Gueï refuses to attend in protest against the arrest of his close aide Captain Fabien 
Coulibaly. 
2001 November - Opposition leader Alassane Quattara returns, ending year-long exile 
in France and Gabon.  
2002 August - Quattara’s RDR opposition party is given four ministerial posts in new 
government.  
Rebellion  
2002 19 September - Mutiny in Abidjan by soldiers unhappy at being demobilised 
grows into full-scale rebellion, with Ivory Coast Patriotic Movement rebels seising 
control of the north. 
2002 October-December - Short-lived ceasefire in October gives way to further 
clashes and battle for key cocoa-industry town of Daloa. Previously unknown rebel 
groups seize towns in west.  
2003 January - President Gbagbo accepts peace deal at talks in Paris. Deal proposes 
power-sharing government.  
Power-sharing 
2003 March - Political parties, rebels agree on new government to include nine 
members from rebel ranks. "Consensus" Prime Minister, Seydou Diarra, tasked with 
forming cabinet.  
2003 May - Armed forces sign "full" ceasefire with rebel groups to end almost eight 
months of rebellion.  
2003 July - At presidential palace ceremony military chiefs and rebels declare war is 
over.  
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2003 August - Group of suspected mercenaries and their backers detained in France; 
said to have planned to assassinate President Gbagbo.  
2003 September - Rebels accuse President Gbagbo of failing to honour peace 
agreement and pull out of unity government.  
2004 March - Deadly clashes during crackdown on opposition rally against President 
Gbagbo in Abidjan. The former ruling party - the Ivory Coast Democratic Party 
(PDCI) pulls out of the government, accusing President Gbagbo of "destabilising the 
peace process". First contingent of UN peacekeeping force deployed.  
2004 May - UN report says March's opposition rally was used as pretext for planned 
operation by security forces. Report says more than 120 people were killed and 
alleges summary executions, torture.  
2004 November - Outbreak of hostilities: Ivorian air force attacks rebels; French 
forces enter the fray after nine of their soldiers are killed in an air strike. Violent anti-
French protests ensue. UN imposes arms embargo.  
2004 December - Parliament passes key reforms envisaged under 2003 peace accord, 
including abolishing need for president to have Ivorian mother and father.  
2005 April - Government, rebels declare an "immediate and final end" to hostilities. 
The move follows talks in South Africa.  
2005 June - Massacres in western town of Duekoue.  
2005 October - Planned elections are shelved as President Gbagbo invokes a law 
which he says allows him to stay in power.  
2005 December - Economist Charles Konan Banny is nominated as Prime Minister by 
peace mediators. He is expected to disarm militias, rebels and organise elections.  
2006 January - Supporters of President Gbagbo take to the streets in Abidjan to 
protest against what they see as UN interference in the internal affairs of Ivory Coast. 
Ruling party (FPI) says it is pulling out of transitional government and peace process.  
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